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Abstract  
The objective of the 2nd Forum of the European Net-
work for Energy Economics Research ENER is to 
stimulate the discussion and exchange of knowledge 
on the progress, barriers, difficulties and prospects of 
the implementation of the EU Electricity and Gas 
Directives, among relevant stakeholders, such as 
governments, energy companies, regulators, TSOs 
and consumers, in EU and Accession countries. 
The Forum meetings also aim at strengthening the 
links between national centres in energy/environ-
mental policy and economics research, in particular 
with those in Accession countries. In total four Fo-
rums will be held on different topics that are relevant 
for the EU. The Thematic Network project ENER, 
co-ordinated by FhG-ISI, brings together sixteen 
institutes from different EU Member States, Candi-
date countries and Switzerland.  
The Bulletin presents the results of the discussions 
in the following sessions: 
• Session 1: The Internal Electricity Market: Im-
plementation of the EU Directives 
• Session 2: Implementation of the electricity 
market liberalisation in the EU accession coun-
tries 
• Session 3: Implementation of gas directive 
• Session 4: Green and clean electricity 
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The European Network for Energy Eco-
nomics Research (ENER)  
Energy policies, traditionally national preserves, have 
become increasingly determined in international areas, 
and nowhere more so than in the European Union. In 
view of these movements towards more international 
and more environmentally responsive energy policies, 
researchers from IEFE (Institute of Energy Economics, 
Bocconi University, Milan), IEPE (Institute of Energy 
Policy and Economics, University of Grenoble), and 
SPRU (Science and Technology Policy Research, 
University of Sussex) made a cooperation agreement in 
September 1985 to promote better communication 
among the groups and stimulate joint research activi-
ties. Since then the activities of the Network have been 
financially supported by the European Commission's 
Directorates General for Energy and for Research.  
ENER has since then grown to include FhG/ISI 
(Fraunhofer Institute of Systems and Innovation Re-
search, Karlsruhe) in 1988, CEEETA (Centre for the 
Economic Study of Energy, Transport and the Envi-
ronment, Lisbon) in 1989, GIEE (Inter University 
Group on Energy Studies, Madrid) in 1992. In 1995, 
the Systems Analysis Department of Risø National 
Laboratory, Roskilde, the Policy Study Unit of the 
Netherlands Energy Research Foundation (ECN), Pet-
ten, and the Study Centre on Technology, Energy and 
Environment (STEM, University of Antwerpen) joined 
the network. Lund University, Department of Envi-
ronmental and Energy System Studies became a mem-
ber in 1996, the Institute of Energy Economics at the 
Vienna Technical University (IEW) in 1997. 
With the current series of Forums the ENER Net-
work is opening up to the accession countries with 
participants from Poland (Polish Foundation for En-
ergy Efficiency FEWE Center in Krakow / University 
of Mining and Metallurgy UMM), Czech Republic 
(SRC International CS), Hungary (Energia Klub), 
Romania (Institute of Power Studies and Design ISPE) 
and to Switzerland (Centre for Energy Policy and Eco-
nomics CEPE). 
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Preface 
The objective of the Forum of the European Network 
for Energy Economics Research ENER is to create a 
debate between relevant stakeholders in academia, 
governments, industry and NGOs in important fields in 
relation to energy, climate change and economics. It 
also aims at strengthening the links between national 
centres in energy/environment policy and economics 
research in particular with Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries in view of their accession to the EU. It 
is hoped that the common activities with the partner 
institutes in those countries as well as with stake-
holders participating in the events organised by ENER 
will contribute to continued co-operation in the same 
way as the one initiated among ENER institutes in the 
current EU Member States one decade ago. 
For this purpose, a Thematic Network was set up, 
financially supported by DG Research under the 
ENERGIE Programme. The Thematic Network co-
ordinated by the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and 
Innovation Research FhG-ISI/Germany gathers 16 
institutes from EU Member Countries, Central and 
Eastern European Accession Countries and Switzer-
land, which bring in their skills and experiences in both 
qualitative and model-based analyses. Within the The-
matic Network, four ENER Forums are to be held, all 
of which in the EU accession countries, under the 
common theme of Paths for Energy Policy between 
Policy Challenges and Market Domination. 
The first ENER Forum 1 was held in Krakow, Po-
land, February 2001 on the topic Integrating the Kyoto 
Mechanisms into the National Framework. The pro-
ceedings of the ENER Forum 1 can be found in the 
previous ENER Bulletin. 
The current ENER Bulletin contains the proceedings 
of the ENER Forum 2 held in Prague, the Czech Re-
public, November 2001 on the topic Monitoring the 
progress of the implementation of the EU Gas and 
Electricity Directives: Are European markets becom-
ing competitive? 
The Electricity Directive 96/92/EC has been an 
important stimulus for significant market and 
regulatory dynamics that are still unfolding across 
greater Europe. Electricity production in the EU has for 
decades been based on monopoly production and 15 
separate, national markets. Over time, and due largely 
to technological change, it became increasingly clear 
that it was possible to permit competition to develop in 
this industry, like any other, whilst still maintaining 
essential and basic public policy and service 
objectives. Some countries, for example the United 
Kingdom and much of Scandinavian, made this change 
some years ago. For most EU countries, however, and 
for the EU as a whole, the Directive’s implementation 
deadline of 19 February 1999 marks the date that a 
competitive regulatory framework becomes the norm, 
not the exception, for electricity trade and production 
across the EU. Opening up electricity production to competition is 
an important tool to improve the efficiency of the elec-
tricity production industry and thereby to benefit 
electricity consumers. This is of fundamental 
importance given the climate change commitments, 
given the climate change commitments, which the EU 
entered into at Kyoto1. 
Likewise, for the European gas sector, the 
implementation date of 10 August 2000 for the Gas 
Directive 98/30/EC is a milestone in what has been a 
very long process of creating a single market for 
natural gas. Customer choice is the key in opening up 
European gas markets to competition as it will allow 
consumers to look for lower prices and better service. 
New entrants into the gas market will provide new 
opportunities to the advantage of customers. 
Liberalisation of the gas markets is a very important 
tool that contributes to the development of the Euro-
pean economy towards its goals of efficiency and 
competitiveness in an ever-increasing global market 
place2 . 
The objective of the ENER Forum 2 has been to 
stimulate the discussion and exchange of knowledge on 
the progress, barriers, difficulties and prospects of the 
implementation of the EU Electricity and Gas Direc-
tives, among relevant stakeholders, such as govern-
ments, energy companies, regulators, TSOs and con-
sumers, in EU Member and EU Accession Countries. 
In three sessions, the participants addressed a range 
of issues related to the implementation of EU Electric-
ity and Gas directives in the EU Member States and 
Accession Countries. In addition, in a fourth session, 
they discussed green and clean electricity issues in the 
context of the energy market opening.  
The ENER Bulletin provides the text of most of pa-
pers presented during the two days of the ENER Forum 
2 and also the summaries and major conclusions from 
the individual sessions. All presentations are available 
in PowerPoint from the ENER Internet site: 
www.eu.fhg.de/ENER/Enerhome.htm 
                                                           
1 Opening to choice: The single electricity market. Luxem-
bourg: Eur-OP, 2000, 22 p. 
2 Opening up to Choice: The Single Electricity Market. 
Luxembourg: Eur-OP, 1999. 21 p. 
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Opening speeches 
 
 
Opening of the ENER Forum 2 
Jan Pouček, Head of Energy Policy Department, Min-
istry of Industry and Trade, the Czech Republic 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
 
It is my great pleasure to welcome you to Prague and 
to open the second ENER Forum on behalf of the Min-
istry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic on 
also to welcome you in premises of our Ministry. 
   The Czech Republic, on its process of accession to 
the European Union, welcomes and appreciates possi-
bilities for further and deeper co-operation with the 
European Commission, institutions and organisations 
both from the EU countries and from other accession 
countries.  
The energy sector plays a very important role in na-
tional economies of these countries, in their foreign 
trade, and also in international co-operation and global-
isation. The European Commission in its Green Paper 
of 2000 expressed its concern about the security of 
energy supply, which becomes even more serious after 
the incident of the 11 September in the United States. 
The European Network for Energy Economics Re-
search, with its 17-year old history and experience, is 
an important link in this process. We appreciate that 
the ENER Network has been opened to participation of 
institutions from accession countries, and it is a great 
honour for us that Prague has been chosen for organis-
ing the second ENER Forum meeting with so impor-
tant topic as the progress of an implementation of the 
EU Gas and Electricity Directives. 
I would like to use this opportunity and present you a 
brief review of the progress the Czech Republic has 
reached in the field of modern energy policy imple-
mentation and liberalisation of the energy market. 
The Czech Energy Policy was approved by the Gov-
ernment in January 2000. The policy is based on the 
same objectives as the energy policy of the EU. It 
emphasises the requirement for security of energy 
supply, protection of the environment while respecting 
the principles of sustainable development and also 
support to the competitiveness of the national econ-
omy. 
The main strategic objective of our Energy Policy is 
the determination of the basic concept of the long-term 
development of the energy sector and specification of 
necessary legislative, institutional and economic 
frameworks that would motivate energy companies to 
introduce the environment-friendly behaviour. 
At present, when the current Energy Policy had been 
in power for nearly 2 years, our Ministry prepared the 
first monitoring paper. The review of the individual 
steps made in last 2 years shows that we are on the 
right track to meeting major targets and indicators. 
There is no need for making changes in the valid en-
ergy policy.  
What could be underlined is the fact that we had suc-
ceeded to prepare 2 new fundamental acts related to the 
energy sector that were approved by the Czech Parlia-
ment last year and that have been in full power since 
January 2001. The Energy Act and the Energy Man-
agement Act and Decrees and Regulations issued to 
these acts are in full concordance with the valid EU 
legislation in this field. 
I call your attention especially to the issue of the en-
ergy market liberalisation, the main theme of this Fo-
rum. 
The Czech Energy Act states that natural persons and 
corporate bodies may do business on the territory of 
the Czech Republic only on the basis of the state’s 
consent, which is a licence issued by the Energy Regu-
latory Office. The licence is issued for a period of at 
least 25 years for generation of electricity and produc-
tion/import of gas, transmission of electricity and gas, 
distribution of electricity and gas, storage of gas, pro-
duction and distribution of heat. In addition, licences 
are also issued for trade in electricity and gas for a 
period for at least 5 years.  
The Act, furthermore, stipulates detailed terms for 
the issuance of licences, the position and responsibility 
of the responsible representative, requirements for the 
application of a licence, the procedure of the Energy 
Regulation Office during the issuance of a licence, the 
rights and obligations of licence holders and the obli-
gation to supply beyond the framework of the licence, 
including a possible related proven losses and the fund 
established to cover such losses. 
For selected kinds of investments the Energy Act in-
troduced a state authorisation. It concerns construction 
of power generation units with output of 30 MW and 
more, construction of direct electricity lines, direct gas 
pipelines, underground gas reservoirs, gas pipelines 
connecting the inland gas network with foreign gas 
systems, selected gas pipelines and heat production 
units with the total thermal output of 30 MW and more. 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade decides about the 
issuance, change, prolongation and cancellation of the 
state authorisation for construction. Authorisations are 
issued for corporate bodies and natural persons if they 
demonstrate their compliance with the conditions 
stated in the Energy Act.  
I would like to emphasise that the Energy Act is en-
tirely non-discriminatory towards foreign persons – 
they have the same rights and obligations as domestic 
ones. 
Regarding the opening of the energy market, the start 
of the opening and its speed differs by sector. The 
market for coal and coal products, as well as for all 
types of oil products, has been opened some years ago, 
and the prices of these products are fully driven by the 
market and are not regulated.  
In case of the electricity market, the Energy Act 
stipulates the position, rights and obligations of elec-
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tricity market participants, i.e. operator of transmission 
system, operators of distribution systems, technical 
dispatch centers, electricity market operator, eligible 
and protected customers and electricity traders. 
The Energy Act stipulates (§ 21) that opening of the 
market on the territory of the Czech Republic will be 
organised on the basis of regulated access to the trans-
mission system and the distribution systems and the 
possibility to construct electricity generation units and 
direct lines on the basis of the state authorisation. 
Prices for transmission and distribution of electricity, 
system services and for protected customers will be 
regulated by the Energy Regulation Office.  
The electricity market will be opened gradually as 
follows: 
• From 1 January 2002 the electricity market will be 
opened to end users whose consumption of elec-
tricity related to one consumption place, including 
generation for their own consumption, exceeds 40 
GWh either in 2000 or in the period from 1 July 
2000 to 30 June 2001; the right for regulated ac-
cess to networks will be also granted to licence 
holders for generation of electricity with the in-
stalled capacity more than 10 MW; 
• From 1 January 2003 the electricity market will be 
opened to end users whose consumption of elec-
tricity related to one consumption place, including 
generation for their own consumption, exceeds 9 
GWh in 2001 or in the period from 1 July 2001 to 
30 June 2002; the right for regulated access to 
networks will also be granted to all licence holders 
for generation of electricity; 
• From 1 January 2005 the electricity market will be 
opened to all end users of electricity supplied from 
higher than low voltage networks whose consump-
tion related to one consumption place, including 
generation for their own consumption, exceeds 
100 MWh in 2003 or in the period from 1 July 
2003 to 30 June 2004; and finally 
• From 1 January 2006 the electricity market will be 
opened to all end users. 
Additional procedures of privatisation of the electric-
ity sector were approved by the Czech Government in 
October 2000. The privatisation consultant has been 
chosen to help the Government in preparation of the 
tender and evaluation of the offers. At present, the 
process of privatisation is ongoing. 
Opening of the gas market has also been prepared. 
The Energy Act stipulates that opening of the market 
on the territory of the Czech Republic is organised on 
the basis of agreed access to the transmission system 
and regulated access to distribution systems and on the 
basis of authorised access to the construction of se-
lected gas facilities. The gas market will be opened 
gradually as follows: 
• From 1 January 2005 the gas market will be 
opened within the scope of at least 28% of the to-
tal annual consumption of gas in the Czech Repub-
lic. The right to selection of the gas supplier will 
have those licence holders that use gas for genera-
tion of electricity in thermal power plants or for 
co-generation within the scope of their consump-
tion for such generation, eligible customers and li-
cence holders for distribution of gas within the 
scope stated in the implementing regulation, how-
ever, as a minimum eligible customers whose pur-
chase of gas in the previous calendar year meas-
ured in one consumption place is higher than 15 
million m3; 
• From 10 August 2008 the gas market will be 
opened within the scope of 33% of the total annual 
consumption of gas in the Czech Republic. The 
right to select the gas supplier will have those li-
cence holders that use gas for generation of elec-
tricity in thermal power plants or for co-generation 
within the scope of their consumption for such 
generation, eligible customers and licence holders 
for distribution of gas within the scope stated in 
the implementing legal regulation, however, as a 
minimum eligible customers whose purchase of 
gas in the previous calendar year measured in one 
consumption place is higher than 5 million m3. 
The furtherance of the privatisation of the gas sector 
was approved by the Government of the Czech Repub-
lic in November 2000. The privatisation consultant was 
selected which is helping the Government in prepara-
tion of the tender and in evaluation of individual offers. 
As in case of the power sector, the process of gas sec-
tor privatisation is also ongoing at present. 
I would like to inform you that the new Czech en-
ergy legislation divides the responsibilities for the 
exercise of public administration between various 
public authority bodies. The Ministry of Industry and 
Trade is mainly involved in development of the energy 
policy, in issuing the state authorisation for building 
new energy facilities and for fulfilment of the obliga-
tions resulting from the international agreements and 
treaties. The Energy Regulatory Office was established 
as a fully independent authority to exercise the regula-
tion in the energy (i.e., power and gas) sectors. The 
State Energy Inspection Board is supervising whether 
activities in energy sector are fulfilled in accordance 
with provisions of the Energy Act and the Energy 
Management Act and relevant orders. 
During this year the necessary Orders of the Ministry 
of the Industry and Trade and the Energy Regulatory 
Office as well as Regulations of Government have 
being issued for the proper implementation of provi-
sions of the new energy acts. Simultaneously the nec-
essary organisational changes and setting new institu-
tional framework has been done. 
At present, we are sure that the preparation of our 
energy sector and public administration is successfully 
completed for opening the electricity market from the 
beginning of the next year. 
Simultaneously, we have done plenty of work to 
adapt the whole Czech legislation in such a way that it 
complies with the EU legislation in this field. We hope 
that within the negotiation on our accession to the EU, 
the energy chapter will be successfully closed before 
the end of current year.  
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In my opinion, there can be a simple answer to the 
fundamental question – Is the Czech energy market 
becoming competitive in compliance with the EU 
Electricity and Gas Directives? – we can answer: 
• YES, the market is fully competitive in case of 
coal and oil products and heat, 
• YES, the market will step by step become com-
petitive starting since 2002 in case of electricity; 
and  
• YES, the market will step by step become com-
petitive starting 2005 in case of gas. 
 
Ladies and Gentlemen,  
We believe that the ENER Forum in Prague will be 
very helpful and useful in transferring know-how in 
issues connected with competitiveness of the energy 
markets. We are sure that exchange of meanings and 
experiences among distinguish participants of the Fo-
rum could facilitate the wider and faster opening of 
energy markets. We are looking forward to hearing 
new ideas and recommendations that will help us solv-
ing or overcoming some issues related to this matter. 
I wish all of you a successful meeting and pleasant 
stay in Prague. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market opening in EU countries, Norway and Switzerland as of 1 January 2002 
 
Electricity Market Opening in Europe
full (100%)   (6)
advanced (30%-100%)   (6)
minimum due to EU directive (30%)   (4)
Europe
 
From Haas and Auer, Introducing competition in the Western European electricity market: A critical review, Fig. 1 
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European Research Area: scien-
tific basis for EU decision-
making: The case of energy and 
environment policies 
Domenico Rossetti di Valdalbero, European Com-
mission, DG Research3 
 
Keywords. European Research Area, Energy socio-
economic research, European policy-making. 
 
Abstract. The European decisions in the field of energy 
and environment need to have a scientific reference. The 
methods and tools (models) developed in the EU energy 
socio-economic research, particularly in the 5th EU RTD 
Framework Programme, provide the support to many deci-
sions related to energy security of supply, greenhouse gas 
emission trading within the EU, internalisation of external 
costs, renewables targets and energy taxation. 
Introduction  
European decision-makers often tend to support their 
choices on a scientific base. Whether it is a renewable 
electricity target, an energy tax, a quantified objective 
to reduce greenhouse gases emissions, a voluntary 
agreement between public authorities and industries, 
a state aid exception for clean energies or a standard 
for energy efficiency, an evaluation of the impacts of 
the adopted measure will be requested by policy-
makers. 
The Communications Towards a European Re-
search Area4, Making a reality of the ERA: guide-
lines for EU research activities (2002-2006)5 and the 
Amended proposals concerning the specific pro-
grammes implementing the 6th FP for RTD&D activi-
ties6 respectively insist on “Developing the research 
needed for political decisions…”, “Support for pol-
icy-making and European scientific reference sys-
tem…” and “Underpin the formulation and imple-
mentation of Community policies…”. 
The EU energy socio-economic research 
In the 5th EU RTD&D FP, together with “technologi-
cal” research which includes hundreds of projects 
aiming at promoting new and clean energy and envi-
ronment technologies, improving quality of life, 
boosting growth, competitiveness and employment, 
“socio-economic research” in the Energy, Environ-
ment and Sustainable Development programme pro-
vides the scientific basis for energy and environment-
related policy formulation. In particular, for the en-
ergy part by: 
                                                           
3 The views presented in this paper do not necessarily 
reflect the European Commission official positions and the 
author alone assume the responsibility for the contents. 
4 COM(2000)6 
5 COM(2000)612 
6 COM(2002)43 
• The elaboration of scenarios for energy supply 
and demand technologies and their interaction, 
and the analysis of cost effectiveness (based on 
full life cycle costs) and efficiency of all energy 
sources; 
• The socio-economic aspects related to energy 
within the perspective of sustainable develop-
ment (the impact on society, the economy and 
employment). 
The majority of EU energy socio-economic re-
search projects makes the links between energy and 
environment and addresses the issues of natural re-
sources, economic growth and social needs including 
both market competition and environmental con-
straints, top-down and bottom-up approaches.  
The research tools and their policy applica-
tions 
Some examples of tools and assessment methods 
developed by EU researchers and used for European 
policy-making (Energy, Environment, Competition 
and Taxation) could be presented. This was particu-
larly the case with the projects related to: 
• POLES and PRIMES, a world and European 
energy model that have been and are being 
considered as part of the scientific references for 
the: 
− * Energy projections (2020 and 2030) and 
the impacts of fuel taxation on technology in 
the Green paper on energy security of sup-
ply7; 
− * Economic effects of a EU-wide emission 
trading in the Proposal for a directive estab-
lishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emis-
sion allowance trading within the Commu-
nity8; 
− * World energy, technology and climate out-
look – 2030 that will be published by the 
European Commission at the end of 2002. 
• ExternE, a green accounting framework giving 
the monetary valuation of the socio-
environmental damages for the electricity (and 
partly for transport) fuels and technologies. If 
various recent EU documents like the Sixth Envi-
ronment Action Programme9 or the White Paper 
on European transport policy for 201010 clearly 
insist on the need to internalise external costs, 
the Community guidelines on State aid for envi-
ronmental protection11 give a concrete figure for 
a specific case: “Member States may grant oper-
ating aid to new plants producing renewable en-
ergy that will be calculated on the basis of the 
external costs avoided (…). At any event, the 
                                                           
7 COM(2000)769 
8 COM(2001)581 
9 COM (2001)31 
10 COM (2001)370 
11 OJEC, C 37 (3/2/2001) 
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amount of the aid thus granted to the renewable 
energy producer must not exceed 5 Euro cents 
per kWh”. 
• SAFIRE, a computer based framework providing 
an indication for setting national targets for elec-
tricity from renewable energy sources (the objec-
tive is to double –from 6 to 12%- the share of re-
newables in the gross inland energy consump-
tion, i.e. to pass from 14% today to 22% in 2010 
of the electricity produced from renewables). 
These assessments were used for the White Pa-
per on renewable sources of energy12, for the 
Proposal for a directive13 and finally for the Di-
rective on the promotion of electricity produced 
from renewable energy sources in the internal 
electricity market14. 
• GEM–E3, a general equilibrium model which 
has already given the evaluation of the economic 
and environmental impacts of energy taxation 
(cf. Proposal for a directive restructuring the 
Community framework for the taxation of energy 
products15). GEM-E3 could provide future indi-
cations on the economic and environmental im-
pacts of the changes, which an introduction of a 
more harmonised tax regime at the EU level 
would entail, and the consequences of an inter-
nalisation of external costs as mentioned in the 
EU strategy for Sustainable Development16. 
Conclusions 
Various recent European documents mention the 
need of research for policy-making. The 6th EU 
RTD&D FP in preparation expects to have specific 
activities covering a wider field of research including 
the part dedicated to “Supporting policies and antici-
pating scientific and technological needs” (570 M€ 
for the 2002-2006 period). 
Energy and environment are not the only covered 
policies but they are key issues in the EU agenda, 
particularly considering the focus on sustainable 
development (cf. Göteborg European Council, 15 and 
16 June 2001) and the importance of energy at the 
Barcelona summit (15 and 16 February 2002). 
Many quantitative tools have been developed in the 
past thanks to the European research (non nuclear 
energy programme). For the future, European policy-
makers need to have updated and improved European 
and world models (endogenous technological change, 
other Kyoto greenhouse gases, demand side, Central 
and Eastern European Countries…). New energy 
systems should be built to take into consideration 
very-long term problems such as resource depletion, 
                                                           
12 COM(97)599 
13 COM (2000)279 
14 OJEC, L 283 (27/10/2001) 
15 COM(97)30 
16 COM(2001)264 
climate change and radioactive waste management. 
Emerging subjects like the externalities of energy 
security of supply, the evaluation of ecosystem dam-
ages (cf. environmental liability); the sustainable 
development (cf. Johannesburg); the regional impacts 
of infrastructure changes (cf. hydrogen economy) or 
the assessment of a “Kyoto II” should be covered by 
European research. 
Glossary 
 
ERA European Research Area 
EU European Union 
FP Framework Programme 
RTD&D Research, Technological Development 
and Demonstration 
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Session 1:  The Internal Electricity Market: Implementation of the EU 
Directives  
Rapporteur’s Summary by Eugene D. Cross, ECN Policy Studies, The Netherlands 
 
 
Session One was comprised of four presentations and 
related discussions on the broad theme of the develop-
ment of the European electricity market in light of the 
Commission’s proposals to amend the existing Elec-
tricity and Gas Directives.17 The underlying effort was 
to gain a more definitive assessment of the conse-
quences of the liberalisation in the electricity sector 
and to identify topics for further inquiry.  Following 
the two initial presentations of the relevant views of 
European Commission and of Eurelectric, a lively 
debate was stimulated by the critical review offered by 
Hans Auer and Richard Haas of the Vienna University 
of Technology. The session was capped nicely by an 
useful presentation by Clemens Cremer (FhG-ISI) of 
the options and potentials for cross-border electricity 
transfers. 
The session took a pan-European perspective, for the 
most part, and it was open-ended in the sense that it 
formed a basis for subsequent discussions in the after-
noon (on national implementation in the CEECs) and 
on the following day (on gas markets and green 
power).  
Patrick Rousseaux, representing the Directorate 
General for Energy and Transport (DG TREN) of the 
European Commission, presented an overview and a 
defence of the proposals as published in March 2001 to 
amend and supplement the Electricity and Gas Direc-
tives. The Commission’s view is that these further 
measures are justified for three main reasons: (1) con-
ditions are right for a further opening of the market, (2) 
most MS are opening further anyway, and (3) The 
European Heads of State and Government requested a 
further opening at their meeting in Lisbon on 23 and 24 
March 2000. .  
Mr. Rousseaux noted that a public hearing was held 
on 14 September 2000 in Brussels to assess the opinion 
of the stakeholders.  For the electricity sector, he re-
ported that there was general agreement at that time on 
the need for a strengthening of the requirements for 
unbundling.  At present, there is often not “real unbun-
dling” of the transmission system operator (TSO) in 
several Member States, meaning that the risk remains 
that the TSO can favour related generating companies 
in its despatching function.  Regarding common rules 
on the duties and functions of regulators, he reported a 
general consensus in favour of new requirements, 
                                                           
17 The Commission’s proposals, first published in March 
2001, consisted originally of two documents: (1) Proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and natu-
ral gas; and (2) Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on conditions for access to the 
network for cross-border exchanges in electricity.  Several 
subsequent  proposals to amend the Electricity Directive have 
been made available unofficially during 2001 and 2002. 
given that almost all Member States have established 
separate regulatory authorities. Only Austria and Ger-
many were lacking an electricity regulator in Septem-
ber 2000, but Austria has subsequently established one 
as well. Regarding new provisions on public service 
obligations (PSOs), he noted that the Commission was 
seeking a requirement for “universal service” (an obli-
gation to supply to all at reasonable prices) and better 
protection of customer rights (e.g. clear contractual 
terms, not just boilerplate protection for utilities).   
As pointed out by the Commission in its communica-
tion of March 2001,18 the proposal to amend the Elec-
tricity and Gas Directives can be divided into quantita-
tive proposals and qualitative proposals. The quantita-
tive proposals include a timetable for all electricity and 
natural gas customers, regardless of their size, to be 
able to choose their suppliers freely. In the electricity 
sector, all non-household customers would therefore be 
able to choose freely as of 1 January 2003, with full 
market opening two years later. In the natural gas sec-
tor, the proposed deadline for market opening for non-
domestic users is one year later (1 January 2004), but 
all gas customers should be free by 1 January 2005 
(convergent 100% opening of electricity and gas mar-
kets).19 The qualitative proposals concern the mini-
mum obligations regarding access to the network, 
consumer protection, regulation, security of supply, 
and the unbundling of the transmission and distribution 
function in integrated gas and electricity companies.   
Regarding the proposed EU regulation on cross-
border trade in electricity, Mr. Rousseaux observed 
that the Florence Forum has not been able to reach 
consensus on a cross-border tariff mechanism and that 
other elements are missing. The document drafted by 
the Commission proposes three different types of 
measures: 
1) establishing compensation mechanisms for flows 
of electricity; 
2) defining harmonised principles for cross-border 
transmission tariffs; and 
3) allocating available interconnection capacity be-
tween national transmission networks. 
Following Mr. Rousseaux’s presentation, general 
concerns were expressed by certain participants over 
                                                           
18 Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament – Completing the internal energy 
market, COM/2001/0125 final. 
19 This proposed time schedule for market opening was 
subsequently adjusted at the Barcelona Summit of the Euro-
pean Council, held on 15-16 March 2002, where the Council 
and the European Parliament were urged to adopt a proposal 
for the market opening of both electricity and gas, including 
freedom of choice of suppliers for all non-household con-
sumers as of 2004.  
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the application of the proposed draft directive to the 
accession countries, and the related position of the 
Commission regarding transition periods (normally not 
allowed). In addition, Dominique Finon (IEPE, CNRS) 
raised the specific issue of the need to achieve some 
EU standardisation of power exchanges, given that 
there are significant problems with co-ordination of 
auctions at borders (e.g., to allow a French supplier to 
effectively bid into the Dutch market, while using the 
Belgian grid).  
Inge Pierre, representing Eurelectric, reviewed the 
position of the European electricity sector. He noted 
the on-going and challenging work in defining pro-
posed rules on CHP, including the effort to conduct a 
dialogue and reach consensus on criteria for determin-
ing “quality CHP”.  The European Commission has 
promised a directive on CHP, and it must take into 
account various national systems of promoting CHP 
(e.g. quota-based market mechanisms).  
The critical and provocative review offered by Hans 
Auer, Richard Haas and Michael Stadler of the Vienna 
University of Technology on the status of competition 
in the European electricity sector provided the basis for 
a lively discussion.  Rather than one market, there are 
at least five virtually separate electricity markets in 
greater Europe, and perhaps more (Auer). There are 
problems with insufficient unbundling, as well as vari-
ous concerns with the structure and impact of transmis-
sion pricing (e.g. resulting in a decline in investments 
and of the quality of the transmission grid) (Auer).  
Concerns were also expressed about the merger and 
acquisition trends, i.e., that an EU electricity  “cartel of 
3 or 4 really dominant players” could develop and 
would have sufficient market power to manipulate 
prices (Auer).  Hence, in five years, we may have  
solved problems with unbundling and market opening, 
only to find that we are left with a few strong players 
(Auer).   
Regarding mergers, such concerns were acknowl-
edged to be important, but such a pessimistic outlook is 
perhaps not necessary, given that new generation will 
come on-line from various sources (Rousseaux).  
Moreover, Nordpool demonstrates that even when 
there’s a dominant position (of 50%) in Sweden, as 
soon as there is competition from other sources, Vat-
tenfall cannot set the price (Finon).  And competition 
and regulatory authorities are present and can maintain 
the ‘game of competition’ (Finon). The German situa-
tion, where there is no regulator and unclear rules, 
should be viewed as exceptional within the EU, and 
when corrected, the game of competition can work. 
(Finon). Notwithstanding this view, it is arguable that 
companies the size of EdF and EON cannot be forced 
to offer plant on the day-ahead market (Auer).  We are 
close to a situation where large suppliers could ma-
nipulate the price, perhaps in a dry year (Auer).   
The head of the Hungarian energy office, Mr. Kader-
jak, responded on a positive note that no company at 
present could increase profits by curtailing sales. It is a 
possible future threat, but not yet the case. Competition 
is really likely in one or two years, he stated, and Aus-
tria, for example, must fear the onset of competition 
since they are closing borders.   
On the issue of the application of reciprocity clauses 
to block imports, Mr. Auer stated that Austria was not 
a large player in this respect, and has excess capacity 
and significant hydropower, such that it was not an 
issue for most Austrian utilities. However, he noted 
concerns in Italy and Slovenia.  Miha Tomsic (Slove-
nia) suggested that the impact of the convergence of 
market opening in gas and electricity was significant, 
noting that cross-border bottlenecks in electricity trade 
could perhaps be overcome through development of 
the gas transport network.   
In a final presentation for the session, Mr. Cremer 
presented future patterns of electricity trade that could 
take place under several scenarios as modelled by their 
team.  The question of the impact of wind power de-
velopments (P. Grohnheit from Riso National Labora-
tory), and of ecotax issues (Finon) on the reference 
case were raised and addressed.   
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Introducing competition in the 
Western European electricity 
market: A critical review 
Reinhard Haas, Hans Auer, Michael Stadler, Energy 
Economics Group, Vienna University of Technology, 
Austria. 
 
Keywords. Liberalisation, Competition, ESI, Western 
Europe 
 
Abstract. In Western Europe restructuring of the electricity 
supply industry (ESI) is (currently still) widely accepted and 
considered to be successful so far. Yet, the expectation of 
lasting cheap electricity is based on very simplified assump-
tions on the strategic behaviour of electricity generators and 
network operators. Straightforward, we are convinced that 
there are a lot of barriers for effective competition which will 
lead to highly volatile and rapidly increasing wholesale 
electricity prices. The major conclusion is that we are far 
away from a simple solution to achieve competition in a 
unique European electricity market. There are too many 
possible barriers in the whole supply chain which makes it 
unlikely that real competition in the European electricity 
market will ever take place! 
Introduction 
The directive of the European Commission on a com-
mon electricity market has triggered the liberalisation 
process in Western Europe. The three major items of 
this directive are: 
• free choice of supplier for eligible customers and 
corresponding dates for eligibility (= schedule for 
minimal degree of market opening); 
• unbundling of vertically integrated utilities into 
generation, transmission (TM) and supply; 
• models for access to the grid 
Yet the implementation of these features is described 
only very superficial. Especially, with respect to trans-
boundary issues clear guidelines are missing. This led 
to the following major points of criticism: 
• The guidelines for unbundling are to weak to en-
sure a separation of grid operation and generation 
sufficient to avoid market power over the grid; 
• There are no basic principles and no clear regula-
tory requirements for TM pricing and access to the 
grid; 
• No general rules for transboundary electricity 
exchange (if anything can be set by the EC only it 
is the condition for cross-border electricity trade) 
• Customer discrimination: No deadline exists for 
100% degree of market opening; 
Anyway, competition in Western Europe has started 
and the restructuring of the ESI is (currently still) 
widely accepted and considered to be successful by 
and large. The major reason for this is that prices have 
dropped – at least for large industrial customers – and 
the expectation that enduring low prices will prevail 
over the next years. 
Yet, surprisingly also in Europe up to now only few 
investigations exist on the conditions necessary for 
long-term competition in electricity markets. As has 
been argued by the authors already years ago – e.g. 
Haas et al (1997) and Haas/Auer (2001) – the expecta-
tion of lasting cheap electricity is based on very simpli-
fied assumptions on the strategic behaviour of electric-
ity generators and network operators. 
In this paper it is argued that many issues are cur-
rently neglected, which may lead to tremendous back-
lashes for competition in Western Europe. Straightfor-
ward, we are convinced that these backlashes will lead 
to highly volatile and rapidly increasing wholesale 
electricity prices. 
The following barriers for effective competition are 
analysed in detail:  
• How does geographically and timely different 
market opening affect competition? 
• What are the problems and setbacks due to insuffi-
cient unbundling? 
• How does an incorrect operation of and access to 
the grid affect competition? 
• Which transboundary obstacles impact competi-
tion? 
• Does the number of electricity generators develop 
in a favourable way for competition? 
• What are the future perspectives for the ESI in 
Western Europe? 
Requirements for effective competition 
The European debate on restructuring of the ESI is 
sometimes confusing. The terms “deregulation”, “lib-
eralisation” and “competition” are mixed up very of-
ten. Another major contradiction and misleading per-
ception is that deregulation means “privatisation”. 
In the following the most important basic principles 
for introducing competition are summarised. It is im-
portant to note that also the following order in which 
the different elements have to be introduced is impor-
tant! 
Conduct correct unbundling!  
Competition requires the separation of parts of the ESI 
where competition is possible and parts where it is not, 
see Fig. 4. Currently, in generation and supply compe-
tition is pursued while the TM and distribution grids 
remain natural monopolies. The separation of electric-
ity generators and the TM grid is important because of 
two reasons: 
• to guarantee that potential new generators are not 
discriminated from access to the grid and  
• to avoid cross-subsidization of generation by TM; 
• to make correct pricing and access rules to the grid 
possible. 
Introduce competition! 
The basic principle of competition is that so many 
companies are competing that it is not possible for a 
single company to influence the market price and to 
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exert market power. Hence, for real competition a large 
number of generators and suppliers is necessary to 
bring electricity prices down to marginal costs of gen-
eration. Moreover, excess capacities are required to 
make competition possible. 
Yet, if utilities are mainly investor-owned (e.g. UK 
and U.S.), then, if something like liberalisation is under 
discussion they start to merge immediately and ulti-
mately head towards virtual monopolies charging mo-
nopoly prices, see also Haas et al (2000) and Bunn 
(1998).  
In this context mergers, acquisitions, and strategic 
alliances are important tools. What are the major rea-
sons for this development? The basic principle is: First, 
private companies merge respectively buy shares from 
each other; second, competition decreases and, third, 
the prices rise, see Fig. 12. 
In practice, e.g. only minimal shares of ownership 
held by otherwise competing utilities respectively 
joint-ventures can avoid competition.  
Liberalise the market – No discrimination! 
Liberalisation from the customers‘ point-of-view 
means that they may choose the supplier or the genera-
tor free. Of course, these choice must be possible for 
every customer! Otherwise, the group of customers 
which may choose the supplier free always has a stra-
tegic advantage and will benefit at the costs of the 
customers remaining captured.  
Do not  set up mandatory market structures! 
In a functioning electricity market an equilibrium be-
tween different types of periodical markets exists – that 
is to say, between long-term contracts, short-term mar-
kets and balance markets. Of core relevance is that it is 
possible to sign long term contracts, e.g. bilateral or by 
futures. This possibility is a core difference between 
different liberalisation models. It did neither exist in 
the “old” English pool model nor in the Californian 
electricity market. Yet, it does exist in the very well 
functioning NordPool. 
Deregulate! 
The next important step in this process is to deregulate 
and re-regulate. A typical example of deregulation is to 
abandon the regulation of electricity prices and invest-
ment recovery. Of course, this step does only make 
sense if real competition is guaranteed. Otherwise price 
deregulation may lead to a skyrocketing of electricity 
prices! 
Moreover, with respect to the transmission and the 
distribution grid it is necessary to re-regulate especially 
the prices and rights for access to the grid. 
Internalise external costs! 
It has to be ensured that all distortions that may occur 
between old and new capacities and between energy 
carriers with high externalities vs energy carriers with 
low externalities are abounded. Moreover, public ac-
ceptance of power stations and various fuel types has 
also to be taken into account. Hence, to ensure real 
competition in the long run externalities have to be 
included by proper taxes. 
Privatise? 
Eventually, the question remains whether privatisation 
contributes to more intensified competition. In our 
opinion privatisation does not mean "increase competi-
tion" but rather "strive for monopolies respectively 
oligopolies". Hence, full privatisation (100% private 
ownership) is not a condition for competition, which is 
proven impressingly by the Norwegian example. 
Distortion of competition due to geographically 
and timely different market opening 
The first major barrier for effective competition is the 
geographically and timely different opening of the 
market. It leads to customer discrimination and high 
transaction costs for transboundary electricity trade due 
to reciprocity. 
Customer discrimination is caused by the EU direc-
tive which prefers liberalisation for large customers 
and discriminates households. Due to the EU directive 
the liberalisation targets are: 
 
19 February 1999: Users taking >40 GWh/yr, or 
25% of national market 
19 February 2001: Users taking >20 GWh/yr, or 
28% of national market 
19 February 2003: Users taking >9 GWh/yr, or 
33% of national market 
2007: Review of liberalisation process 
 
Moreover, the EC announced recently that it intends 
to fully open the electricity market. Yet, this is still 
subject to approval by the member country govern-
ments and it is not clear when it will happen. 
This discrimination leads to a distortion of competi-
tion in that way that large customers get by far lower 
energy prices than private households. 
Table 1 and Fig. 1 depict the opening of the market 
in different EU member countries in 2002. Some coun-
tries like UK, Sweden, Germany, Finland, Norway and 
Austria have fully opened their market (=100 %). Oth-
ers like France, Greece, Ireland have opened only the 
minimum. 
 
Electricity Market Opening in Europe
full (100%)   (6)
advanced (30%-100%)   (6)
minimum due to EU directive (30%)   (4)
Europe
 
Fig. 1. Market opening in EU countries, Norway and 
Switzerland as of 1 January 2002. (See close-up on 
page 9). 
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Table 1. Electricity directive implementation (1 Janu-
ary 2002) in EU countries Norway and Switzerland  
Country Eligible customers Market opening 
Austria all 100% 
Belgium >100 GWh 35% (100% in 
2010) 
Denmark >10 GWh + distribu-
tors 
90% (100% in 
2002) 
Finland all 100% 
France >20 GWh (16 GWh) 30% (34% in 2003)
Germany all+distributors ? 100% 
Greece >100 GWh + others 
TBA 
>26% 
Ireland > 4 GWh 28% (32% in 2003)
Italy >9 GWh 40% 
Luxem-
bourg 
>100 GWh 45% 
Netherlands 2 MW/20 GWh + 
distrib. for elig. cust. 
33% (100% in 
2007) 
Norway all  100% 
Portugal >9 GWh + distrib. for 
8% of volume 
34% 
Spain > 1GWh 42% (100% in 
2007) 
Sweden all 100% 
Switzerland No final customers 0 % 
UK all 100% 
   
Norway (not in the EU) has already fully opened its 
market whereas in Switzerland (not in the EU) the 
market opening is 0%. 
This leads to the fact that, currently, Western Europe 
(15 EU member countries plus Norway and Switzer-
land) is still far away from a joint harmonised electric-
ity market. It consists of at least five separated markets, 
see Fig. 2. These are: 
1) UK and Ireland, 2) The Nordic countries, 3) 
Spain and Portugal, 4) Italy, and 5) Central Europe 
(France, Germany ...). 
It should be noted that, of course, these markets are 
to some extent also separated by geographical trans-
mission capacity constraints and legal issues, mainly 
limited access to the grid (especially in France and 
Germany). With respect to Italy it has to be stated that 
the connection to other countries (mainly France and 
Switzerland) is mainly due to long-term contracts. 
1
2
3
4
5
 
Fig. 2. The different separated electricity markets in 
Western Europe 
Evidence for the existence of these separated mar-
kets is given by the different wholesale electricity 
market price levels, which are depicted in Fig. 3. Prices 
over the last years have been lowest in the Nordpool 
and highest in the English pool. 
 
2
3
1
UK Pool-Price
APX Spot market pricec
en
ts
/k
W
h
4
SWEP-Price
Spanish Pool price
CCGT generation costs (gas price: 0.12 € /m³)
Nordpool-Price
  0
CCGT gen. costs (gas price: 0.09 € /m³)LPX/EEX-Price
 
Fig. 3. Range of current wholesale electricity prices 
and generation costs in different Western European 
markets 
The problem of insufficient unbundling 
The next question is: What is the state-of-the-art with 
respect to Unbundling of the Western Europe ESI? 
Correct unbundling is based on the idea that compe-
tition requires the separation of parts of the ESI where 
competition is possible and parts where it is not, see 
Fig. 4. Currently, in generation and supply competition 
is pursued while the transmission and distribution grids 
remain natural monopolies. The separation of electric-
ity generators and the transmission grid is important 
because of the following reasons: 
• to ensure that potential new generators are not 
discriminated from access to the TM grid and  
• to avoid cross-subsidization of generation by 
transmission. 
Generation
COMPETITION
Supply 
Grid
UNBUNDLING!
NO
UNBUNDLING!
REGULATED 
NATURAL 
 MONOPOLY
 
Fig. 4. Correct Unbundling of the ESI! 
Currently due to a lack of rigorous unbundling mar-
ket power of generators over the grid is a major obsta-
cle for a real competitive electricity market. Especially 
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in Germany and France it is likely that incumbent 
generators will retain market power over the transmis-
sion grid over the next years. Currently the large verti-
cally integrated German utilities make high profits with 
the grid and no profits or even losses in generation. 
The major problem in Germany is that due to private 
ownership of the large vertically (generation + trans-
mission) integrated utilities it is virtually impossible to 
achieve a rigorous unbundling. In general, the majority 
of EU countries has implemented at least legal unbun-
dling. In Scandinavia, UK and Spain separate grid 
companies exist, see Table 2 and Fig. 14. With respect 
to access to the grid only Germany has chosen negoti-
ated third party access (nTPA). Remaining EU member 
countries (incl. Norway) have implemented regulated 
third party access (rTPA), see Table 2. 
Table 2. Type of unbundling and ownership of the TM 
grid in EU member countries and Norway in 2002  
 Unbundling Ownership 
Country 2002 2002 
Austria 
Legal (APG); Man-
agement (TIWAG, 
VKW) 
3 Owners / 3 Operators 
(APG, Tiwag, VKW) 
Belgium Legal 1 1 Owner / 1 Operator (Elec-trabel) 
Denmark Legal 1 Owner / 1 Operator per Island (Eltra, Elsam) 
Finland Ownership 1 Owner / 1 Operator (Fin-grid) 
France Management 1 Owner / 1 Operator (RTE)
Germany Management Many Owners / Many Op-erators  
Greece n.a. 1 Owner / 1 Operator 
Ireland Legal 1 Owner / 1 Operator 
Italy Legal Many Owners / 1 Operator
Luxem-b. Management  
Nether-
lands Legal
 2 Many Owners / 1 Operator 
(TenneT) 
Norway Ownership Many Owners / 1 Operator (Statnett) 
Portugal Legal Many Owners / 1 Operator
Spain Ownership 1 Owner / 1 Operator (REE) 
Sweden Ownership 1 Owner / 1 Operator (Svenska Kraftnät) 
UK 
Ownership (E&W); 
Management (Scot-
land, N. Ireland)  
1 Owner / 1 Operator 
(NGC) 
Legend: 1Belgium: although the TSO has not been nomi-
nated yet 
2The Dutch government intends to buy the major-
ity share in the Dutch TSO 
F,D,CH,L: Vertical Integration between Gen.&Transm.   (4)
Fully Legal Unbundling   (7)
Fully Unbundling by Ownership   (5)
Unbundling in Europe
 
Fig. 5. Degree of unbundling of the TM grid in West-
ern Europe 2002 
Of further relevance is the principle, that suppliers 
can choose their generator free. This leads to the per-
ception that suppliers must also be able to generate 
their electricity themselves! Hence, an unbundling of 
generators and suppliers is not necessary! On contrary 
this type of unbundling is counterproductive as the 
recent developments in California prove! 
Table 3. Access to TM grid and type of TM price regu-
lation in EU member countries and Norway in 2001  
 Access to the grid Type of TM price regulation 
EU Coun-
try 2002 2002 
Austria rTPA cost based 
Belgium rTPA cost based 
Denmark rTPA cost based 
Finland rTPA no direct regulation
France rTPA cost based 
Germany nTPA Cost based 
Greece rTPA cost based 
Ireland rTPA cost based 
Italy 
rTPA .. eligible customers
SB(rTPA)..captive cus-
tomers 
price cap 
Luxem-
bourg rTPA cost based 
Nether-
lands rTPA 
cost based / maxi-
mum tariff 
Norway rTPA government bond rate plus 1% 
Portugal 
rTPA .. eligible customers
SB(rTPA)...captive cus-
tomers 
cost based 
Spain rTPA standard costs 
Sweden rTPA no direct regulation
UK rTPA price cap 
Note: rTPA...regulated third party access, nTPA...negotiated 
third party access, SB...Single Buyer model. 
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Correct operation and access to the grid 
With respect to the operation of and access to the grid 
the principal requirements are: 
• to ensure that the existing grid is used and up-
graded/extended with maximum benefit for soci-
ety, 
• to assure that those who have the highest Willing-
ness-to-pay for the use of the grid get the right to 
use it; 
Of course, these issues are very closely linked to a 
correct unbundling. 
Derived from these basic objectives the most impor-
tant questions with respect to access to the grid and the 
magnitude of prices in various countries are: 
1) Who has the right to use a TM line? When? Over 
which period of time? 
2) What is the correct magnitude of the price? How 
to price bottleneck capacity? 
3) How is the structure of pricing? (Fixed fee, fee per 
kW or per kWh) 
4) Is there a fee for changing the supplier?  
5) Who pays for an extension of the grid if a new 
generator wants to feed in at a point where no suf-
ficient grid exists? 
To answer these questions we first have to identify 
the basic principles for TM pricing. These are: 
• The prices should reflect the marginal costs of the 
use of the grid 
• The pricing system should be simple and transpar-
ent 
• Incentives to strike a balance between supply and 
demand should be provided 
• The pricing system should guarantee the recovery 
of the operation costs 
• But: What about revenues from auctions if we do 
not want that the grid operator makes excessive 
profits?  
Introduction of auction based systems of transmission 
rights 
A major problem is that the right of access to the grid 
is often not driven by economic incentives. To find an 
optimal solution we analyse now how an optimal TM 
pricing system looks like. We have to take into account 
different possible demand cases: 
1) If excess capacity is available it is sufficient to 
recover the costs by charging a price equal to the 
average costs. 
2) Yet if demand is close to capacity available the 
WTP of the different customers has to be taken 
into account e.g. by means of an auction-based 
price-setting procedure. This ensures that capacity 
is used in the economically most efficient way. 
Capacity
Price
P_max = long term marginal costs
Demand_Max
SupplyP = Average costs
100% 
Demand_Opt
 Short-
 term
Long-
term
Excess grid capacity:
 
Fig. 6. TM prices under perfect vs imperfect access to 
the grid  
 
A solution could be auction-based TM rights. An ex-
ample: 
TenneT, the Duch transmission system operator, is 
preparing a plan together with the German and Belgian 
TSOs for the auction of cross-border capacity. Under 
the scheme specific percentages of total interconnec-
tion capacity are allocated for annual, monthly and 
daily contracts, and auction these off to the highest 
bidder. Safeguards have to be built into the system to 
avoid gaming and limit large traders from buying all 
available capacity. The scheme is being studied by 
TSOs in other European countries facing cross-border 
capacity problems (e.g. Spain). A similar auction sys-
tem between E-ON-Grid in Germany and Eltra in 
Denmark was launched in 2001 and, after some diffi-
culties, is now working well.  
Market participants evaluate an auction-based sys-
tem fairer to all traders in the market – avoiding poten-
tially discriminatory processes like „first-come, first-
serve“, proportional or merit-order allocation. 
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Fig. 7. Share of transmission and distribution costs in 
selected Western European countries 2001 
Differences in national TM fees 
Competition in various EU member countries is further 
curtailed by high transmission fees and differences in 
transmission pricing models. Fig. 8 compares the share 
of transmission and distribution costs for residential 
customers in selected Western European countries in 
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2000. As can be seen they vary tremendously. On the 
one hand, they are still high in recently liberalised 
markets like Austria and Germany.  
According to the announcements of the regulatory 
bodies in these countries they are expected to decrease 
in the future. On the other hand, in Norway the trans-
mission and distribution charges are extremely low. As 
a consequence, currently less investments to maintain 
the grid take place. In order to change this situation it 
is likely that in the future in Norway charges for 
transmission and distribution have to increase.  
An example for large differences in grid access 
prices within a single country is Germany. In 2001 the 
prices varied between 3,13 pf/kWh (1,55 cents/kWh) 
and 7,10 pf/kWh (3,5 cents/kWh). 
Will the incumbents retain market power? 
Finally, the major crucial issue in the discussion of 
competition with respect to TM and access to the grid 
is whether incumbent utilities will manage to retain 
discrete market power over (part of) the high-voltage 
grid or whether in a serious unbundling the TSO will 
become independent. Some examples which depict this 
problem are: 
The Berlin utility BEWAG has very small TM ca-
pacities. Hence, it rejected to transmit electricity from 
other utilities to customers in Berlin. Yet, the FCO 
(Federal Cartel Office) ruled that due to the “law” of 
unbundling BEWAG cannot reserve 100% of its TM 
capacity for own generation. BEWAG has been forced 
by the watchdog  to open 20% of its TM capacity for 
other utilities. 
In The Netherlands the Dutch network operator has 
been fined the anti-cartel authority NMa relating to a 
complaint by the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro. 
The NMa ruled that SEP has abused its dominant mar-
ket position by unfairly blocking grid access to Norsk 
Hydro. 
MWh 
Price
Price imperfect grid access
Demand
Supply
Price perfect grid access
imperfect
grid access
perfect
grid
access
 
Fig. 8. TM prices under perfect vs imperfect acecss to 
the grid  
How does imperfect access to the grid influence com-
petition? 
What if no correct unbundling is conducted and net-
work operator exerts market power? How does imper-
fect grid access influence electricity trading? It leads to 
the situation depicted in principle in Fig. 8. Not all 
capacity available shows up in the supply curve and 
hence demand intersects with the supply curve (broken 
line) curtailed by imperfect access to the grid. Straight-
forward, this leads to a higher market price for electric-
ity than under perfect access to the grid. 
Transboundary restrictions 
In addition to national problems The most important 
constraints limiting transboundary electricity trade are: 
• Reciprocity in transboundary trade; 
• Bilateral differences in the magnitude of prices; 
• (In-) Compatibility of transboundary rules (eg 
reciprocity due to different eligibility of custom-
ers) 
• (In-) Compatibility of TM tariff schemes in differ-
ent countries 
• Limited capacities: At some nods of the grid the 
capacities available to transmit electricity are 
smaller than the capacities demanded by the mar-
ket. This leads to the problem of congestion; 
• Non-Transparency in tariff structures, access 
rights, magnitude of access fees 
Bilateral differences in transmission tariffs 
In Fig. 9 the differences in transmission tariffs for 
selling electricity from Germany to Austria and vice 
versa are depicted. All numbers in these figures are in 
€/kWh.  
According to these bilateral differences it is e.g. for a 
customer in Bavaria more attractive to buy electricity 
in Austria than vice versa (if the price for electricity 
generation is the same).  
Political reasons 
Since France was not able to meet deadline of minimal 
market liberalisation in 1999 the anger of neighbouring 
countries over France’s foot dragging has turned into a 
big problem. The Netherlands, UK, Germany and 
Spain, having already liberalised, found themselves 
unable to access the French market, while the reserve 
was not the case. Spain has threatened to remove EdF’s 
supply license. Moreover, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Spain have suggested that French imports of elec-
tricity will be limited unless France liberalises further. 
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Fig. 9. Bilateral differences in the transmission tariffs 
between Austria and Germany (feed-in level 110 kV, 
demand level: 20 respectively 30 kV). Source: Haas et 
al (2000). 
Old long-term contracts 
Spain’s national grid company Red Electrica (REE) 
expects to make 80% of the cross-border capacity of 
1,100 MW with France available to competition when 
it started auctions in 2001. But this measure mainly 
depend on the results of renegotiation and perhaps 
early cancellation of its low-price, long-term electricity 
import contract with Electricité de France (EdF). That 
long-term contract currently occupies 500 MW of 
import capacity, with much of the rest also currently 
tied up in contracts with EdF and Electrabel (Belgium). 
REE will keep 20% of capacity back to cover balanc-
ing needs. REE is expected to make about 30% of 
import capacity available in annual auctions, and allow 
resale of import capacity in monthly auctions. The bulk 
of capacity, around 50%, should be up for grabs in 
weekly auctions. Anyway, the recent crisis in Califor-
nia has to some extent mitigated this problems. 
Generators: Heading for strategic prices 
Another tremendous barrier for effective competition, 
which increases continuously, is the decreasing number 
of generators. Remember that the fundamental princi-
ple of competition is that there is a large number of 
companies who do compete! 
Yet, this does not fit with the objectives of private 
companies. These are: 
• Satisfy shareholders 
• Prices and profits as high as possible 
• Avoid competition! 
Table 4. Major mergers, acquisitions and share pur-
chases in Europe 1995- 2001 
Acquiring Company Acquired Company share 
EdF London Electricity (UK) 100% 
EdF 
SWEB generation, 
supply (via London 
Electricity) 
100% 
EdF ESTAG (A) 25%+1vote 
EdF EnBW (D) 25%+1vote 
Vattenfall (S) (via 
Vasa Energy) 
Stadtwerke Rostock 
(D) 12,55% 
Vattenfall (S) HEW (D) 25% 
Texas Utilities (US) Eastern (UK) 100% 
ScottishPower (UK) Manweb (UK) 100% 
National Power (UK) Midlands Electricity (UK) 100% 
PowerGen (UK) East Midlands Elec-tricity 100% 
Preussen Elektra (DE) EZH (NL) 25% 
Scottish Hydro Elec-
tric Southern Electric 100% 
PNEM-MEGA PNEM/MEGA Lim-burg merger 
EnBW (D) EVS/Badenwerk merger 
BirkaEnergi (SE) Stockholm Ener-gi/Gullspang merger 
Electrabel (BE) EPON (NL) 40% 
E-ON (D) Preussen Elek-tra/Bayernwerk (D) merger 
RWE (D) VEW (D) 100% 
Vattenfall(S) 
/HEW(D) VEAG (D) 51% 
E-ON (D) PowerGen (UK)  100 % 
E-ON (D) Sydkraft (S) 51 % 
RWE (D) KELAG (A) 22 % 
E-ON-Hydro (D) VERBUND/Austrian Hydro Power (A)  
merger 
(pending) 
 
The “merger-mania” in the last years in Western 
Europe – see Table 4 – proves that the major strategy 
of investor-owned electricity generators is not to com-
pete but rather to merge or to purchase shares. The 
mergers pursue two major objectives: 
1) An official one: to achieve a potential for savings 
due to synergies; 
2) An unofficial one: to become able to set prices as 
high as possible. In practice minimal shares owned 
by otherwise competing utilities or joint-ventures 
can avoid competition and allow to set strategic 
prices; 
Fig. 11 clearly shows that the major current goal of 
large European utilities is getting larger and heading 
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towards oligopolies. From the 17 largest generators 
which existed in 1999 today only 11 exist. Of particu-
lar concern with respect to competition is the situation 
in Central Europe (France, Germany, BeNeLux, Aus-
tria) where only 5 large blocks dominate the market: 
EdF/EnBW, RWE, E.ON/Sydkraft/VERBUND, 
HEW/Vattenfall/ VEAG, and Electrabel. It is hard to 
believe that this structure ensures effective competition 
even in the short-term. It is much more likely that the 
major objective is to set strategic prices. Indeed, as Fig. 
19 shows electricity prices in Central Europe have 
been increasing steadily since 1999. 
This leads to the following pattern which can be ob-
served in most countries where liberalisation takes 
place: First, prices decrease due to efficiency gains but 
after a short period of time they start to increase con-
siderably, mainly due to the exertion of market power 
and a lack of excess capacities, see Fig. 10. 
1. Efficiency
 gains
2. Strategic
prices
Shut-down of
 capacities
Market power 
Electricity
Price
Time  
Fig. 10. The ambigous role of shut-down of excess 
capacities 
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Fig. 11. Ranking of the largest European electricity generators in 1999 and 2002. Source: annual reports. 
 
 
 
An important issue in this context is the resulting 
shut-down process of excess capacities. If excess ca-
pacity exist and and utilities compete at least to some 
extent the price they receive for electricity will only be 
equal to the short-run marginal costs, see Fig. 13. Un-
der perfect competition without remarkable excess 
capacities the price will be equal to the long-run mar-
ginal costs (LRMC). But if there is no competition the 
price will be set strategically and might be substan-
tially higher than under competition especially if de-
mand is very inelastic, see Fig. 14. And e.g. the large 
German utilities E.ON and RWE have already an-
nounced that they intend to close substantial capacities. 
Monopoly
Price
Number of utilities
CURRENT  DEVELOPMENT!
COMPETITION
 
Fig. 12. Current vs. ideal development of the number 
of generators 
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Fig. 13. Competitive prices with existing excess ca-
pacities 
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Fig. 14. Strategic prices given a lack of excess capaci-
ties 
Future perspectives  
Finally, the crucial question is: What does the future 
hold for liberalised electricity markets in Western 
Europe?  
Most important in this context is the question how 
prices will develop. First it is of interest how wholesale 
electricity prices have developed in recent years in 
major European markets. Fig. 15 depicts that there are 
considerable differences between different markets. 
The UK pool price was about three times higher that 
the cheapest market, the NordPool. Yet, in 2001 the 
prices in the NordPool has caught up, mainly due to 
looming capacity shortages. Also the Spanish pool 
price is higher than the average. In Spain also capacity 
shortages are looming. The electricity price at the 
German bourses EEX (Frankfurt) and LPX (Leipzig) in 
1999 and 2000 was lower than the Spanish and English 
pool price. But it has caught up considerably at the end 
of 2001. 
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Fig. 15. Development of electricity generation prices in 
major European markets 
Regarding the future development of electricity 
prices an important issue is the volatility of hydro 
power. As Fig. 16 shows for Austria hydro power 
availability varies tremendously over time. With an 
average of 1 the maximum over a year is about 1.2 
while the minimum is 0.8. Hence, the minimum is only 
2/3 of the maximum! This relationship is even more 
dramatic if we look at it on a monthly base. 
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Fig. 16. Annual variation of hydropower availability in 
Austria  
As can be seen from Fig. 17 for Austria (and the 
conditions in other Central European countries with 
large hydro power shares like Switzerland and France 
are very similar) in winter months the minimum pro-
duction in the long run is only half of the maximum! 
Moreover, in many countries there is a feedback of 
available hydropower on the availability of nuclear 
power plants due to cooling capacity. Hence, to some 
extent the reduction in electricity generation due to less 
hydro availability will be intensified by a decrease in 
nuclear generation! 
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Fig. 17. Monthly range of Hydro Power availability in 
Austria  
Summing up, most of the arguments raised above in-
dicate that electricity prices in Europe will start to 
increase soon. There are some further aspects not dis-
cussed comprehensively in this paper which support 
this argument: 
• Increasing dependence from natural gas and in-
creasing natural gas prices; 
• Increasing horizontal integration, especially of gas 
and electricity; 
• Increasing reliance on imports in most countries 
leaving open the question: Which country will ex-
port electricity in the long run? 
• no incentives for building new capacities, neither 
in generation nor in TM; 
Hence, it is likely that the development of electricity 
prices over time in liberalised markets follows in prin-
ciple the pattern shown in Fig. 18. 
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Fig. 18. Development of electricity prices over time (in 
principle) in liberalised electricity markets. 
Fig. 19 depicts the recent developments on the 
wholesale level in Germany from 1999 - 2001. It can 
be seen that since 1999 the wholesale prices have been 
increasing almost continuously. 
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Fig. 19 Recent development of wholesale electricity 
prices in Germany 1999-2001 
Another interesting case in point is the dynamics of 
various developments. Above the fundamental cond-
itions for effective competition in electricity markets 
have been summarised. With respect to these different 
conditions currently the basic strategy of incumbent 
utilities in Western Europe appears to be as follows: 
There are two phases: 
• In Phase 1 competition would be possible because 
of excess capacities and a sufficient number of 
generators exists. But it is curtailed by barriers for 
access to the grid, for changing the supplier and 
limited market opening in some countries. That is 
to say, barriers are maintained to postpone real 
competition until there is no more a relevant num-
ber of competing generators. Moreover, competi-
tion is distorted in Phase 1 by to cheap generation 
prices and to high prices for access to the grid; 
• In Phase 2 when finally the most pressing prob-
lems regarding access to the grid and customer 
switchover are settled (e.g. due to the so-called 
„Florence-Process“) competition will be no more 
possible because of a lack of competing generators 
and a lack of excess capacities. 
TWO PHASES OF MARKET
LIBERALISATION:
Unbundling
Today 2005
Fully open market
Comp. in generation
 Comp. in supply
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO  
Fig. 20. Two phases of market liberalisation  
Conclusions 
Policy makers and the public in Western Europe are 
currently still blinded by the recent drops in electricity 
prices. Yet, the future looks less bright. The major 
conclusions of this analysis are: 
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• We are far away from a simple solution to achieve 
competition in a unique European electricity mar-
ket. There are too many possible barriers in the 
whole supply chain which makes it unlikely that 
real competition in the European electricity market 
will ever take place! 
• Competition requires a rigorous separation of 
market elements where competition is possible 
(generation & supply) and parts which remain 
natural monopolies (transmission grid). Unbun-
dling of generation and transmission by means of 
separate accounting as currently practiced in vari-
ous countries is not sufficient for real European-
wide competition! 
• A major condition for competition is many genera-
tors. Yet, in Western Europe currently the number 
of generators decreases dramatically mainly be-
cause of strategic alliances and mergers. Unless 
the European Commission takes regulatory steps 
to ensure that there is a sufficient number of com-
peting generators in Western Europe it is unlikely 
that effective competition will ever take place! 
• Cheap electricity prices can be sustained only if 
excess capacities are available. We predict that af-
ter the dust of merging, acquisitioning and share 
purchasing has settled capacities will very soon 
become scarce in Western Europe and the volatil-
ity and the absolute level of wholesale electricity 
prices will increase substantially; 
• An important issue in this context is the temporar-
ily decrease in hydro power we have to expect in 
the near future after years of hydro production far 
over the average; 
• Yet, the development described above also pro-
vides new opportunities, especially for more effi-
cient use of electricity and decentralised genera-
tors. The gap between decreasing large “old” ca-
pacities and increasing demand for energy services 
has to be met by increases in energy efficiency and 
new decentralised generation facilities. These will 
be based most favourable on renewable energy 
sources. High electricity prices will of course sup-
port these developments. 
Finally, we state that liberalisation is not the target 
but a means. More precisely, it is one small piece in a 
large puzzle of competition requirements. Or as John 
Chesshire (1999) puts it “liberalisation is a means, not 
an end!” 
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Abstract. The specific impacts of market liberalisation on 
the electricity supply sector depend on many different factors 
and boundary conditions. A comparison of these impacts in 
Germany and Austria, two countries which both participate 
in the European internal market and have a central geo-
graphical location in Western Europe, and which both have 
borders and important trade relationships with Central Euro-
pean countries, provides some important insights. Further-
more, the paper also covers the expected influence of the 
increase in the electricity trade volumes in the two countries, 
also with their Central European neighbours, and the con-
cerns that this may lead to conflicts in the achievement of 
targets in energy, environmental, and climate change policies 
aimed for both at the national and at the European level. 
Introduction 
The liberalisation of the electricity sector, like in other 
network-based industries, induces substantial structural 
change, and the consequences for a particular country 
are often hard to predict, as experience has shown, e.g., 
in the UK and Norway. This change causes an urgent 
need to often rapidly adjust to a new market environ-
ment – by adapting the prices and quantities offered, 
the marketing strategy, and the portfolio of products 
and services purchased and sold. However, the strate-
gic and operational adjustments required may be quite 
different, depending on the particular boundary condi-
tions for the electricity supply industry in question 
(e.g., in terms of domestic energy resource base, CO2 
reduction obligations, etc.) and the actual impact of 
market liberalisation on the electricity supply sector. 
In the course of the European electricity market lib-
eralisation, as stipulated in the EU Directive 96/92/EC, 
the German federal legislation decided for an instant 
full liberalisation by April 1998 (EnWG 1998), while 
the Austrian parliament (at first) opted for a stepwise 
market opening in line with the minimum limits given 
in the EU Directive 96/92/EC, starting in February 
1999. Following the rapid restructuring of the power 
supply industry in Europe, however, and in the light of 
                                                           
20 An extended version of this paper was presented at the 3rd 
International Energy Symposium “Dichotomies and Chal-
lenges”, Ossiach, Austria, 19-21 Sept 2001. 
21 madlener@cepe.mavt.ethz.ch 
22 jochem@cepe.mavt.ethz.ch 
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the uneven exposure of Austrian utilities to competitive 
pressures, it was decided in 2000 to completely open 
the Austrian power market by 1 October 2001 as well, 
way ahead of many other EU member states. 
Given the different market opening schedules and 
other differences, such as in market size and in the pre-
opening organisational and ownership structure of the 
utilities, it seems to be worthwhile to compare the 
impacts of liberalisation in the two countries – with an 
annual per capita electricity consumption of beyond 
6,500 kWh, comparatively high environmental stan-
dards, and traditionally strong electricity trade relation-
ships with Central European countries. Besides, factual 
competition in the power sector in both countries has 
developed at an impressive pace. The findings may 
also provide some useful hints for utilities and public 
administration in countries that are planning to open 
their electricity markets within the next couple of 
years, too, such as Croatia, Slovenia, and Switzerland. 
Primary energy supply mix for power genera-
tion – the starting point 
The primary energy basis for electricity generation in 
the two countries is significantly different, and can be 
expected to have some specific implications on the 
behaviour of the participants in the electricity markets 
in the two countries. Whereas electricity generation of 
the German power sector has been traditionally heavily 
dependent on coal (hard coal: ca. 25%; lignite: ca. 
26%) and nuclear energy (ca. 36%), with almost negli-
gible shares of hydro (1.5%) and wind power (0.4%), 
respectively. In contrast, the Austrian power sector has 
its foundation in hydro power (ca. 44%), fossil-fuel 
based thermal power generation (oil: ca. 9%; gas: ca. 
30%: coal: ca. 12%; mostly in co-generation plants), 
and – as a result of the 1978 people’s referendum on 
the Zwentendorf plant – no nuclear generation (ARGE 
Energiebilanzen 2001; Statistics Austria/E.V.A. 2001; 
own estimates).23 
In Germany the current market share of natural gas 
of about 10% is expected to rise considerably in the 
future, mainly because of the anticipated continued 
boom of combined-cycle power plants due to their 
lower capital cost (and thus lower financial risk), rela-
tively low CO2 emissions per kWh of output – and, 
most recently, also the planned phasing out of nuclear 
power within the next two decades, as agreed upon 
between the German government and power industry. 
Altogether, the fossil-fuel share of electricity genera-
tion is expected to rise, as it is unlikely that the phase-
out of nuclear capacity can actually be compensated 
immediately by increases in energy efficiency and/or 
the use of renewables alone. Restrictions imposed by 
the German Kyoto obligation can be expected to lead 
to increasing net electricity imports from neighbouring 
countries with a lower carbon fuel mix. 
                                                           
23 Note that here thermal-based input fuels appear much 
more important than hydro power in terms of primary energy 
contributions for a given electrical output, because thermal 
conversion losses are also counted as contributing to primary 
energy production. 
In Austria the situation is markedly different, at least 
in the short to medium term. Given the high depend-
ency of Austria on (clean, domestic, and currently 
competitive) hydro power, fossil-fuel plants are merely 
used as back-up systems in times of high power de-
mand and low river flows/pump storage levels. This 
dispatch priority, however, leads to a considerable 
amount of under-utilized (and hence quite expensive) 
reserve capacity, which at the same time is rather diffi-
cult to reduce, depending on the market situation in 
terms of demand growth, fuel prices, electricity import 
options and transmission capacity constraints, and the 
required local physical reserve capacity – especially in 
times of low precipitation levels (cf. Schröfelbauer 
2001, esp. Fig. 8). In its current restructuring activities, 
which were started as early as 1994, the largest Aus-
trian power producer, Verbund, is concentrating its 
power plants into two distinct and essentially centrally 
managed blocks for hydro and thermal power plants, 
enabling to exploit important synergy potentials in 
plant operation, maintenance, and administration. 
Market opening – the window of opportunities 
Despite some political will to liberalise, exemplified 
recently by the full opening of the Austrian power 
market by 1 October 2001, the electricity markets both 
in Germany and Austria are still characterised by im-
portant market barriers and impediments to competi-
tion. In particular, two issues need to be sorted out 
urgently: (i) the transmission tariffs and capacities 
available and (ii) the accepted impacts of liberalisation 
on national integrity. 
The EU Directive 96/92/EC allows for different 
speeds of market opening, but demands a minimum 
speed for all member countries, measured in terms of 
an annual electricity consumption threshold above 
which electricity consumers are free to choose their 
supplier (19 Feb 1999: 40 GW equiv. to 26.5%; 19 Feb 
2000: 20 GW equiv. to 30%; 19 Feb 2003: 9 GW 
equiv. to 35%; percentages approx.).24 The German 
government and parliament decided to open the elec-
tricity market completely in a single step by 24 April 
1998, which included: 
• immediate free choice of electricity supply for all 
consumer categories; 
• financial unbundling of vertically integrated utili-
ties (minimum requirement); 
• negotiated third-party access (nTPA) to the grid; 
• allowance of power traders. 
An immediate full opening of the market was chosen 
with the argument that smaller electricity consumers 
would either demand the distributors, generators or 
traders to offer similar conditions to those offered to 
the larger consumers (threat of changing the supplier), 
or they would merge their small electricity demand to 
                                                           
24 Percentages are approximate, calculated as the total elec-
tricity share consumed by final consumers with an annual 
consumption level exceeding 40 GWh, 20 GWh, and 9 GWh 
(according to the three liberalisation steps scheduled in the 
EU Directive 96/92/EC). 
ENER Forum 2. Monitoring the progress of the implementation of the EU Gas and Electricity Directives:  
Are European markets becoming competitive? Prague, Czech Republic, 15-16 November 2001 
26 ENER 24.01 
 
larger quantities (e.g. by establishing joint purchase 
syndicates) in order to receive more favourable prices 
from the (now) competing electricity companies. 
Table 1. Individual electricity transmission and distri-
bution rates, Germany (as of April 2001) 
 Lowest Average Highest Related company 
 (in ¢EUR/kWh) Lowest 
rate 
Highest 
rate 
High volt-
age trans-
mission 
0.86 1.27 2.04 Energie-
Dienst/ 
KWL 
AÜW, 
Kempten 
Medium 
voltage 
transmission 
0.62 1.45 2.78 RWE-Net, 
Dortmund 
avacon 
aBL, 
Helmstedt 
Low voltage 
distribution 
0.66 1.85 3.50 Mainova, 
Frankfurt 
Energie-
Dienst/ 
KWR 
Source: BWK (2001b), p.27; own calculations. 
Note: Cumulative rates tend to be higher (lower) than the sum of the 
lowest (highest) rates. 
Table 2. Cumulative electricity transmission and distri-
bution rates, Austria (as of January 2001) 
 Annual hours of utilization 
 1,000 hrs 4,000 hrs 8,000 hrs 
(in ¢EUR/kWh)
Lowest 
rate 
Highest 
rate 
Lowest 
rate 
Highest 
rate 
Lowest 
rate 
Highest 
rate 
110 kV (3) 1.51 3.42 0.86 1.46 0.66 1.28 
10/30 kV (5) 2.62 7.63 1.59 3.68 1.42 3.21 
Transformer 
station (6) 3.15 10.29 1.91 5.52 1.71 4.76 
0.4 kV (7) 6.50 15.61 3.68 8.88 2.90 7.74 
Source: WKOÖ (2001); own calculations. 
Notes: Grid use charges in Austria vary by region (province); 
numbers in brackets denote the voltage layer. 
In contrast, Austria has implemented the EU Direc-
tive 96/92/EC with an electricity act that was published 
on 18 August 1998 (Elektrizitätswirtschafts- und or-
ganisationsgesetz – ElWOG) and entered into force on 
19 February 1999. The Federal law was concretised by 
complementary laws of the nine Länder, as well as two 
ministerial ordinances, one dealing with the principles 
of transmission pricing and the other with stranded cost 
compensation. Besides, the Länder laws focused on 
details of the promotion of renewable energy use, new 
power plant authorisation criteria, and public service 
obligations. In 2000 a new electricity act was published 
(ElWOG 2000). Among other changes (e.g. installation 
of a clearing house, labelling obligation), an important 
aim was to reduce the existing imbalance in market 
exposure faced by the various Austrian regional elec-
tric utilities (ranging from some 5-80%). 
Regulatory issues – levelling the playing field 
Germany, the largest electricity market in the European 
Union, is the only EU member country that still sticks 
to a negotiated third-party access (nTPA) to the grid 
without a regulator. This offers, at least for a while, 
some leeway for the transmission and distribution grid 
operators to charge excessive transmission fees and 
hence to reduce competitive pressure. At the same 
time, at least temporarily, it reduces the need for inno-
vation and structural change. Three years after the 
market opening, rates for electricity transmission and 
distribution still vary quite substantially among the grid 
operators in Germany (Table 1). Electricity traders 
have been complaining about the large differences 
between (partly still unpublished) transmission rates, 
delays of wheeling contracts, and high measurement 
charges at the point of final use (Oehler 2001). One of 
the six large utilities, EnBW, has even called for a 
regulator (Wertel 2001). The German antitrust admini-
stration has stated that there is sufficient evidence that 
some of the observed wheeling and distribution rates 
are far above real cost and that unjustifiable charges for 
grid use are taken from traders and final consumers. 
Therefore, it is presently developing a concept for 
establishing fair rates for using the grid (E&M 2001a). 
In contrast to Germany, an independent regulatory 
authority for the electricity sector (‘E-Control’) has 
been established in Austria by 1 March 2001. It has to 
monitor and regulate the 100% liberalised Austrian 
power market since 1 October 2001, when the new 
electricity act (ElWOG 2000) entered into force. This 
approach seems to be much more in line with the cur-
rent stance of the European Commission, which has 
recently clearly indicated a strong preference for a 
regulated TPA (e.g. European Commission 2001). 
There is also hope that the regulator will harmonise the 
currently very heterogeneous grid-use charges (Table 
2) in the near future, thereby reducing existing market 
distortions. 
Impact on excess capacity – countdown of pro-
duction monopolies 
Surplus capacity of electricity generation before libe-
ralisation was more than 17 GW in Germany alone (or 
around 20%) and the total surplus capacity within the 
EU was estimated to be in the order of 40–50 GW. In 
Austria, due to the high reliance of electricity genera-
tion on hydropower, surplus capacity in a particular 
year depends strongly on the annual amount and sea-
sonal distribution of rainfall, which creates a need for 
higher reserve capacity and makes it harder to come up 
with a concrete number. 
Because of the different speeds and points in time of 
the market opening in the EU member countries, and 
the open time schedule for the accession of the Central 
European countries, the impact of market liberalisation 
on excess capacity is somewhat difficult to evaluate. 
However, it is not only the timing of the opening and 
extension of the power market which influences the 
phasing out of excess capacity, but also the 
• age structure and economic performance of exis-
ting power plants, which may induce investments 
in new and highly efficient generating capacity 
(e.g. 10 state-of-the-art generating plants with a to-
tal capacity of 3,900 MW were added to the Ger-
man stock in 2000 alone); 
• intensity of competition in particular regional or 
national markets; 
• market structure and power, which also depend on 
the companies’ size (financial flexibility), type of 
power plant (high financial back-ups of companies 
running nuclear power plants), and ownership (e.g. 
EdF with no specific profitability obligations, mu-
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nicipal electric utilities (Stadtwerke) traditionally 
co-financing other public services, e.g., city trans-
portation and swimming-baths); 
• price policies of the utilities, differentiated by 
customer groups; 
• development of new entrepreneurial activities by 
existing utilities (e.g. to aid customer binding), 
new foreign energy companies entering the 
domestic market, or specialised companies (e.g. 
contractors for co-generation plants); 
• new recent technological developments, such as 
information and communications technology, re-
mote control of electricity generating plants, mi-
cro-turbines, and in the future also fuel cells; and 
• national or regional policy measures for develop-
ing renewables and/or co-generation, such as those 
aiming at climate change mitigation and/ or tech-
nical innovation (e.g. the German buy-back rate 
law for renewables, and most recently for co-
generation and fuel cells). 
Given this complexity, it is not trivial to trace back 
the direct impacts of the electricity market opening at 
the national level. But the net phasing out of surplus 
capacity is substantial anyway: In Germany, for in-
stance, two of the major remaining companies an-
nounced in summer 2000 to phase out around 10,000 
MW of generating capacity, some of which is planned 
to be kept in a conservation status. Two nuclear power 
plants, a rather old plant in Stade and a new and practi-
cally never fully operational plant near Mülheim-
Kärlich, with a total capacity of 2,000 MW (or almost 
10% of the nuclear capacity in Germany), will be 
phased out by 2003 (see E.ON Energie Presse 2000; 
RWE 2000; VDEW 2001, among others). 
The association of the German electricity sector 
(VDEW) comments on these changes by emphasising 
the optimisation process the sector has to undergo. 
Companies no longer plan their own maximum reserve 
capacity, but try to co-operate. In other cases, mergers 
contribute to reducing the reserve capacity. VDEW 
(2001) also emphasises that the planned and already 
realised reduced capacities of electricity generation 
will not reduce the traditionally high level of security 
of electricity supply. 
In Austria the development has been less dramatic, 
given the dominance of hydro power stations for which 
the investment cost with few exceptions (like the run-
of-river plant Freudenau) have been recouped during 
the time of a regulated monopolistic market structure, 
so that they are currently very cost-competitive. The 
planned shut-down of the (hard-)coal-fired thermal 
power plants at St. Andrä (124 MW), Korneuburg (285 
MW), and Zeltweg (137 MW) in the short run and of 
Voitsberg (330 MW; lignite) in the medium run has not 
only been motivated by their relative cost-inefficiency, 
but also been driven by the marketing desire of the 
Verbundgesellschaft to offer and sell still ‘greener’ 
electricity in the future. 
Impact on electricity prices – the expected 
fruits 
Due to the enormous market pressure and the induced 
rationalisation, average electricity prices have been 
substantially reduced since the beginning of the market 
opening in Germany (and even before 1998 in antici-
pating the liberalised market: 1991/97 industrial con-
sumer prices declined by 20%, residential consumer 
prices by 5%; see Jochem/Tönsing 1998; BMWi 
2000). The producer prices have almost halved within 
three years, reaching average figures in the order of 1.5 
¢EUR/kWh at the Leipzig Power Exchange (LPX). 
These prices did in many cases not even cover the 
variable costs of electricity generation and may have 
been possible only by the revenues gained from finan-
cial assets of the large utilities. The consumer prices 
charged depend on the producer prices, the rate for 
using the transmission and distribution grid, 
taxes/levies imposed, and the sales margin. The rates 
for using the grid, which depend on the voltage and 
time of use over the year, vary substantially among the 
companies, with average values of, e.g., in Germany 
1.3 ¢EUR/kWh at the high voltage and 4.6 ¢EUR/kWh at 
the low voltage level (including the upstream rates). 
The Dow Jones VIK Price Index for industrial con-
sumers shows an interesting development of the elec-
tricity prices between the opening of the German 
power market in April 1998 and June 2001 (Fig. 1): 
• At the opening of the market, industrial consumer 
prices among the large generators only differed 
around 1.2 ¢EUR/kWh, whereas they differ by more 
than 2 ¢EUR/kWh since January 2000. Theoreti-
cally, one would have expected a decrease of the 
difference under competitive conditions. 
• Average electricity prices in Germany declined by 
some 2 ¢EUR/kWh between 1998 and early 2000, 
stagnated during most of 2000, and seem to fluc-
tuate since early 2001 with some tendency to in-
crease again. 
 
4.00 
4.50 
5.00 
5.50 
6.00 
6.50 
7.00 
7.50 
8.00 
8.50 
9.00 
Mar 98May 98Jul 98Sep 98 Nov 98 Jan 99 Mar 99May 99Jul 99 Sep 99 Nov 99 Jan 00 Mar 00May 00Jul 00 Sep 00 Nov 00 Jan 01 Mar 01 May 01Jul 01 Sep 01
Month 
in 
¢E
U
R/
k
W
HEW 
EnBW
Eon (South)
RWE 
Germany 
Fig. 1. Industrial electricity price development in Ger-
many, Dow Jones VIK-Index, 3/1998–9/2001 
Source: BWK (2001a), p.10 
Hence there is some indication that the transition 
phase of liberalisation, as far as price adaptation is 
concerned, may last no longer than 4–5 years in a 
country with full market opening. Industrial customers 
have greatly benefited from the price decline since the 
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market opening, whereas retail prices for private 
households have been reduced only slightly in Ger-
many (partly as a result of the eco-tax, which was 
introduced in 1999 and raised to 1.5 ¢EUR/kWh by 1 
Jan 2001; similarly, in Austria the savings of the cap-
tive consumers have been considerably reduced by the 
rise of the electricity levy from 0.73 to 1.5 ¢EUR/kWh 
(ATS 0.1 to ATS 0.2/kWh) by 1 June 2000 as one of 
the fiscal measures taken to reduce the budget deficit). 
Impact on utility company structures – search 
for the optimal size 
The major objective of the liberalisation of infra-
structures with natural local monopolies is to introduce 
competitive structures and to increase market transpa-
rency in order to avoid economic inefficiencies and 
extra profits of local or regional monopolies. Competi-
tive behaviour in the deregulated electricity market was 
expected to lead to rationalisation of labour and capital, 
but of course it also leads to concentration (e.g. merg-
ers & aquisitions, co-operation agreements) of the 
electricity generating and distributing companies in 
search for economies of scale and of scope. Some 
sceptical energy economists have argued that the liber-
alisation of electricity supply could eventually lead to 
an oligopolistic market structure with similar prices 
and de facto dependency of most electricity consumers 
from electricity suppliers, but within the changed con-
text of a much narrower set of business objectives, as 
compared to the broader objectives and perspectives of 
local and regional utilities before market liberalisation. 
Presently, one can observe the following changes in 
market structure of the German supply market (see also 
Table 3): 
• The number of large generating and high voltage 
transmission companies (Verbundunternehmen) 
decreased from nine in the early 1990s to six in 
2000 and is likely to diminish further to four by 
2003 (two thirds of the German electricity genera-
tion capacity is owned by RWE and E.ON alone). 
• The number of regional distributors decreased 
from 80 in 1997 to 34 in 2001, and is likely to go 
down to less than 25 within a few years; the 
merger & acquisition process is still going on (five 
regional companies in Bavaria will be merged to 
one company before the end of 2001). 
• The number of municipal electric utilities (1997: 
800) is decreasing, though no official statistics ex-
ist and the recent numbers published in various 
journals differ strongly (ranging from no changes 
to a decline by 230). 
Table 3. Structural change due to liberalisation in the 
German electricity industry, 1997-2005 
 1997 2001 2005** 
Type of company No. of companies 
High voltage generation 
and transmission* 
8 6 4 
Regional distributors 80 34 < 25 
Local distributors, munici-
pal utilities 
800 570 to 800? < 400 
Data sources: Schiffer (1999); ARE (2001); E&M (2000); estimates 
by CEPE.  * Verbundunternehmen; ** estimate. 
Looking into the next few years it seems rather likely 
that the number of companies at all three levels of elec-
tricity supply in Germany will at least halve. But more 
importantly, the ownership of the formally independent 
regional and local distributing companies is changing 
from public to private, and often shifts to the big Euro-
pean players in the electricity and gas markets. Going 
Europe seems to be a must for the big and formerly 
national players, and the list of examples becomes 
longer every week: e.g., recently the German EnBW 
has contracted 600 GWh of electricity per annum with 
Austrian customers, and E.ON is a top favourite to 
become a new shareholder of EVN, the utility of lower 
Austria. Verbund seeks access to final consumers 
abroad by delivering electricity to German Stadtwerke, 
while RWE has set a foot in the south of Austria (by 
buying 49% of KELAG via the Carinthian energy hol-
ding company). Meanwhile, the new joint venture EHP 
(European Hydro Power) between Verbund and E.ON 
will create a ‘new’ major European player in the provi-
sion of green power (NZZ 2001). 
Most of the price reductions could be achieved by 
severe rationalisation of labour. Employment in the 
German electricity sector declined by 18,000 between 
1993 and 1997, and between 1997 and 2000 by some 
additional 64,000 (i.e. 25%), whereas electricity pro-
duction stagnated from 1997 until 1999. In Austria, the 
number decreased from some 30,400 by the end of 
1990 to 24,000 by the end of 1999 (end of 1997: 
26,500). This rationalisation may have its own social 
cost as, for example, most of the demonstration pro-
jects and free consulting services offered to small cus-
tomers regarding a more efficient use of energy have 
been stopped. Other options of cost savings, such as 
diminished technical redundancy in the grid, reduced 
maintenance, and phasing out of power generation 
plants have also been taken up by the companies. 
Impact on CHP and power from renewables – 
importance of adequate boundary conditions 
Co-generation of heat and power (CHP) has a long 
tradition in the two countries studied, both in industry 
as well as in district heating. The low electricity prices 
for large industrial customers during the last few years, 
however, led to a 20% decline of co-generated electric-
ity in the German industry between 1995 and 1999. 
According to a mid-2000 survey, the declining trend is 
continuing (Vierthaler 2000). The decline was most 
pronounced in the steam turbine technologies (-30% 
for back pressure turbines, -23% for extraction con-
densing turbines), whereas gas turbines (+10%) and 
engine-driven plants (+55%, though from a low level) 
experienced considerable growth (VIK 2001). The 
decline of co-generated electricity was also influenced 
by structural changes towards less energy-intensive 
industries. In contrast, the share of co-generated elec-
tricity in Austria increased by 22% to 14.3 TWh 
(equivalent to 24.8% of total electricity generation) 
during the same period (Eurostat 2001). 
In Germany, on 11 May 2001 five associations 
agreed upon a compromise on a bonus system for elec-
tricity produced by co-generation and fed to the grid 
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(voluntary agreement, approved of by the government). 
The bonus (1.5 to 1.25 ¢EUR/kWh) and its duration (4–8 
years) depend on the construction year of the CHP 
plant and the year of re-powering. It is claimed in the 
declaration that the bonus will contribute to an addi-
tional electricity production of some 55 TWh p.a. in 
2010, cutting Germany’s CO2 emissions by some 11 
million tonnes. The cost of the bonus is estimated to be 
about EUR 4 billion and to increase electricity prices 
for all customers by 0.1 ¢EUR/kWh (E&M 2001b). 
Electricity used within the co-generating companies 
will not be eligible for the bonus, an important draw-
back relative to a quota and a certificate system that the 
German government originally wanted to implement as 
a market-oriented instrument. 
In order to maintain innovative developments in the 
use of renewable energies, which commonly exhibit 
substantially lower external cost, the German parlia-
ment decided upon a law on buy-back rates for 
electricity from renewables in 1999 (EEG 2000), that 
guarantees certain feed-in prices for electricity based 
on renewables, and that particularly helped to sustain 
the rapid development of wind power plants in Ger-
many. In Austria, feed-in tariffs have been used for 
quite some time by the provincial governments for the 
promotion of renewable energy technologies. The new 
electricity act (ElWOG 2000) contains a rather ambi-
tious, increasing quota target for non-hydro-based 
renewables (1% by Oct 2001; 2% by 1 Oct 2003; 3% 
by Oct 2005; 4% by Oct 2007, based on final electric-
ity consumption) and, in combination with a tradable 
certificate system, another consumption-based fixed 
quota target of 8% for small-scale hydro power (≤ 10 
MW). And while the feed-in law for electricity from 
renewables was extremely successful in supporting 
wind energy diffusion in Germany, it contributed an 
extra 0.2 ¢EUR/kWh to the bills of the electricity users. 
Influence on cross-border electricity trade vol-
umes – profits and troubles? 
Concerns have been raised that the opening of the 
electricity market in Western and Central Europe may 
at least in some countries induce major changes in the 
electricity trade balances. Particularly, imports from 
France and Central European producers, or even cheap 
electricity from Russia, have been identified as a 
potential threat to German and Austrian electricity 
producers. The capacity of the ten accession countries 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia accounts for approximately 20% (112 GW) of 
the power generation capacity of the EU-15 in 1999 
(561 GW). Most of the Eastern European countries 
have excess capacities, albeit most of the capacity is 
neither very efficient nor very reliable, and in most 
countries (except perhaps in the Czech Republic) rather 
polluting.  
A most recent analysis on the future development of 
cross-border electricity trading patterns in Germany, 
however, concluded that net imports may actually 
increase up to only 8% in 2005 and can be expected to 
decrease thereafter (Bradke et al. 2001). In line with 
this and other studies (e.g. Prognos/EWI 1999, 2000) 
and our own assessment we do not expect the German 
or Austrian power trade balance to deteriorate signifi-
cantly. There are several reasons: transmission losses 
are significant. Over time the age structure of the 
power plants in Europe will converge significantly, 
making foreign trade of base and medium load power 
less attractive. Moreover, due to the continued integra-
tion of the European power market and the environ-
mental obligations to be adopted by the accession 
countries, similar generation cost in the Central Euro-
pean countries can be expected. Due to a large poten-
tial in hydro-based peak power production, Austrian 
generators, just like the Swiss, are in a favourable 
position in this respect. The possible increase in net 
imports will be influenced both by increased imports 
and by reduced exports. Also, import levels in the 
coming decade will strongly depend on actual electric-
ity demand. Electricity trade patterns are also limited 
by current cross-border transmission line capacities, 
which due to their high capital intensity are unlikely to 
be substantially increased in the near future. Moreover, 
traditionally importing countries such as Italy (from 
France) are not likely to increase their generating ca-
pacity above their electricity demand growth. Finally, 
the risk inherent in building long-distance transmission 
lines from Eastern to Western Europe is further aggra-
vated by the yet unknown diffusion rates of the fuel 
cell technology in Western and Central Europe over 
the next 20 years (‘virtual power plants’). 
Conclusions 
The introduction of competition and the establishing of 
a fair level playing field (non-discriminatory market 
access, transparency) are cornerstones of a successful 
liberalisation policy. However, the pre-liberalisation 
structure of the industry, the institutional framework 
and political circumstances, the domestic power re-
sources available, and the aptitude for swift adjust-
ments of both industry and regulatory bodies seem to 
be often neglected in analyses and discussions. From 
this viewpoint we could identify the following impor-
tant trends in our analysis: 
• The surplus generating capacity of some 10–15% 
will disappear within a few years; capital-inten-
sive, large-size generating technologies (e.g. nu-
clear or hydro plants), although currently in a quite 
comfortable position, have less chances in the fu-
ture due to the high investment risks in at least 
partially saturated markets, innovative technolo-
gies (e.g. fuel cells, micro-turbines), and decentral-
ised renewable electricity generation (e.g. wind, 
geothermal, biomass) with relatively low external-
ities; 
• Without political intervention, co-generation is 
likely to suffer in the adaptation period because of 
very low industrial electricity prices based on 
short-term marginal cost calculations (sometimes 
lower than the variable cost of CHP), back-
pressure steam turbines are specifically endan-
gered; in the longer term, CHP may have a 
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brighter future, envisioning a widespread use of 
fuel cells (‘virtual power plants’); 
• The transition phase in an instantly opened electri-
city market with some overcapacities may be 
around 4–5 years, before prices tend to be based 
again on long-term marginal cost, whereas concen-
tration processes (and thus the need for consolida-
tion of business units) will last much longer; 
• Companies with large financial resources, particu-
larly nuclear power operators, can develop sub-
stantially more market power and benefit more 
from the liberalised market than small utilities 
(economies of scale, purchase power); further, it is 
not clear whether antitrust bodies will in the long 
run be able to effectively avoid market power 
abuse by new oligopolistic market structures; 
• The substantial rationalisation of labour (by at 
least one third of the workforce under monopolis-
tic power generation and retail markets) occurred 
at the expense of energy efficiency/saving consult-
ing activities for small consumers, cross-financing 
of non-profitable public services, and reduced 
RD&D spending; 
• Offers for energy services, such as contracting for 
bigger customers, will continue to be drastically 
increased to bind large consumers for longer peri-
ods to electricity (and gas) deliveries. 
After the breakthrough at COP-6bis in Bonn and 
COP-7 in Marrakech, respectively, to salve and in 
2002 to eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol, present 
activities of CO2 mitigation are likely to be reinforced, 
and more energy-efficient and less carbon-intensive 
electricity generation and use will receive increased 
attention in the future. This in turn may have a substan-
tial impact on the utilities’ service portfolio, on the 
prospects for decentralised power generation options 
and efficient electricity use, and the export opportuni-
ties for highly efficient technologies to industrial and 
developing countries (‘leapfrogging’), especially to 
those currently in the process of opening their electric-
ity markets. 
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Abstract. In this paper some focal points with major 
influence on the power exchanges are described. The 
technical restrictions imposed to international trade of 
electricity by the networks and the costs for power 
transports are discussed. Further, the electricity sectors 
of four EU countries and three Central European coun-
tries are characterised concerning the market structure, 
the main energy sources for electricity production and 
the historical international exchanges. The marginal 
costs of power generation are calculated for the years 
2000, 2005 and 2010 to make projections of the future 
electricity exchanges using the example of Germany. 
Introduction 
The EU Directive 96/92/EC had an enormous impact 
on the electricity markets all over Europe. Former 
supply monopolies are transformed into active market 
players, a development still carrying on. An increasing 
part of the electricity consumers can choose their sup-
plier which may be located abroad. In some countries 
even the household consumers can buy their electricity 
from the supplier of their choice as of the first minute 
of liberalisation. In many countries, the new market 
elements led the incumbents and the newcomers on the 
markets to a tough price competition in the struggle for 
keeping their market share and for gaining new cus-
tomers. The opening of the market has also changed 
the relation between the utilities fundamentally. The 
international exchange of electricity which formerly 
based on long term contracts is mutating into a fiercely 
contested market with low margins.  
Company structure 
The electricity industry was organised in quite a vary-
ing manner across the Europe. Whereas in several 
countries like for example in France or in Central 
European countries, a single, state owned utility was 
serving the whole market, in other countries like Ger-
many, the market was divided among regional suppli-
ers, which could be as small as municipal utilities serv-
ing not more than a couple of thousands of customers. 
The end of the monopolies induced a long series of 
organisational changes. First of all, the vertically inte-
grated utilities had to be broken up. However the break 
up could also mean just to reorganise the companies 
internally, without creating truly independent entities. 
The change of the electricity industry was not so much 
                                                           
25 This paper is based on the result of study prepared by the 
authors for the German Federal Ministry of Economy and 
Technology. 
dominated by this break-up, but more by the mergers 
and acquisitions that took place since and are still con-
tinuing. EdF from France for example bought utilities 
all over Europe like London Electricity or ECK of 
Krakovia. In Germany for example, the new player 
E.On emerged out of the two players Veba and Viag. 
The interconnected network 
A major part of Europe is integrated in the intercon-
nected power grid of the UCTE already today (See 
Fig. 1) and DC-connections to the networks of Great 
Britain and of Scandinavia enlarge the area, in which 
imports and exports can be done. As a consequence of 
the destruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Serbia, 
the south-eastern part of the UCTE network had to be 
disconnected from the main part. Up to date, the con-
nection could not be restored, but approaches are made 
to reunite the networks by integrating the networks of 
Bulgaria and Romania. 
In 1995, the networks of the eastern part of Germany 
and of the CENTREL formed by Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary were synchronised 
with the UCTE. The exchange capacity between the 
UCTE and these countries increased to at least the 
double of the level it had before, which was limited to 
the transfer capacity of three DC-coupling stations. 
The transfer capacities to the Ukraine and to Russia (or 
Belarus respectively) are only very small today. The 
high voltage lines of the former unified energy system 
of the Eastern Block are still existing but they can not 
be used as long as the networks are not synchronised. 
Therefore only the capacity of several blocks of the 
power station Burshtyn which are synchronised with 
the UCTE network is transferred to Poland and Slova-
kia. In order to achieve a major increase of power 
exchange between Ukraine and Russia on the one hand 
and the UCTE-countries on the other hand, either the 
grids of the former two countries had to be synchro-
nised with the UCTE or additional DC-couplings had 
to be installed. Both of these options demand high 
investments, especially a possible synchronisation, 
because the network design of the UCTE grid and of 
the former Soviet Union’s grid differ in several impor-
tant fields. 
Limited transfer capacities 
Transfer capacity is limited not only to the neighbour-
ing networks in Eastern Europe,  but there are also 
bottlenecks along the borders in the interior of the 
UCTE-area and to the neighbouring networks of Great 
Britain and to Nordel. Examples are the connections 
between France and Italy, Germany and the Nether-
lands or Germany and the Centrel (in this case Poland 
and the Czech Republic). At most of these points, 
where congestion occurs, auctions were held by the 
network operators to allocate the transfer capacity in a 
transparent way. The prices paid at these auctions 
reached as high as € 95,000 per MW (see Table. 1). At 
the French-Italian border auctions were planned as well 
for 2001 but could not be held as they were contested 
at Italian courts. The transfer capacity was then allo-
cated following a scheme which put an advantage to 
the holders of long term contracts. This solution is to 
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criticise as it obstructs the development of market 
structures  
Outer margin of second UCTE area
UCTE
CENTREL
UES Russia
UES of Ukraine
NORDEL
Non-members of UCTE in second area
Others
Outer marginof UCTE-Area
 
Fig. 1. The main interconnected networks in Europe 
The interconnected network in Europe allows power 
exchanges only to a certain degree. (A prognosis for 
the transfer capacity is published by ETSO every half 
year.) So, the construction of new power lines could 
promote the international power exchanges and help in 
developing the market. Actually, only few actions for 
new lines are undertaken, and these concentrate mostly 
on the construction of submarine cables. The construc-
tion of new terrestrial lines is very difficult, as the 
environmental concerns are very high and often there 
is strong opposition from local stakeholders against 
such projects. Another problem is imposed by the fact 
that the electricity traders, who have the highest inter-
est in the augmentation of the transfer capacity work 
with contracts that usually are not longer than three 
years, a timeframe in which the investment into new 
power lines can not be paid back. 
Table 1. Results of auctions for transfer capacity 
Border and 
direction 
Network 
operators 
Results of auctions 
in €/MW 
Pl→D PSE, VEAG 25.017 
D→Pl PSE, VEAG -- 
CZ→D CEPS, E.on 4.380 
D→CZ CEPS, .É.on 40 
DK→D Nordel, E.on 14.200 
D→DK Nordel, E.on 2.095 
NL→D Tennet, RWE 750 
NL→D Tennet, E.on 307 
D→NL Tennet, RWE 92.203 
D→NL Tennet, E.on 95.484 
F→GB EDF, UKTSOA 65.832 
GB→F EDF, UKTSOA  
Data: E.on, 2000, TSO, 2001, Smith 2001 
Transmission tariffs 
To date, there is no European agreement concerning 
the costs for international power exchanges. The net-
work access still has to be negotiated bilaterally with 
every grid operator along the way of any transaction. 
The European Transmission System Operators associa-
tion (ETSO, 2000) had formulated a proposal for a 
fixed international network access fee that would have 
had to be paid once for the first border crossing and 
opened the way up to final destination. The proposed 
amount of 2 €/MWh was not accepted as the electricity 
traders judged it as too high. Negotiations were contin-
ued on a concept favoured by the European Commis-
sion that allocates at least a part of the costs to the final 
users of electricity and leaves a reduced fee to the 
electricity trade (DVG, 2001). On the one hand, reduc-
ing the costs for the power transmission would pro-
mote the international electricity market, on the other 
hand, it would set a misleading price signal favouring 
long distant transports at the expense of power genera-
tion close to the consumption. 
European countries’ power industries – exam-
ples 
France 
The electricity industry lies in the hands of the state- 
owned Electricité de France. Next to the EdF there are 
only few small electricity generating companies. The 
high integration of the electricity supply originates in 
the French tradition of a high responsibility of the state 
for the public services. The French government de-
cided to follow the minimum requirements of the 
European electricity directive. The market will be fully 
opened by 2006. EdF strongly defends its market posi-
tion and stated that in the year 2000 only five per cent 
of the eligible customer chose a different supplier 
(EdF, 2001). 
Power generation in France relies heavily on nuclear 
energy. The share of this energy source grew from less 
than a quarter to almost 80 % in the middle nineties. 
Apart from nuclear power hydropower has a share of 
around 15 %. France is the largest exporter for electric 
energy in Europe (62 TWh in 1999; UCTE, 1999). 
Compared to the inland use, France possesses a high 
surplus capacity for power generation. However, tak-
ing into account the long term contracts, EdF has to 
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fulfil, the generation capacity seems to touch its limits 
in peak load situations in winter times.  
Italy 
Already beginning of the nineties, plans for the privati-
sation of the state owned electricity company ENEL, 
which is the major producer of electricity in Italy 
(1997: 63.5 % of the Italian demand were produced by 
ENEL) have existed. But only with the European direc-
tive in the background the idea to end the monopoly 
could become reality. As of 2003 no supplier may 
cover more than 50 % of the electricity demand. The 
ENEL will be broken up into a holding of a production 
company, a transmission company and a distributor. 
The generation of electricity in Italy is mainly based 
on fuel oil and natural gas. These two energy sources 
make up around 70 % of generation with a growing 
share of natural gas (Unipede, 1998). Italy stopped the 
use of nuclear energy after a referendum in 1987. The 
use of the comparatively expensive energy sources oil 
and gas in medium aged and older power stations with 
lower efficiency leads to high costs of power genera-
tion in Italy. The cost structure and the decision not to 
use nuclear energy made grow the electricity imports 
to Italy in the last decade. Italy is the largest importer 
of electric energy in Europe (42 TWh net imports in 
1999; UCTE 1999). 
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the electricity industry was reor-
ganised already in the eighties in order to introduce 
some market elements. Production and distribution of 
power were separated strictly. The reorganisation led 
to a concentration of the industry into four generation 
companies and around 25 distributors. Apart from a 
few exceptions, only the generation companies were 
allowed to buy electricity from foreign suppliers. The 
market elements had only limited impacts, as there was 
no variation in prices and the relatively small distribu-
tion companies could not organise a sufficient market 
power against the supply monopoly of the generation 
companies organised in the association SEP. 
With the European directive the transformation of 
the electricity industry was continued. The market is 
opened stepwise until 2007, but already 2002, around 
two third demand can chose the supplier. Of the four 
generation companies three have been sold abroad. In 
Amsterdam, the power exchange APX was founded, 
contributing to a transparent market. 
The most important source of energy for power gen-
eration is natural gas with a share of slightly below 
60 % (1998: 58 %) followed by coal (around 30 %). 
The Netherlands are another major importing country 
for electricity. In the recent years the import balance 
never fell below 10 TWh, but it showed strong varia-
tions. 
Germany 
The electricity industry, which had no market elements 
before 1998, was opened in one big step giving the 
right to choose the supplier to every customer. Unex-
pectedly, the competition arose not only in the segment 
of big and medium sized industry customers but also in 
the field of private households. The German utilities 
started a big round of mergers to form bigger and po-
tentially stronger players on the newly formed market. 
There are two major players, RWE and E.on. EnBW is 
the third of the bigger players but considerably smaller. 
There will be probably a fourth big player, formed out 
of utilities in the north east of Germany but the out-
come of the merger of the utilities of Hamburg and 
Berlin and of the VEAG just faced a setback. The 
market transparency rose significantly with the start of 
operations of the power exchanges LPX and EEX, 
which recently merged. 
Power generation relies mainly on nuclear energy, 
hard coal and brown coal. None of the other sources of 
energy reaches the ten percent margin. Still one can 
note that the share of natural gas rose steadily over the 
last decade. In the future, the agreement between the 
federal government and the electricity industry to 
phase out the use of nuclear energy will have a major 
influence on the electricity industry. 
Imports and exports of electricity each are in the 
range of 6-8 % of the consumption. The balance of the 
exchanges always was lower and fluctuated between 
net imports and net exports (UCTE, 1999). 
Table 2. Characterisation of the four western countries 
analysed 
 F I NL D 
Electricity consumption 
1998 (TWh), final energy1 395 261 95 488 
Projection for 2010² 478 335 117 526 
Import/export balance 
1998 (TWh)³ -57 41 12 -1 
Market opening in 2000 30 % 30 % 33 % 100 % 
1 IEA, 2000, 2 European Commission, 1999, ³ UCTE, 1999 
Poland 
The Polish electricity industry is still dominated by the 
big national utility PSE. But still, there are already 
quite few market elements in the industry. By 2000 
around 43 % of the internal power demand was open to 
the market (DIW, 2000) and the doors of the Polish 
energy exchange (PPX) opened in the same year. Until 
2006 a complete opening of the market is foreseen in 
the energy law of 1997. Several regional utilities have 
been sold to foreign power companies. Even with the 
described market elements in place, there is only very 
low competition as many power stations have long 
term contracts with the national electricity company 
PSE. These contracts were made secure the invest-
ments in the modernisation of many older coal fired 
power stations. The traded volume at the PPX therefore 
is still low. Market access for foreign suppliers is not 
guaranteed but not excluded either. 
Hard coal and brown coal stood for more than 
95 %of the energy for power generation. Nuclear 
power has never been used in Poland. Even with the 
modernisation of power stations in the last years, in 
Poland still exists a big stock of older power stations 
with higher emissions. 
Poland is a net exporting country of electricity. Most 
of the exports are directed to the Czech Republic. At 
least part of the exports are transits to West-European 
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countries. The exchanges are also controlled by the 
regional distribution of the power stations in Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Eastern Germany, which in-
fluences strongly the physical flow of electricity in this 
region. At least part of the Polish exports to the Czech 
Republic are transits into western Europe. 
The Czech Republic 
The Czech electricity sector has already been trans-
formed partially and market elements are in force. The 
market power of the national energy supplier CEZ 
which produces around 70 to 75 % of the electricity is 
still predominant. Next to the CEZ, there are producers 
which own the CHP-stations. These power stations, 
providing the heating energy for bigger cities, have 
been privatised already in the beginning of the nineties. 
On top, there are several independent power producers 
on the supply market (Strmiska, 1999). There are eight 
regional distribution companies, which have to buy 
part of their demand from the national supplier CEZ at 
set prices. For the rest of their demand, they may chose 
freely the supplier which may be abroad. 
The Czech electricity production relies strongly on 
brown coal, with a share of over 50 %. Second in the 
order of importance is nuclear energy, which will in-
crease its share with the full operation of the Temelin 
power station. According to CEZ, the coal fired power 
stations have been modernised already and do fulfil the 
environmental requirements for the accession to the 
European Union. Although still very low, the share of 
natural gas for power generation is about to increase. 
The foreign trade of electricity is of high importance. 
The Czech Republic is a net exporter of electricity, 
although there is a serious amount of imports espe-
cially from Poland. Main destinations for exports are 
Germany and Austria. 
Slovakia 
In Slovakia, the transformation of the electricity sector 
started later than in most of the other countries in Cen-
tral Europe. First steps were made in 1998 with a new 
formulation of the energy law (DIW, 2000). In order to 
be able to fulfil the accession criteria to the European 
Union, the energy policy was reviewed again in 2000. 
The single buyer system, which was set out in the law 
of 1998 should be transformed into a network access 
system. Since beginning of 2001, about 20 % of cus-
tomers can choose their supplier amongst domestic 
companies. The access of foreign suppliers to the Slo-
vak electricity system is not foreseen in the medium 
term. 
Nuclear Energy is the most important source of en-
ergy for electricity production in Slovakia with a share 
of 47 % in 1999, followed by Coal and hydropower. 
The share of nuclear power will probably continue to 
increase, as the Bohunice power station, commissioned 
end of 1999, will unfold its influence only in the fol-
lowing years. 
Slovakia used to be an electricity importing country. 
With the commissioning of the Bohunice power sta-
tion, the balance of foreign exchanges will change to 
net exports of power.  
Table 3. Characterisation of the three Central European 
countries analysed 
 PL CZ SK 
Electricity consumption 
1998 (TWh), final energy1 112 52 21 
Projection for 2010² 152 69 31 
Import/export balance 
1998 (TWh)1 -4,2 -2,4 4,0 
Market liberalisation in 
2000 43 % - - 
1 IEA, 2000, 2 Unipede, 1998 
 
Projection of generation cost 
Market background 
In several countries, including Germany, the utilities 
kept a high amount of surplus generation capacity. In 
the time of the monopolies, this surplus was no burden 
and could be used to keep a considerably high power 
quality. Non-profitable power stations could be sup-
ported in vertically integrated companies.  
The quickly emerging markets and the price compe-
tition pushed down the wholesale prices for electricity 
to marginal costs of generation in most of the load 
situations. As a consequence, many generating compa-
nies started to shut down power stations with a high 
cost structure in order to decrease the losses that could 
no more be supported by other parts of the business. 
The structure of power generation in the European 
countries plays a major role in the actual wholesale 
prices for electricity. In Germany, the prices dropped 
down to the costs of a depreciated coal fired power 
station. In Italy, the prices are considerably higher 
because there, many older less efficient oil and gas 
fired power stations set the marginal cost in many load 
situations. The shutting down of capacity and the re-
powering of existing power stations and several new 
installations lead to a gradual change in the cost struc-
ture.  
Costs of generation 
Using a database with power station data from the 
European Countries, the marginal costs of electricity 
generation in the single countries were calculated. 
These are a good indicator the competitiveness of the 
electricity industry in the European market. The data-
base, provided by a manufacturer of power stations, 
contained data of five year age classes of different 
types of power stations. Further technical data had to 
be introduced, e.g. concerning the availability and the 
average efficiency of the power stations of a specific 
type and age class. Here mainly the IKARUS database 
was used (Stein u. Wagner, 1999). Further assumptions 
had to be made for the fuel costs. The electricity de-
mand was used to calculate the load for a typical aver-
age winter day load situation. The data of UCTE 
(1999) and of Unipede (1998). The demand was as-
sumed to be inelastic in respect to the supply price. As 
the calculations should represent the short-term price 
setting, this assumption will not impose a major error 
to the results.  
The results shown in Fig. 2 reveal clearly the cost 
differences in generation in the different countries. 
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France with its high nuclear capacity has very low 
marginal costs in the area of 1 €-Cent/kWh whereas 
Italy has the highest Prices in this group of countries in 
2000. In this year, Germany with marginal costs just 
over 2 €-Cents/kWh lies in the mid range but climbs 
into the upper cost region in 2005 owing to the fact that 
several power stations will be taken of the grid, which 
do not reach enough operation hours with positive 
margin under market conditions. The calculation re-
sults, with modest estimations for the growth of real 
fuel prices, show little changes in the marginal costs in 
four of the seven analysed countries. The existing 
capacity is still sufficient to fulfil the domestic demand 
within the coming decade. In Poland, the shut down of 
older capacities and the projected growth of the elec-
tricity demand lead to a rise in marginal costs at the 
end of the period. 
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Fig. 2. Marginal Costs of Generation in seven Euro-
pean Countries 
Future international exchanges of electricity 
The liberalisation of the electricity markets has 
changed the structure of the industry strongly. But still 
the market opening has not yet led to a massive switch 
of end-use customers to foreign suppliers. Best exam-
ple is France where the incumbent EdF defended its 
market successfully up to date. 
But the cost differences in generation and the result-
ing price differences on the wholesale markets are a 
motor for a continuously growing international ex-
change of electricity. The limits to this market are set 
by the network capacities, which out of today’s per-
spective will not be expanded in the coming decade 
significantly. 
The price development in the German market and the 
tough competition will probably lead to increasing 
imports of electric power to Germany and to a demand 
of exports. It is very likely, that independent power 
producers will try to find access to the markets of the 
Netherlands and of Italy, both of which were main 
importers in the last decade. This will increase compe-
tition for German exports to the neighbouring Nether-
lands and set free generation capacity which was used 
to settle demand in Italy for possible exports to Ger-
many. The more or less balanced foreign trade with 
electricity of the past will probably change into a im-
port surplus which could grow to an import surplus of 
as much as 30 TWh per year in the period between 
2005 and 2010. 
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Session 2: The Internal Energy Market: Implementation of the EU Di-
rectives in the Accession Countries  
Rapporteur’s Summary by Eugene D. Cross, ECN Policy Studies, The Netherlands 
 
 
Session Two focussed on the developments in electric-
ity and gas liberalisation in four accession countries – 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania – 
in order to reveal the progress and obstacles with im-
plementation of the Electricity and Gas Directives in a 
more specific country context. The first two speakers 
were the respective regulators from Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, namely Peter Kaderjak and Pavel 
Brychta, whose presentations were followed by an 
update on Polish developments from Mr. Bolesta from 
the Office of European Integration in Poland, and on 
Romanian developments by George Lavrov (ISPE- 
Romania). 
In the first presentation, Mr. Kaderjak, director gen-
eral of the Hungarian Energy Office (HEO), outlined 
the ownership, structure and regulation of the Hungar-
ian electricity and gas sector, as well as the recent 
developments in Hungarian liberalisation measures.  
The Hungarian Electricity Act (which was passed in 
December 2001) provides the basis for introduction of 
competition.  The new law will enter into force as of 1 
January 2003, with a few special exceptions set forth in 
the closing provisions. In other words, development of 
electricity licences, codes and regulations will take 
place during 2002, and the market will open from 
2003.  Network access will be regulated, authorisations 
procedures will be used for new generation capacity 
(and not tendering procedures), and licence holders 
must unbundle their accounts.  An independent system 
operator (ISO) has been established (MAVIR) with the 
task of controlling the unified transmission system and 
the entire Hungarian power system at national level.  
Its basic duties and powers are set forth in the Hungar-
ian Electricity Act, and include tendering for network 
development, integration of electricity sales contracts 
and co-ordination of the execution of electricity sales, 
various planning functions, and the public acquisition, 
provision and regulation (in agreement with the HEO) 
of ancillary services.   
The market opening process in Hungary is burdened 
by pre-existing long-term PPAs that were signed five 
years ago.  These are difficult to unwind, and the gov-
ernment must determine how to press forward with 
their renegotiation.  There is a question of whether the 
proposed consolidation of IPPs as a means of dealing 
with the PPAs is consistent with the Commission’s 
interpretation of the EU state aid rules. The HEO will 
have to make a determination on this issue.  Regarding 
the HEO he heads, Mr. Kaderjak stated that it is not 
completely independent, not now or never, given that 
he has never seen a “completely independent energy 
regulator”. 
Pavel Brychta, the Chairman of the Czech Energy 
Regulatory Office (ERO) presented the recent activi-
ties and principle work of the new regulatory body. 
The ERO, established as of 1 January 2001 as a sepa-
rate authority distinct from the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade, has been enabled by law to support eco-
nomic competition and protect consumers in those 
energy sectors where competition is not possible. The 
Energy Act stipulates that the ERO is an administrative 
office “having a special heading in the national 
budget”. Furthermore, the Act states that the ERO 
“shall be headed by its Chairperson who shall be ap-
pointed, and may be removed, by the government” 
only on the basis of specific causes listed in the Act.  
The ERO has been empowered, inter alia, to lay down 
the general “rules to organise the electricity market”, 
decide disputes over network access, approve the rules 
of operation of the TSO and DSOs, and “issue legal 
provisions for the regulation, negotiation, and control 
of prices in the energy area”. 
Following the presentations of the Hungarian and 
Czech regulators, the subsequent discussion focused on 
the abilities of the regulators and competition authori-
ties to promote and sustain competition in the market.  
A distinction was noted between the ex post powers of 
competition authorities, which review transactions that 
have taken place or for which official (merger) notifi-
cation has been made, with the ex ante tasks of regula-
tors, which must monitor the level of competition in 
the market and approve requests of companies to un-
dertake certain activities. 
Mr. Cross observed that some countries, such as 
Britain, have established concurrent jurisdiction such 
that competition office and the sectoral regulators (e.g. 
the electricity and gas regulator OFGEM) can enforce the 
prohibitions of competition law using their concurrent 
powers. He pointed out that many of the accession 
countries have developed the relationship between 
their energy legislation and competition legislation 
(and the defined inter-relationship of their respective 
regulatory and competition authorities) by including 
cross-references to the competition legislation in their 
energy legislation.  In Estonia, for example, there is a 
cross-reference in the 1998 Estonian Energy Act to the 
Competition Act’s definition of enterprises dominating 
the market.  In Hungary, cross-references to the Hungar-
ian Competition Act can be found in each of the sub-
sectoral energy laws.  However, this is not the case in the 
Czech Republic, where the Czech Energy Act of Decem-
ber 2000 does not refer specifically to the Czech Act on 
Protection of Competition.   
Mr. Bolesta presented his detailed assessment of Po-
land’s compliance with both the Electricity and Gas 
Directives, focusing on anticipated legislative adjust-
ments and other measures. He reported that a new 
energy act was under preparation to replace the 1997 
Energy Act, and his prediction was for its adoption 
during 2002. The subsequent discussion addressed the 
level of actual competition in the Polish power market.  
Mr. Bolesta was asked about the actual number of 
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customers who had switched suppliers, but this infor-
mation was not available.  However, he noted that 70% 
of the market is reserved under power purchase agree-
ments (PPAs), and therefore only 30% of the market is 
at issue and under discussion.  
Mr. Lavrov presented his paper on the evolution of 
the Romanian electricity market, reporting the creation 
of a wholesale power market in 2000 and “significant 
progress in deregulation of energy sector and in estab-
lishing a competitive electricity market.” He also noted 
that two distribution companies are scheduled for pri-
vatisation.   
The subsequent discussion addressed a mix of topics, 
as various priorities for discussion and research were 
suggested and addressed in the time available.  Based 
on his discussion with other participants, Miha Tomsic 
suggested distribution tariffs as a topic, as well as spe-
cial “social tariffs” for low-income consumers.  It was 
acknowledged that further attention to the regulation of 
ancillary services was needed. The Commission’s new  
proposals for the electricity sector do not mention 
whether such regulatory authorities should have the 
power to oversee ancillary services, which heretofore 
has been left to the discretion of the Member States to 
regulate.  Without this, competition in the market may 
not develop sufficiently.  
Mirek Maly (SCRI/Enviros – Prague) noted trends in 
the coal market and predicted that the coal sector 
would survive in the Czech Republic (where gas-fired 
CCGTs have reportedly had difficulty finding a mar-
ket, and where coal-fired power is underpriced only by 
nuclear).  Miha Tomsic provided an update on the 
future of the coal sector in Slovenia.  In Slovakia, the 
most expensive electricity was reported to be coal-
fired.    
A final suggested topic was on security of electricity 
supply and the role of pumped storage capacity. A 
delegate from Slovakia noted concerns over the owner-
ship of pumped storage, and a suggestion was made 
that the pumped storage facilities in Slovakia should be 
owned by the power distribution companies.   
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Abstract. The paper will present state of play of transposi-
tion of the Gas and Electricity Directives to the Polish law 
system. The paper is focused not only on legislative adjust-
ments. It will also present other measures undertaken to 
match the EU requirements. The ultimate goal of the paper is 
to assess level of compliance and find major gaps. The next 
step is to propose the possible way to solve existing problems 
and close the gaps. The paper will present possible future for 
the energy markets in Poland with its advantages and disad-
vantages. Assessment what was already done and what still 
needs further attention is also of vital importance. 
Introduction 
Poland is on its way to the European Union. The ad-
justment process accompanies accession negotiations. 
It covers all fields of economy but the emphasis is put 
on the European Single Market regulations. One of the 
elements of this process is adjustment in the energy 
sector. A lot has been done in the last couple of years 
but some changes are still to be done. 
Negotiations 
Energy chapter negotiations lasted for almost two 
years. The chapter was provisionally closed on 
27.07.01. Poland had two important problems. One 
was how to comply with Community legislation con-
cerning obligatory stocks of crude oil and petroleum 
products. The second was the speed of opening of the 
Polish gas market. At the beginning Polish negotiators 
asked for two transition periods, 8 years to comply 
with oil stocks requirements and 3 years to reach re-
quired level of opening of the gas market. 
After two years of talks with the European Commis-
sion it was agreed that Poland would have to build the 
required  oil stocks capacity by the end of 2008. Poland 
agreed to withdraw its request for the transition period 
concerning the gas market opening after a number of 
analyses concerning situation on the Polish gas market 
had been made. 
At the end of the day negotiations are concluded and 
the most important part of the adjustment process has 
already begun. The aim of this paper is to briefly pre-
sent the state of play of Gas and Electricity Directives 
implementation in Poland.  
Gas Directive 
Structure of the Polish gas sector 
Poland consumes ca. 12 bio. m³ of natural gas. 4 bio. 
m³ are extracted in the country and 8 bio. m³ come 
from import, mainly from Russia on the basis of Jamal 
“take or pay” contract. According to official prognosis 
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the natural gas consumption will increase to reach 22-
27 bio. m³ a year in 2010. 
The Polish gas market is controlled by the state 
owned monopoly enterprise Polish Oil and Gas Com-
pany (PGNiG). To match the Gas Directive require-
ments Poland has decided to introduce wide range of 
structural changes in the sector, which should enable 
better transposition of the Directive and introducing of 
real competition. To this end existing monopoly 
PGNiG will be divided into 6 independent undertak-
ings: 
• four distribution companies, 
• one prospecting and extracting company, 
• transmission company, which will manage gas 
stocks and existing long term contracts. This com-
pany will keep the name PGNiG. 
The above-mentioned structure will be established as 
of 1.1.2002. At the end of the day, all the new compa-
nies are already registered and wait for assets transfer 
from PGNiG. 
The next step in the sector restructuring will be pri-
vatisation. The prospecting and extracting company 
will be sold by public listing. Shares of 4 distribution 
companies will be offered to the chosen investors. 
They will be allowed to acquire the majority share-
holds. According to the existing restructuring program, 
transmission company PGNiG will not be privatised 
within next 5 years. After this period decision about 
the future of the company will be taken. 
It has to be stressed that the new structure will create 
a very good basis for introducing of the real competi-
tion to the sector. On this basis a good piece of regula-
tion must be elaborated. The complex amendment of 
the Energy Law is already in the pipeline. Existing 
regulations are generally very good, but there are still 
some gaps between the Polish law and the Gas Direc-
tive. 
Polish gas market regulation 
The Polish gas market is regulated by two acts: the 
Energy Law and the Geological and Mining Law. 
Geological and Mining Law regulates the market of all 
natural resources extracted in Poland. In respect to the 
gas market it touches only on prospecting and extrac-
tion of this fuel. It sets safety requirements and regu-
lates authorisation procedures for prospecting and 
extraction of natural gas. It was last amended in July 
2001 and it is now fully compliant with the Gas Direc-
tive requirements. The 1997 Energy Law regulates 
remaining gas market issues and other energy market 
parts. It represents a major benchmark in the process of 
adapting Polish energy markets to market economy 
principles. It provides the necessary legal conditions 
for economic activity in the areas of fuels, electricity 
generation, transmission, distribution and trade, intro-
duces TPA and sets the general framework for gradual 
market opening. 
In the process of transposing the Gas Directive to the 
Polish law system secondary acts are also important. 
• Regulation on tariff setting mechanism describes 
the conditions of tariff setting by market operators. 
It defines the TPA as the regulated regime, as the 
tariffs must be approved prior their entry into force 
by the regulator. This regulation includes also 
timetable for reaching the market prices free of 
cross-subsidies. 
• Regulation on connection to the gas network sets 
the conditions for connection to the gas network. 
• Regulation on the TPA regime sets the timetable 
for market opening for eligible customers. 
• Regulation on diversification of gas supplies sets 
the rules of gas imports. It is so called “security of 
supply” regulation. 
Market regulator 
Poland fulfils requirements of the Gas Directive in this 
field. The Energy Regulatory Authority (ERA) was 
established in 1997, on the basis of the Energy Law. 
ERA is the energy market regulator. The office is re-
sponsible not only for natural gas market regulation but 
for electricity and heating markets as well. The compe-
tencies on the gas market are: 
• granting authorisations for fuels production, gas 
transmission and distribution, trade and stocking; 
• regulation of natural gas prices; 
• quality control of the supplied natural gas; 
• settling the disputes concerning connection to the 
gas network; 
• co-operation with anti-monopoly authorities to 
promote competition in the gas sector; 
• assembling information about the gas market and 
investments in the sector. 
There is one gap between Polish legislation and the 
acquis. It is impossible to grant an authorisation either 
for transmission or for distribution. It could only be 
granted for “transmission and distribution”. This prob-
lem will be solved by the existing draft amendment of 
the Energy Law. 
There is also a need to add to the competencies of 
ERA right to assemble information about the gas mar-
ket and investment on this market as to transmit it to 
the European Commission. This amendment is also 
envisaged in the mentioned draft. 
Tariffs 
Tariff setting is regulated by the Energy Law and the 
Regulation on tariffs. At the end of the day cross-
subsidy does still exist. According to PGNiG sources it 
will be abolished within 3 years. The timetable envis-
ages 5% raise over inflation ratio in the first year and 
15% raise in each of two next years. That should bring 
gas prices to the market level in 2004. 
The ERA President approves all the tariffs, as the 
Polish TPA is a regulated regime. It is important, that 
if the conditions of the free gas market will be fulfilled, 
ERA President might resign from approving tariffs. It 
is consistent with the Gas Directive but not with the 
draft Directive, as the EC opts for fully regulated TPA 
regime for transmission and distribution. Poland has 
ENER Forum 2. Monitoring the progress of the implementation of the EU Gas and Electricity Directives:  
Are European markets becoming competitive? Prague, Czech Republic, 15-16 November 2001 
ENER 24.01 39 
 
this fact in mind and any change of the Energy Law 
will be proposed if needed. 
Third Party Access 
Regulated type of TPA was introduced in Poland. The 
tariffs are regulated and the customers know the condi-
tions and prices connected with the network access in 
advance. In this respect Polish law is fully consistent 
with Gas Directive. But as it was mentioned before, in 
special circumstances, ERA President might resign 
from approving the tariffs and this may result in transi-
tion to the negotiated TPA. This issue requires further 
attention. 
At the end of the day 25 customers are eligible to 
choose the gas supplier. The problem is that the regula-
tion on tariffs requires distant related tariffs and these 
are not present yet. In this respect TPA system is not 
working practically. The other hurdle is that PGNiG is 
still one vertically integrated monopoly and possibili-
ties to switch the gas supplier are very week. This 
should change with 1.1.2002 as distant related tariffs 
will be introduced and the monopoly finally abolished. 
The main gap on the way to European structures is 
the nature of Polish TPA. The free choice of suppliers 
exists, but it is restricted only for gas extracted in Po-
land. This is the major concern of market operators 
from EU countries. During the negotiations Poland 
asked for transitional period concerning market open-
ing for imported gas, but finally decision was made to 
lift the barrier. Result is that TPA will have to be 
granted to all the market operators on the day of acces-
sion. 
Opening of the gas market 
The Regulation on the TPA regime includes the time-
table of opening of the gas market. Table 1 shows both, 
Polish timetable and this envisaged in the Gas Direc-
tive.  
Table 1. Opening of the gas markets in Poland and EU 
countries 
Type of eligible  
customers 
EU countries Poland 
Customers buying 
more than 25 mio. m3 
10 August 2000 1 July 2000 
Customers buying 
more than 15 mio m3 
10 August 2003 1 January 2004 
 
Customers buying 
more than 5 mio. m3 
10 August 2008 5 December 2005  
- full opening of the 
gas market 
 
It is easy to see that Polish timetable is far more 
radical and in contrary to the Gas Directive it sets out 
the final date of full gas market opening. It has to be 
stressed that Polish regulations are almost compliant 
with the Draft Directive26. The single gap here is to 
include into the eligible customers all gas-fired power 
generators. It is already envisaged in the Energy Law 
amendment. 
                                                           
26 Draft Directive amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and 
natural gas, COM (2001)125, Brussels, 13.3.2001. 
Unbundling 
According to the Gas Directive, the integrated natural 
gas undertakings are obliged to keep in their internal 
accounting separate accounts for their natural gas 
transmission, distribution and storage activities, and, 
where appropriate, consolidated accounts for non-gas 
activities, as they would be required to do if the activi-
ties in question were carried out by separate undertak-
ings, with a view to avoiding discrimination, cross-
subsidisation and distortion of competition. These 
internal accounts shall include a balance sheet and a 
profit and loss account for each activity. 
In Poland cross-subsidisation still exists as it was 
mentioned before. In addition, the Energy Law pro-
vides only for keeping separate accounts (apart from 
consolidated accounts for non-gas activities). There is 
no obligation for gas undertakings to prepare separate 
balance sheet and a profit and loss account for each of 
the activities. This will be changed by the prepared 
Energy Law amendment. The additional advantage will 
be restructuring of the sector organisational structure, 
what was already described above. 
Security of supply 
Last but not least is the problem of security of supply. 
Poland bears in mind security of supply policy, which 
is nowadays one of the main concerns in the EU.27  
The ordinance of the Council of Ministers of October 
24, 2000 on the minimum level of diversification of 
gas supplies from sets the maximum level of gas sup-
plies from one country. For the years 2001-2002 the 
level is 88%. For the next two years supplies from one 
country will diminish to 78% level to reach 49% in the 
year 2020. 
To meet the ambitious goals set by the regulation Po-
land is diversifying its sources of supply. 
• On 2 July 2001 the Polish Oil and Gas Company 
(PGNiG) signed a contract with a Danish company 
DONG for a supply of 2 billion m3 of gas annually 
for the period of eight years, starting in 2003; 
• On 3 September 2001 a Polish-Norwegian contract 
was signed for the delivery of natural gas. The 
contract provides the delivery of 74 billion m3 of 
natural gas in the years 2008-2024. 
Electricity Directive 
Structure of the sector 
The structure of electricity sector in Poland allows 
introduction of the efficient regulation. At the end of 
the day there are no vertically integrated undertakings 
on the market. Instead there are three clearly separated 
sub-sectors: generation, transmission, and distribution. 
This is a very good basis for fair competition. As anti-
trust authorities are against vertical integration, looking 
for profit market operators are subject to horizontal 
integration. Parallel process is the privatisation of 
                                                           
27 Green Paper - Towards a European strategy for the security of 
energy supply, COM(2000) 769, Brussels, 29 November 2000. 
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stated-owned companies, which also changes structure 
of the sector. 
Existing structure not only lays down a very good 
basis for introducing pro-market regulations, but also it 
is a great possibility to follow the Electricity Directive 
requirements. Unbundling is easier, TSO independence 
guarantied and competition easy to monitor. 
Electricity market regulation 
The Energy Law provides the necessary legal condi-
tions for economic activity in electricity generation, 
transmission, distribution and trade. It introduces TPA 
and sets the general framework for gradual market 
opening. It is considered as a very good regulation for 
electricity market. It is also important, that it was pre-
pared at the same time as the Electricity Directive. 
That is why both regulations are similar. Some gaps 
still exist, but these are relatively easy to close. The 
most difficult task for the future will be to solve some 
political problems like speed of the market opening. 
All the existing gaps will be closed by the above-
mentioned Energy Law amendment, which is already 
in the pipeline. What is important, Polish experts want 
to transpose some of the regulations envisaged in the 
Draft Directive. 
Apart from the Energy Law, three secondary acts are 
very important for the market regulation. 
• Regulation on tariff setting mechanism sets the 
conditions of tariff setting by market operators. It 
defines the TPA as the regulated regime, as the 
tariffs must be approved prior their entry into force 
by the regulator. 
• Regulation on connection to the transmission 
network sets the conditions for connection to the 
transmission grid. 
• Regulation on the TPA regime sets the timetable 
for market opening. 
Market regulator 
The Energy Regulatory Authority was established in 
1997, on the basis of the Energy Law. ERA is the en-
ergy market regulator. As it was mentioned before the 
office is responsible i.e. for electricity market regula-
tion. The competencies on the electricity market are 
similar to these on the gas market. 
• granting authorisations for electricity generation, 
electricity transmission and distribution, electricity 
trade; 
• regulation of electricity prices; 
• control of supplied electricity quality; 
• settling disputes concerning connection to the 
network; 
• co-operation with anti-monopoly authorities to 
promote competition in the electricity sector; 
• assembling the information about electricity mar-
ket and investments in the sector. 
As the competencies of the regulator are similar to 
the gas market the gaps are similar as well. ERA Presi-
dent can not grant an authorisation either for transmis-
sion or for distribution. It could only be granted for 
“transmission and distribution”. The second gap is lack 
of competence to assemble information about invest-
ments in the electricity market in order to transmit it to 
the European Commission.  
Tariffs 
Tariff setting is regulated by the Energy Law and the 
Regulation on tariffs. Despite pro-market structure 
cross-subsidisation exists in the electricity sector. Ac-
cording to the government declarations Poland will 
remove price distortions in 2004. 
Taking into account the advanced process of imple-
menting the competitive market mechanisms, the 
President of ERA acknowledged electricity market as 
competitive. Therefore, since 1 July 2001 enterprises 
having authorisations for electricity generation or trade 
have been exempted from the duty to submit tariffs for 
approval. 
Still  to be approved are the tariffs set by: 
• enterprises generating electricity and heat – as 
regards energy that has to be purchased in accor-
dance with the Regulation of the Minister of the 
Economy of 15 December 2000 on obligatory pur-
chase of electricity generated from renewable 
sources and electricity from co-generation and the 
scope of the obligation;  
• transmission system operator; 
• companies with authorisations for electricity 
transmission and distribution. 
The above-mentioned decision makes it difficult to 
define type of the TPA regime on electricity market. 
But the most important thing is that transmission sys-
tem operator and distributors have to have its tariffs 
approved before they enter into force (Regulated TPA). 
That solution is fully compliant with the Draft Direc-
tive. 
Opening of the electricity market 
The opening of the Polish electricity market is based 
on the Energy Law and the Regulation on the time 
schedule of obtaining by particular customers the ac-
cess to transmission services. The Table 2 compares 
Polish timetable with these envisaged by the Electricity 
Directive. 
Table 2. Opening of the electricity markets in Poland 
and EU countries 
Type of eligible  
Customers 
EU countries Poland 
Customers buying 
more than 40 GWh 
19 February 1999 1 January 2000 
 
Customers buying 
more than 20 GWh 
19 February 2000 - 
 
Customers buying 
more than 10 GWh 
- 1 January 2002 
 
Customers buying 
more than 9 GWh 
19 February 2003 - 
Customers buying 
more than 1 GWh 
- 1 January 2004 
 
Customers buying less 
than 1 GWh 
2005? 
 
5 December 2005 
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It is hard to compare two above described timetables 
as they define different customers groups. But gener-
ally speaking the market opening speed is similar. 
What is important here, Poland has defined date of 100 
% market opening as for December 2005. Similar date 
could be found in the Draft Directive. 
The gap in this field is again Polish TPA regime. The 
free choice of suppliers exists, but it is restricted only 
for electricity generated in Poland. This problem still 
exists, but it was already agreed that any barriers for 
foreign players will be removed on the day of acces-
sion Poland to the EU.  
Unbundling 
The same gap exists here as in case of natural gas mar-
ket. The Energy Law provides only for keeping sepa-
rate accounts and there is no obligation for electricity 
undertakings to prepare separate balance sheet and a 
profit and loss account for each of the activities. The 
gap will be closed by the Energy Law amendment. 
The important advantage for unbundling is the exist-
ing structure of the sector. It allows keeping transpar-
ency especially when we consider access to the trans-
mission or distribution system. 
Summary 
It has to be said that the implementation process of the 
Gas and Electricity Directives is going well. The com-
plex amendment of the Energy Law is already in the 
pipeline and its regulations will facilitate closing the 
gaps mentioned in this paper. 
Electricity market structure is functioning well and it 
should be a good example for the gas sector to follow. 
If all the changes envisaged by the draft law or gov-
ernmental programs will be introduced, there is a real 
opportunity for Poland to become the important player 
on the internal energy market. 
Nevertheless, there are still some major problems, 
which are really difficult to resolve. Restructuring of 
the gas market is under the question mark. This sector 
was always influenced by the politics as the strategic 
for the Polish economy. All the changes in the struc-
ture and especially in the ownership are really difficult 
to introduce.  
For the electricity sector stranded costs still remain a 
problem. Despite several drafted solutions the issue 
remains unsolved. The scale and impact on the compe-
tition is great as the amount of electricity traded under 
long-term contracts reach 70%. 
Bearing in mind the problems mentioned above, 
there is still a long way to go towards establishing a 
competitive Polish energy market. Despite actions 
undertaken, still a lot of work is to be done. Good 
pieces of regulation are in the pipeline, but some issues 
can not be solved by the legislation. The good co-
operation between legislators and market operators is 
needed. New investment, especially in the interconnec-
tion capacity is also a must. 
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Development of the Romanian 
electricity market 
George Lavrov, Institute of Power Studies and Design 
– ISPE, Romania  
Introduction 
The total available capacity of the Romanian genera-
tion system at the end of 1999 was 15,079 MW, of 
which 40% were in hydropower plants. Due to the 
decrease of the electricity consumption, the electric 
power system developed an overcapacity. It is clear  
the transition to a market economy had a strong impact 
on the electricity sector, as consumption decreased 
between 1989 and 1999 about 5.6% per year from 71.4 
TWh to 39.9 TWh. 
Taking into consideration the evolution of Romanian 
energy sector in the transition period, it is important to 
achieve for the Romanian energy market  a proper fuel 
policy, an economic evolution of domestic primary 
energy resources, an adequate energy pricing policy 
and a proper restructuring of the economy. 
Evolution of the Romanian electricity market 
Romania is engaged in the process of accession to the 
EU and is making efforts to  align to the provisions of 
the EU Directive 96/92/EC regarding common rules 
for the internal electricity market. Consequently, the 
following conditions have been  considered as priori-
ties for the creation of the electricity market in Roma-
nia: 
• division of the production, transport/dispatch and 
distribution/supply activities: 
• access to the transportation and distribution net-
works correlated with the appearance  of eligible 
consumers; in this way it is expected to encourage 
the introduction of the competition to the distribu-
tion/supply side and the improvement of the pro-
duction offer. 
In this direction, Romania has taken  the following 
steps : 
• ratification of the both Energy Charter Treaty and 
Energy Charter Protocol (year 1997); 
• creation of the National Authority for Regulation 
in the field of Energy – ANRE (year 1998); 
• approval by the Parliament of the “Electricity and 
Heat Law” (year 1998); 
• approval of the “National Strategy for privatiza-
tion for year 1999” with the main objective of the 
reform policy to end the restructuring of the en-
ergy sector by creation of the regulation and insti-
tutional framework; continuation of the national 
energy companies restructuring by separation and 
establishment of  independent commercial compa-
nies suitable to be privatized; creation of the 
Commercial Operator, and the mechanisms and in-
frastructure for Electricity Stock; increase of the 
interconnection degree with the UCTE networks; 
• the establishment for year 2000 of an initial open-
ing of the electricity market to the competition (in 
the first stage to 10% of the final electricity con-
sumption about 4 TWh). 
The Romanian wholesale market of electricity was 
created in the year 2000. It isdevelops based on the 
principles deriving from the primary Romanian legisla-
tion and from the necessity of the alignment to the 
provisions of Directive 96/92/EC. Important aspects 
include the following:  : 
• the market operates through commercial arrange-
ments between the participants concerning the 
electricity and the associated services, defined in 
the Commercial Code of the wholesale electricity 
market; 
• the regulatory framework assures an non-
discriminatory and transparent treatment for all 
participants in to the market; 
• at the level of the producers and suppliers, the 
market becomes gradually competitive; it is im-
posed a gradual transition for an efficient control 
of the risks,  in  view the initial structure of the 
sector (monopoly, vertical integrated); for trans-
portation and distribution activities, the market is 
fully regulated; 
• the access to the market is performed by the li-
censes; 
• any participant in  the market (license holder, 
eligible consumer) is justified to have a  regulated 
access to the transportation and distribution net-
works; 
• the market of the regulated contracts regarding 
prices and quantities, operates in parallel with the 
competitiveness market performed by bilateral ne-
gotiates contracts and  the spot sales and purchas-
ing; at the beginning the spot market appears to 
compensate the contracts differences; 
• the deliveries on the wholesale market are based 
on the producers’ offers and are established 
through a specific mechanism defined in the 
“Regulation for electric system programming and 
dispatching”; 
• the eligible consumers can choose their electricity 
suppliers that  performs contracts, bilateral and 
negotiated (quantities and prices); 
• connection to the electricity transportation and 
distribution networks is considered an obliged 
public service, regulated;  
• any new participant to the market is treated in the 
same way as the existing participants; 
• the market access and applied prices are non-
discriminatory for the electricity generation tech-
nologies and energy resources used.  
The market manager is Commercial Operator, which 
ensures the operation of the market mechanisms ac-
cording to the “Commercial Code of the electricity 
wholesale market”. In the short term, the main partici-
pants to the market will be producers, buyers (distribu-
tors, suppliers, producers, eligible consumers), trans-
portation operator and system operator. For mid term, 
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by reduction of the risks and fluidity of the financial 
operations, the intermediary agencies for supplying 
(energy brokers), representatives of the producers or 
consumers will be admitted. 
From the point of view of the commercial market re-
lations, the Romanian electricity producers can be 
grouped such as: 
• producers proceeded from National Electricity 
Company: Termoelectrica and Hidroelectrica; 
• independent power producers (including National 
Company “Nuclearelectrica”); 
• auto-producers.  
The producers - owners of the capacity generation 
portfolio - sell electricity to suppliers and eligible con-
sumers.. The commercial arrangements are regulated 
by the following: portfolio framework contracts for the 
sale/purchase of the electricity, framework contracts 
for transportation and system services, framework 
contracts for the supply of electricity to eligible con-
sumers, and  framework contracts for electricity acqui-
sition from independent power producers or auto-
producers. Portfolio framework contracts for electricity 
sale/purchase are based on the calculated merit order. 
By increasing of the opening degree of the market, the 
share of the guaranteed quantities will progressively 
decrease.  For the privatization of the distribu-
tion/supply and/or production companies, the portfolio 
contracts represent a transparent and credible base for 
negotiation.  
At present, the average supply price of Commercial 
Company “Electrica” results as an weighted average 
value of the producers prices and supplying quantities. 
This principle will be applied and after the division of 
the Commercial Company “Electrica” into many com-
panies. The number and the structure of the new distri-
bution/supply companies will be optimized considering 
the principle of the performing of the some specific 
costs. Thus, each distribution/supplying company will 
purchase the required quantities of electricity from the 
same “basket of producers”, at the same price estab-
lished by the initial portfolio framework contract (Fig. 
1). Efficiency of the activity will be reflected in their 
own efforts to reduce the costs. 
One IPP has, on the mid term, the following possi-
bilities to trade the electricity: 
• contract type PPA (purchase power agreement) for 
12 – 15 years with one of the producer; 
• contract type PPA with suppliers; 
• bilateral contracts with eligible consumers; 
• transaction on the spot market. 
The management of the electric system is ensuring 
on the economic loading order. With priority in the 
merit order, the generation units with constraints are 
placed, such as: the hydroelectric power plants, NPP 
Cernavoda, the co-generation units at the optimum 
level imposed by the heat load, burning of a pre-
established quantity of coal. 
In the medium-term, the commercial companies re-
sulted by separation from National Company “Elec-
trica” will be the electricity distributors and suppliers. 
The activity of these companies is regulated through 
portfolio/framework contracts for electricity sale/pur-
chase, the framework contract for distribution service, 
the technical code of the distribution networks, and the 
supply framework contracts for captive consumers. 
The accreditation of the eligible consumers for crea-
tion of the competitive market is an important reform 
measure of the sector. Criteria and requirements for 
eligibily refer to the level of annual consumption (100 
GWh/year in the first step). For year 2000, the initial 
opening degree of the electricity market was estab-
lished to 10%. 
 In accordance with the economic transition and  the  
success  of  the  privatization  process, it is possible to 
license all industrial consumers with a consumptions 
higher or equal with 100 GWh/year; that would corre-
spond to a 25% opening  of the market. The continua-
tion of the accreditation of industrial consumers  with a 
consumption higher than or equal to 40 GWh/year 
would determine the increase of the market opening  to 
be about  35%. 
The transportation operator performs the public ser-
vice of transporting electricity at the regulated tariffs. 
The activity is regulated by the “Technical code of the 
transportation network”, the “Commercial code of the 
electricity wholesale market”, the framework contract 
for service catering, and the commercial operation 
licence of the electricity transportation capacities. For 
prevention of the uneconomic development of the 
electricity system,  regional tariffs are expected to be 
introduced. The regional tariffs will stimulate the op-
eration/construction of the generation capacities in the 
deficit area. Introduction of the regional tariffs will 
allow  for consideration of the different tariffs for 
transportation., in order to establish  the merit order. 
The system operator ensures the operation, coordina-
tion of the production, transportation and distribution 
installations (at 110 kV tension), operative planing, and 
operative management of the power system. The sys-
tem operator develops the activity based on the dis-
patching licence and enters into purchase contracts 
with the producers for  the technological system ser-
vices. At present, the tariffs for the system service are 
regulated. The prices and tariffs have an important role 
in the market liberalization, to stimulate the competi-
tion and protection of the consumers’ interests. By 
improvement of the electricity tariffs system, it was 
possible to reduce the cross-subsidies from industrial 
consumers to the residential consumers. This was car-
ried out by adopting new tariffs for industrial consum-
ers and residential consumers. In the future, tariffs are  
expected  to be based on the average costs, on the mar-
ginal costs, and on the price-cap. 
The alignment of the Romanian energy regime to  
EU legislation should improve the consideration within 
the tariffs of the external costs (for instance, the envi-
ronmental impact cost).  The introduction of the same 
incentives for development of the energy efficiency 
projects or projects using renewable energy sources, 
for instance, through taxes, will reflect the policy of 
environmental protection. 
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Conclusions 
Romania has made significant progress in deregulation 
of its energy sector and in establishing a competitive 
electricity market. 
The Ministry of Industry and Resources, as owner of 
almost all entities in the sector, has achieved a institu-
tional reform. New relations have been established 
through regulations issued by ANRE among the new 
producers, suppliers, transport and distribution compa-
nies. 
With a 15% competitive market, a functional day-
ahead spot market, and 8% of electricity directly nego-
tiated between suppliers and eligible consumers, the 
Romanian reform in the electricity sector can thus  far 
be considered a success. 
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Session 3: The Implementation of the Gas Directive 
Rapporteur’s Summary by Eugene D. Cross, ECN Policy Studies, The Netherlands 
 
Session Three was comprised of six presentations and 
related discussions on the development of the Euro-
pean gas market, the implementation of the Gas Di-
rective, and the Commission’s proposals to amend 
the Gas Directives.28 This session was the gas coun-
terpart to the previous day’s session on electricity. 
The underlying effort was to gain a more definitive 
assessment of the consequences of the liberalisation 
in the gas sector and to identify topics for further 
inquiry.   
Mr. Rousseaux reviewed the current state of im-
plementation of the Gas Directive, the proposed 
amendments, the impact of the market opening since 
August 2000, and the Madrid Forum.  He described 
the difficulties and barriers related to grid access, 
including the market structure, and he pointed out the 
reasons that gas liberalisation in Europe is more dif-
ficult than electricity liberalisation.  
Following Mr. Rousseax’s presentation, a lively 
debate centered on the Commission’s recent propos-
als regarding the duties of regulatory authorities.  Mr. 
Cross inquired whether the Commission, in formulat-
ing its draft proposal, had considered requiring that 
such regulatory authorities should have a primary 
duty to promote competition, such as is the case for 
the British regulator, Ofgem.  Mr. Rousseaux indi-
cated that such a proposal by the European Commis-
sion was unlikely and that even when such a duty 
would be imposed on independent regulators such as 
Ofgem, national governments still need not necessar-
ily follow their lead.  In other words, regulators can 
be ignored. Other commentators responded that car-
tels in the sector were progressively strengthening, 
and that competition authorities were “watching but 
not acting”.  It was argued that whether to promote 
competition in the internal energy market is largely a 
“political” choice to be made by the EU institutions 
and the Member States, and that the Commission 
could act more forcefully and pro-actively in this 
regard.  
Peter Claus of Eurogas, representing the gas indus-
try’s view, acknowledged that the EU has a role to 
play in ensuring energy co-operation with non-EU 
supply areas. In particular, the European Commis-
sion’s Competition Directorate has to put pressure on 
non-EU suppliers.  
However, Eurogas does not see a need for the pro-
posed directive to amend the Gas Directive.  “There 
is no need to develop EU legislation further, since 
there is a Gas Directive already as well as new na-
tional legislation in place or being developed.”  His 
main conclusions are that gas markets and liberalisa-
tion efforts must take place in a more volatile and 
uncertain environment and that Europe needs “large 
                                                           
28 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
the Council amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal market in elec-
tricity and natural gas. 
and competent companies to compete with outsiders 
or raiders”.   
The paper of Geert Greving of Gasunie, set forth 
below,  provides further depth to the issue of security 
of supply, focusing on cost and price data for both 
Russian end-users and for the Hungarian natural gas 
sector.  He also refers to the need for introducing 
more “slack” capacity into the European natural gas 
grid through legislation and suggests that the TSO 
should charge for this overcapacity on the basis of a 
regulated price; i.e., that the TSO should agree with 
the regulator how to account for slack capacity in an 
open transmission system, which is perhaps owned 
by several operators, but in any case used by many 
shippers.   He also advocates the idea of “installing 
an annual watchdog function for ongoing investments 
in energy network facilities.”  The European Com-
mission has recommended in its draft proposal to 
amend the Gas Directive (COM(2001) 125) that 
Member States shall designate a body to monitor 
security of supply issues, and in particular the sup-
ply/demand balance in its national market and the 
level of future demand and available supplies (Article 
4a).  It is proposed that this body should issue an 
annual report on the security situation and any related 
measures.29 
In the subsequent discussion, Mr. Rossetti of DG-
Research inquired why natural gas prices in the re-
tail/sales market are not decreasing for consumers.  
Mr. Claus referred in passing to the link between 
natural gas prices and oil prices, but his main argu-
ment is that market liberalisation within the EU can 
have an impact only on costs from the EU-border 
only.  In other words, “liberalisation can only affect 
the post-import costs (for imported gas)”, and that the 
post-import cost component of the final gas price is 
only 15-20% maximum30. His assumption, of course, 
is that the import price cannot affected by EU liber-
alisation even if natural gas prices within the EU are 
substantially decreased.  Asked whether there is a 
tension between the introduction of competition and 
security of supply, Mr. Claus stated that Eurogas has 
no official position on it but would agree with the oil 
industry’s view.  Eurogas “does not want to give 
government influence over commercial decisions”; 
                                                           
29 This requirement for a monitoring body has been 
dropped from the later proposals for amending the Electric-
ity Directive, in favour of a requirement that Member 
States simply “shall ensure the monitoring of security of 
supply issues”.  Similar changes may be made to the pro-
posals to amend the Gas Directive.  
30 In contrast, the cost data for Hungary supplied by Geert 
Greving in his paper entitled “European energy security: an 
urgent energy policy topic” indicates that post-import costs 
in Hungary (transmission, distribution and storage) are 
equal to about one-half of the typical commodity price at 
the border, making the post-import costs amount to about 
33% of the final end-user price.  
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instead, the gas sector companies should do it them-
selves. Governments should perhaps give targets 
following consultation with the gas sector, but there 
should be “no obligations”, rather just targets for 
companies.     
Dominique Finon reported on his recent research 
on the European gas sector, seeking to identify the 
requirements for establishing reasonable short-term 
competition among an oligopolistic club of incum-
bents. He noted the greater elements of resilience to 
liberalisation for the gas sector compared to the elec-
tricity sector.  He has ranked the general accessibility 
to national gas markets based on comparisons of 
conditions of network access, the level of transpar-
ency of network access, and the technical and institu-
tional accessibility of national gas markets.  He con-
cludes that markets are not as competitive as they 
look, and that there is still one European bulk market 
and 15 national markets in the EU.  
Admittedly, we can have a legislated process for 
the gas sector as with electricity, but one can query 
whether we really need to liberalise the sector.  There 
is an ideological concept at work in the EU that we 
seek to integrate the market -- to establish the internal 
market -- through  liberalisation.  This move is un-
avoidable, and we need to apply the rules to the ac-
cession countries as well.   However, the real limita-
tion to the development of competition is the existing 
long-term contracts.  Rapid progress would imply 
cancellation or radical revision of these contracts, but 
flexibility on volume and price limits the possibilities 
for this.     
Analyses of the natural gas markets in the Czech 
Republic and Romania were offered by Mr. Stepan 
(ENA Ltd.- Czech Republic) and Mr. Furlan (ENI – 
Italy) respectively. In the Czech Republic, Transgas 
is the sole owner and operator of the transmission 
networks (including dispatching and transit) and the 
storage facilities.  In 1999, imports covered 98% of 
total supply.  Transgas supplies to distribution com-
panies and has five big industrial clients that are 
supplied directly.  There was a 36% price increase in 
2001 in the gas price, but there is still a large gap 
with prices in the EU Member States.  The price for 
gas to the residential market is 30% higher than coal, 
so further increases in the residential gas price would 
allegedly lead to switching to coal.  Because the 
import price of gas was high in 2000 and 2001, the  
competitiveness of gas against other fuels in the 
Czech Republic is not very good.  The privatisation 
of Transgas by the National Property Fund is under 
negotiation, and there are predictions that a bidder 
will be selected by year-end.    
In Romania, the largest gas market in Central 
Europe, there is a separate gas regulatory agency, the 
National Agency of Mineral Resources (NAMR), 
subordinated to the Ministry. It prepares bidding 
rounds for new exploration, negotiates concession 
contracts, regulates the gas sector, and proposes 
prices and the transmission tariff to the Ministry of 
Finance.  ROMGAZ has been restructured into new 
companies responsible for exploration and produc-
tion, transmission, storage, and two distribution com-
panies. In the Commission’s  regular Progress Report 
for 2000 on Romania’s progress towards accession, it 
noted concerns about the compatibility of Romanian 
rules to establish a transparent framework for the gas 
sector with the Gas Directive’s rules on unbundling 
of accounts in vertically- integrated companies.  It 
also noted the problem of unpaid energy bills in Ro-
mania, a crucial problem that is growing and which 
threatens the whole energy sector of the country.  Mr. 
Furlan noted that any theoretical advice on Romanian 
reform must be tempered by an appreciation of the 
social situation.  Along the same lines, he stated that 
the local reality in Romania does not support an ac-
celeration of the liberalisation as envisaged in the 
proposals to amend the Gas Directive.    
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European energy security: an ur-
gent energy policy topic  
Geert Greving, N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie, 
Gronignen, Holland. 
The Russian/European Energy Dialogue 
In the last few months the Putin/Prodi energy dia-
logue has been underlining the emerging discussions 
on energy security for Europe. This kind of discus-
sion is also important for the internal European de-
bate on the EC green paper: energy security, which is 
due for discussion with the European energy partners 
from outside the region.  
Russian energy policy 
For many years Russian energy policy has been hid-
den from outsiders or only partly revealed to Europe 
and discussed piecemeal. During the Russian-
European Energy Partnership the Russian energy 
policy for all its energy sources has been revealed 
and explained and, moreover, openly discussed by 
expert teams from East and West. This unique situa-
tion underscores the serious desire on the part of both 
sides to establish a real partnership in the field of 
primary energy.  
Past efforts by the IEA and several Russian energy 
experts attempted to piece together the Russian Gov-
ernment’s energy policy, but only during the Rus-
sian-European expert meetings has the complete 
picture emerged and, more importantly, been  con-
firmed.  
Russian energy priorities vis-à-vis the West. 
Russian priorities as far as the West is concerned are 
easy to explain, based on natural gas and oil – and the 
nuclear sector. The main Russian goals are: 
• to earn hard currency from exports 
• to become a reliable exporter to Europe (high,  
stable prices) 
• to become a priority exporter with enlarged ca-
pabilities. 
The main driver for energy exports from the Rus-
sian Federation is the need for hard currency. The 
public sector budget will continue to need the hard 
currency income generated by exports to Europe in 
order to remain in balance and also to keep on course 
in the present transition period. There are hardly any 
other options open to the Government and the Rus-
sian energy sector has a key role to play in these 
efforts. 
It is reliable exports to Europe that will generate 
the most revenues. The less reliable the exports, the 
less hard currency will be earned by the Russians. 
Stability and continuity of  energy export flows to 
Europe are therefore the key as far as the Russians 
are concerned. 
Given the decline of indigenous energy resources 
in Europe itself, more and more inward energy flows 
will have to be contracted in order to enable Europe's 
manufacturing base to keep pace with growing de-
mand. In this setting, the main outside supplies for 
Europe will come from Russian energy sources.  
Moreover, the Russian energy sources have the po-
tential capacity required and, more importantly, are 
already connected to the European energy markets 
where the demand exists. Only marginal investments 
are needed to enlarge the present energy transmission 
capacities to the European energy markets. Even 
these marginal investments, however, are of quite a 
magnitude. We shall discuss this issue in more detail 
later. 
Russian potential greatest with respect to natural gas 
The potential as regards the various energy flows to 
Europe provided by Russian companies is the great-
est for the natural gas sector.  
The present scope for the export of more nuclear 
energy to Europe is limited by current European 
Energy Policy, with its focus on reducing nuclear 
capacity in future.  
Oil exports to Europe are more or less sandwiched 
by the present export capacities on the one hand and 
by the quality of the product available for export on 
the other. Export quality has to be improved before 
there can be any market enlargement towards Europe, 
either by installing new production units or by build-
ing more dedicated pipelines, carrying different 
grades of oil to Europe. 
The conclusion, therefore, at least for the next ten 
years is that priority will be given the Russian natural 
gas sector, in view of its potential compared with the 
other possible energy flows. 
The natural gas sector is of mutual interest. On the 
Russian side the potential for future exports is 
“large”, while from the European point of view, en-
ergy policy is focusing on the fuel of choice: natural 
gas. This has everything to do with the European 
drive to achieve the future agreed emission levels 
under the Kyoto protocol, with subsidies in Europe 
generally aimed at higher penetration of natural gas 
in Europe's total primary energy mix. In most of the 
countries of Europe, the fuel mix is such as to support 
the penetration of natural gas more than before. 
Energy security, inherent to natural gas 
Energy security, in comparison with oil at least, is an 
inherent quality as far as natural gas is concerned. Oil 
is a commodity that is typically sold in energy trading 
markets and, moreover, it is shipped in pipelines and 
mammoth tankers from global producer locations to 
end-users, wherever they are. 
In Europe, only around 5% of the total volume of 
natural gas consumed is shipped by mammoth tank-
ers. In Europe, therefore, the LNG trade and ship-
ments are negligible. The main transport system in 
Europe is still and will continue to be pipelines. They 
may be quite expensive to build, but once built they 
are pretty well there for the duration (technical life of 
50 years). This unique investment background allows 
certain assumptions to be made where project in-
vestments and partnerships involving investors and/or 
pipeline operators are concerned. 
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Natural gas security of supply 
The issue of security of supply in relation to natural 
gas is not only a matter of volume but is also very 
much to do with capacity. Capacity is a key issue in 
the natural gas sector throughout Europe, connected 
as it is to seasonal fluctuations and the high load 
factor necessary for the transmission of natural gas 
over long distances. The volume currently shipped 
over long distances is 40% of the total volume con-
sumed in Europe. In the near future this figure is set 
to rise strongly to around 70% by 2010. Depending 
on domestic European reserves (mainly depending on 
the export capabilities of the UK, Norway and Hol-
land), this figure could turn out a little bit higher or 
lower.  
With an increase in long-distance natural gas sup-
plies to European markets, more and more load factor 
conversion will be needed. It goes without saying that 
load factor conversion, i.e. temporary storage of 
natural gas, is extremely expensive in comparison 
with the storage of oil. 
Securing a downstream natural gas market in 
Europe means balancing pipeline capacity bringing 
long-distance gas to the consumer and natural gas 
storage in order to match the end-user load-factor to 
the high load-factor associated with long-distance 
supply (average end-user load factor of 0.6 compared 
with a load factor of 0.95 for long-distance transmis-
sion). 
If costs and commodity prices are considered in or-
der to gain a feel for the situation and cost relation-
ships, the Hungarian natural gas sector serves as a 
good example for illustrating the overall picture. 
The commodity price at the border in Europe is 
typically around US$90-100/1000m3, depending on 
oil and/or coal price indexes. The costs for high-
pressure transmission in Hungary are around US$10-
11/1000m3 as an national average, while storage 
costs – or should we say load factor conversion costs 
– are in the order of US$20/1000m3. Last but not 
least, distribution costs are in the order of US$26-
28/1000m3. It is clear, therefore, that load factor costs 
represent an appreciable part of the value chain from 
gas well to end-user appliance. The total end-user 
price in Hungary will be around US$150-
160/1000m3. 
The Californian experience and natural gas 
The Californian case, in terms of volume, capacity, 
legislation and other related issues, has been com-
pared to the situation in Northern Europe. An internal 
study carried out by the University of Groningen has 
shown that the starting conditions in this part of 
Europe are the same as in California. More or less the 
same is true from a liberalisation point of view, with 
a comparable open and deregulated consumer market 
to begin with.  
As in Europe, the Californian natural gas sector 
started from out from an oversupply position in terms 
of both volume and capacity. Now that the overca-
pacity in California is a thing of the past, capacity 
shortages are driving up end-user prices steeply. 
A key factor in this game has been the introduction 
of so-called ‘slack’ capacity into the natural gas grid. 
By scheduling both long and short-term overcapacity, 
the idea is that transmission prices should be kept 
within a certain bandwidth.  The present lack of slack 
capacity is strongly pushing up the transmission 
prices and, with them, the energy bill of end-
consumers. 
How to deal with slack capacity 
Introducing slack capacity is easy to incorporate in 
legislation, but actually using and operating slack 
capacity is quite another matter. In a full-scale net-
work, operational capacity has to be calculated and 
controlled, not only for the next 24 hours, or next 
month, but for the next few months and in the long 
term, too. If all required and/or contracted transmis-
sion capacity is being carried, slack capacity has to 
be scheduled into the system and continually moni-
tored and adjusted. Given the fact that slack capacity 
is by definition never used and/or paid for by a ship-
per, the transmission system operator will have to 
agree with the regulator how such overcapacity is to 
be paid for. This is not only a matter of what tariffs to 
apply for slack capacity but, more particularly, how 
to account for the slack capacity in an open transmis-
sion system, maybe owned by several operators and 
in any case used by many shippers. Another issue is 
of course who will be responsible for slack capacity, 
trying to avoid transmission capacity shortages and, 
at the same time,  avoiding sky-high end-user prices, 
as is the case today in Canada and California. 
The short-term versus long-term debate 
These issues have already been hotly debated as 
regards European energy policy. Newcomers are 
keen to have a full short-term market, while the es-
tablished players are strongly in favour of more long-
term commitments, avoiding a European spot market. 
If we again examine the situation in California, we 
find ourselves dealing with a short-term market for 
natural gas overall. The market is setting prices and 
recently they have been extremely high for end-users. 
It seems that it is not energy policy that is dictating 
the final bill for end-users, but the current spot mar-
ket prices. 
The Californian case is even more unique if the 
natural gas market here is compared with the one in 
Canada. In Calgary, end-user natural gas prices are 
much higher than in Vancouver, even ignoring the 
fact that the region of Calgary is a reserve-based 
region. Vancouver has to supply its consumers over a 
long distance from Canadian fields. 
The difference in market mechanism is the overall 
short-term energy business in Calgary, while Van-
couver is almost entirely supplied by long-term 
commitments. Here it seems that a balancing ap-
proach is far better than an approach based solely on 
spot market conditions. It is expected that Europe 
will be based mainly on long-term commitments and 
supply contracts, with short-term volumes reaching 
between 5% and 10% of the total volume. The long-
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term contracts will smooth out short-term volatility 
and the effects of possible market dealing by paper 
traders. 
Public service obligations 
In Europe, and especially Central Europe and Eastern 
Europe, there are public service obligations towards 
residential consumers. 
Residential consumers, who will always have a low 
load factor, are paying a higher price than industrial 
consumers with a high or at least higher load factor. 
The less natural gas that has to be stored the lower 
the costs that are associated with the delivery of en-
ergy to the end-consumers. At least, this is the case in 
Western Europe.  
The situation in Central Europe is more compli-
cated. This region traditionally charged residential 
consumers a lower price compared with the industrial 
users. This involved cross-subsidisation and, during 
the last couple of years, most of the Central European 
counties have been adjusting their fuel mix to some-
thing more like that in Western Europe. 
In Russia the situation is different again and more 
complicated, given the high priority accorded to 
public service in Russian society. Not only is there 
cross-subsidisation in Russia but commonly also 
extensive total non-payment for energy in the resi-
dential market (80% of the market segment), which is 
a serious problem. 
Gazprom as Russian public service provider 
Against this background, it is clear that OAO Gaz-
prom is seen by the Russian Government as a public 
service provider, including the non-payment behav-
iour of its end-consumers. Whereas the end-user 
price in Hungary is in the range US$150-
160/1000m3, the end-user price for Russian residen-
tial customers is set at a level of US$11/1000m3. This 
price is due to be raised in 2005, to a scheduled level 
of around US$20/1000m3, an increase of 100%. 
The cross-subsidy needed to keep OAO Gazprom 
afloat is supplied by the exclusive natural gas exports 
to the European hard currency markets. 
It is clear that the present Russian transit economy 
needs time to adjust to what is common practice in 
the more Western economies. For this reason, it may 
be expected that the exclusive rights enjoyed by 
OAO Gazprom with respect to its export markets will 
continue to apply for some time to come. Officially, 
third-party access for other domestic natural gas 
producers to the Unified Soviet Fuel system operated 
by OAO Gazprom has already been introduced and is 
due to be extended in terms of volume. However, the 
gateway capacity to the high-priced European export 
markets will continue to be restricted to OAO Gaz-
prom. 
Given the timetable for price rises for natural gas in 
Russia itself, it is to be expected that there will be a 
timeframe of more than 10 years before the present 
barriers to changes in the internal fuel mix in Russia 
can be overcome. 
Liberalisation drive in Europe on investments 
The liberalisation drive presently taking place in all 
EC member states is raising a lot of questions for 
both new and established players in the natural gas 
industry where new investments in network facilities 
and/or systems are concerned. 
Under the energy partnership between Russia and 
Europe, the return on investments in new network 
facilities was set at a level of 6%. This figure is out of 
line with the current level of return expected by en-
ergy industry players. These days any feasibility 
study will start from a level of 15% (return on in-
vestment). If 6% is applicable we have to look to 
long-term investors like pension funds for this kind 
of deep investment. 
Apart from such considerations, it is also apparent 
that the Commission in Brussels wants to see interna-
tional tenders for any new interconnection in Europe. 
Precisely what these tenders will involve and what 
their terms and conditions will be has not yet been 
decided or clarified. 
If the existing players in the market put things on 
hold for a while, the present overcapacity, whether in 
relation to volume or transmission capacity, will soon 
disappear, while on the other hand the natural gas 
market will steadily grow under the present energy 
policy of the European Community, which focuses 
strongly on the fuel of choice: natural gas. 
Investment in interconnections with Russia 
The above state of affairs will hit trans-European 
investments tying in the energy resources of Russia 
even more. Already it is extremely difficult for major 
energy companies, like Shell, Exxon, Total/Elf, BP, 
etc to establish project finance in Russia. The devel-
opments surrounding Shtokman will need extremely 
large and deep investment, to give but one example. 
In the Shtokman case we are talking about a level of 
investment of more than US$20 billion. This is a 
project on which investments will have to be made up 
front, with the owners having to wait for a period of 
at least 5 years before they see so much as a penny in 
return. Every one of these projects will involve an 
international player and a Russian partner, with the 
Russian partner not having access to unsecured credit 
lines. 
Quite apart from the huge capital cost involved we 
have to recoup the investment in the long term, which 
is another difficult issue associated with the present 
liberalisation drive of the European Community. 
The long-term commitment 
In the final report on the energy partnership between 
Russia and Europe, the issue of the long-term com-
mitment and, in particular, the vital long-term con-
tracts between Russian supplier and European end-
consumer have been addressed, but they have cer-
tainly not been solved. 
The report states (see annex) that this issue will be 
handled swiftly, but so far no clear solution, and no 
solution encouraging any investor to go ahead with 
any investment either in the Russian region or in the 
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region between Europe and Russia, has been put 
forward. 
Given this situation, any pipeline or vital intercon-
nection capacity between supply area and European 
energy market can be expected to be put on hold until 
further notice. 
The outlook  
The energy partnership between Russia and Europe 
brought the right discussion, started by the 
INOGATE drive by the European Community, back 
on track, namely to focus on the largest European 
volume supplier: Russia. A stable and extended rela-
tionship between Russia and Europe will be mutually 
beneficial. Stability has always been the cornerstone 
for a reliable and, moreover, profitable European 
Energy sector. 
Enormous energy supplies, especially flows of oil 
and natural gas into Europe, will be crucial to sustain 
the economy of Western Europe, but this will neces-
sitate attracting investment in the existing supply 
system and, moreover, new investment in new infra-
structure and upstream developments, as well as 
putting the new infrastructure into operation. 
The present liberalisation drive is killing the pre-
requisite for investment. 
The position of, for example, the European Invest-
ment Bank vis-à-vis upstream Russian investments is 
crucial in order to produce the right conditions for 
attracting new investors to this kind of investment.  
The range of instruments available to the EBRD will 
be too limited in the face of the huge investments 
needed. 
An investment watchdog 
It was for this reason that the idea of installing an 
annual watchdog function for the ongoing invest-
ments in energy network facilities was launched. 
Certain energy policymakers are suggesting a situa-
tion in which investors will be attracted anyway, 
regardless of the level of return on investments. It has 
got to be one thing or the other. 
The existing players are stressing the present ex-
tremely weak investment climate for investing in 
major networks in Europe and are not even looking at 
upstream options in Russia. Whatever the case, the 
installation of an annual ‘watchdog’ would be in 
everyone's favour and would produce evidence as to 
who is right and who is wrong. 
One thing is clear, any predictions about the future 
are bound to turn out wrong, but at least a watchdog 
or annual meeting between the various parties in-
volved could produce information about the invest-
ment climate and could also produce initiatives for 
improvement. 
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Session 4: Green and clean electricity 
Rapporteur’s Summary by Miroslav Maly, SRC International CS, the Czech Republic 
 
Session Four was comprised of three presentations 
and related discussions on Green Certificates in the 
EU context, obstacles and opportunities for distrib-
uted power generation, and impact of Swiss Electric-
ity Law on competitiveness of hydropower. 
   This session dealt with the situation of green and 
clean electricity generation in the framework of the 
electricity and gas market opening in EU member 
and non-member countries.   
Mrs. Maroeska Boots, ECN, presented the basic 
principals of the EU policy in promotion of the re-
newable electricity as stated in the EU RES-E Direc-
tive. She reviewed the national RES-E targets and the 
current state of their meeting by EU country. She 
explains basic principles of the trade in Green Cer-
tificates (TGC) and national TGC systems by indi-
vidual EU country. She further discussed the issues in 
international trade and the Dutch criteria for TGC 
import. In more details she presented the results of 
REBUS model calculations on costs and potentials 
for RES-E in the EU as a whole and by individual EU 
Member State. She concluded on the expected green 
certificate price and the impact of various factors on 
its level. She also discussed the interaction of GC and 
CO2 reduction policy.  
Mr. Aviel Verbruggen, UA-UFSIA-STEM, opened 
his presentation with a brief review of basic individ-
ual technologies used for distributed generation. The 
technologies for supplying distributed power are 
becoming more efficient, reliable and flexible. Fuel 
cells and photovoltaics are promising futures. The 
actual development of distributed projects however 
faces several barriers. He discussed informational 
barriers and barriers related to the distributed charac-
ter of renewable and co-generation plants. After a 
general discussion on the control of renewable power 
and grid connection, most focus was on the terms of 
trade between distributed generators and the grid. 
This is a complex issue because of the difference in 
value of a kWh depending on time, place, quality, 
reliability and liability of supply. Especially the latter 
factor is subject to evaluation, opinion and policy. 
Even when today special arrangements improve the 
terms of trade for distributed generators, we argue to 
keep the basic economic terms in scope to avoid 
moral hazard with subsidy money and to give priority 
to robust distributed solutions above subsidy addicted 
ones.  
Mrs. Silvia Banfi, CEPE, presented the paper on 
the impact of Swiss electricity law on competitive-
ness of hydropower. Although Switzerland is not a 
EU member country, the Swiss Parliament adopted 
the new Swiss Electricity Market Law (EML) in 
December 1999. The EML laid the foundations for 
reforming the Swiss electricity industry by moving 
from regulation to deregulation. Mrs. Banfi briefly 
described the Swiss electricity industry and details of 
the reform plans set out in the law. She also analysed 
the impact of EML on the hydropower firms and an 
discussed the competitiveness of the hydropower 
sector in the deregulated market..  
The Session four showed that green and clean elec-
tricity has been penetrating the European market both 
in EU Member and non-member states in last years. 
Nevertheless there are still many barriers to its wider 
penetration in the future. Thus further promotion 
policy is needed in EU for faster penetration of RES-
E. Some possibilities were presented by speakers 
during their presentations. Following the discussion 
among the participants it was agreed that this issue is 
very important and thus it was agreed to devote the 
ENER Forum 3 especially to this topic. The title of 
the ENER Forum 3 has been agreed as: Successfully 
Promoting Renewable Energy Sources in Europe. 
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Barriers to distributed power 
generation 
Aviel Verbruggen, UA-UFSIA-STEM, Antwerp, Bel-
gium 
 
Keywords. Distributed power, grid connection, barriers, 
co-generation 
 
Abstract. The technologies for supplying distributed power 
are becoming more efficient, reliable and flexible. Fuel 
cells and photo-voltaics are promising futures. The actual 
development of distributed projects however faces several 
barriers. We discuss informational barriers and barriers 
related to the distributed character of renewable and co-
generation plants. After a general discussion on the control 
of renewable power and grid connection, most focus is on 
the terms of trade between distributed generators and the 
grid. This is a complex issue because of the difference in 
value of a kWh depending on time, place, quality, reliabil-
ity and liability of supply. Especially the latter factor is 
subject to evaluation, opinion and policy. Even when today 
special arrangements improve the terms of trade for dis-
tributed generators, we argue to keep the basic economic 
terms in scope to avoid moral hazard with subsidy money 
and to give priority to robust distributed solutions above 
subsidy addicted ones. 
Distributed power  
Many of the power generation technologies that excel 
in climate change mitigation are of a distributed na-
ture (IPCC 2001, WG III, p.180). On the one hand, 
there are the renewable power sources such as wind 
power, small-scale hydro, photo-voltaic conversion. 
On the other hand there is fossil fuel driven co-
generation or Combined Heat & Power (CHP).  
Economies of scale in investment and operation are 
driving the unit size of wind turbines above the MW 
level and are limiting the downscaling of micro-
hydro sites to a level comparable with domestic ap-
pliances. The final effect of these economies of scale 
forces makes the investment in such a particular plant 
mostly not accessible for single households or for 
other energy end-users that do not foster a special 
interest in renewable power generation. Incumbent 
utilities or dedicated independent power producers 
are leading in contracting and operating wind and 
(also “small-scale”) hydro plants. The design and the 
operation of these plants are supply driven, and not 
matched to the needs of particular end-users. 
Photo-voltaics are different, given their modular 
character and because of the need for supporting 
structures that buildings offer at no or very small 
additional costs. End-users are the natural target 
market for photo-voltaics.  
The applied co-generation technologies and the 
scales of application vary widely from 100MW’s 
steam turbines to a few tens of kW’s engines. Popular 
today are especially the gas turbines available in sizes 
from a few hundreds of kW’s to over 100 MW. In 
addition micro gas turbines of a few kW’s to tens of 
kW’s are developed, that will have to compete with 
fuel cells. Both small-scale technologies are receiving 
large R&D attention for automotive applications and 
the advancements there will trickle down to station-
ary appliances. 
Because heat, one of the products of co-generation, 
is expensive to transport over longer distances, co-
generation plants are linked to heat load sites. The 
natural market of most of the new co-generation 
technologies lies in retail sales to end-users that buy 
the device and install it at home, in the office build-
ing, in the factory or at any other energy consumption 
site. To be technically and financially successful, co-
generation plants are site specific, designed and oper-
ated to meet the needs of the end-users at the given 
site.In the wide variety of non-utility producers own-
ing and operating distributed plants, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the ones that do so for selling 
power to the grid, and the ones that primarily want to 
meet the own electricity loads with the power they 
generate on site31. Both groups of distributed power 
producers face a number of common barriers to their 
growth, but the latter group faces particular barriers. 
In this lecture we focus on the barriers impeding the 
development of the latter group, and we will concen-
trate on co-generators given the diffusion of photo-
voltaics is till limited, although growing rapidly.  
Informational barriers 
Familiarity with distributed technologies and with 
the latest developments 
In recent years, there have been significant techno-
logical advances in turbine (wind, hydro, gas and 
steam), engine technology (developed for the trans-
port sector), and new technologies for fuel cells and 
photo-voltaics. These now offer competitive pros-
pects for power generation and for combined heat & 
power generation, based on decentralised systems of 
all scales from the few-kW sizes to the tens-of-MW 
sizes (Major, 1995; Rohrer, 1996; IPCC 2001, WG 
III, chapter 3). Efficiencies, reliability and steering 
flexibility have gone up, and investment and opera-
tion costs have come down, but this information is 
not spread widely enough. Also about new develop-
ments (e.g. fuel cells, micro gas turbines) little docu-
mentation is spread. 
This barrier is the most stringent in developing 
countries and in small institutions and companies, 
especially when the latter have no technical back-
ground. They rely mostly on free information offered 
by agents that are sellers of particular solutions, and 
vested interests dominate this kind of information 
channels. 
Understanding the economics of on site generation, 
in particular CHP 
On-site generation is end-user driven, but intercon-
nects with the vast and complex world of energy and 
energy technology supplies and markets. In order to 
come up with a long living, i.e. financially rewarding, 
project, the investor must optimise his system within 
the given and expected environment. So an investor 
                                                           
31  IGOP or Independent Generator of Own Power 
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must optimise on site choices, e.g. type of technol-
ogy, scale, prime mover, and also safeguard the ro-
bustness of his system when exogenous parameters 
change. 
Distributed generation works in a complex envi-
ronment, with a variety of unexpected developments. 
E.g. even co-generation is known as an energy-saving 
technology, its profitability can be jeopardised by 
rising fuel prices. Beginning scholars in co-
generation are mostly puzzled by the core paradox of 
co-generation, i.e. “a co-generation unit assigns prior-
ity to meeting the heat end-uses, while maximising 
power output”. Optimisation of co-generation pro-
jects requires extensive information about many 
determinants of profitability. Heat and power end-
uses of the application and in particular the simulta-
neity of the load patterns, costs and tariffs of grid 
electricity and the terms of exchange of power with 
the grid, and the evolution of the fuel/energy markets 
should all be studied (COGEN Europe, 1997a and b). 
Experts covering this span of know-how earn high 
salaries in energy companies or engineering-
contracting firms, and are rather employed by vested 
corporations making their availability to small-scale 
independent projects exceptional. 
Uncertainty about main determinants 
A power or co-generation plant is a long-term in-
vestment in the energy infrastructure of a company. 
Several key variables may change during the lifetime 
of the plant and make investment risky. Examples of 
uncertain variables are fuel prices, fuel availability, 
regulatory conditions, environmental legislation, 
terms of trade with the power grid (Hoff, Wenger and 
Farmer, 1996). 
Barriers related to the distributed character 
of the technology 
Payback gap 
Investment money for distributed generation projects 
is more difficult to get and carries higher interest 
rates than funds for grid power supply extension and 
funds for conventional energy supply systems. 
Mainly when donors, international institutions, 
banks, etc. are not familiar with the distributed gen-
eration technologies, developing countries will not 
introduce it in their energy supply infrastructure. The 
flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol (joint 
implementation and clean development) can prove to 
be important in overcoming this barrier. 
Private investors impose excessive profitability 
standards on distributed generation projects. This is 
mainly due to a risk-averse attitude regarding non-
core business activities that include the self-
generation of electricity.  
Because distributed generation has to compete in 
many places with central supply alternatives the 
much looser profitability criteria applied on the latter 
result in an under-development of distributed sources. 
Distances to the energy grids (electricity, natural 
gas) may be large 
When there is no link to a power grid, surplus elec-
tricity cannot be conveyed to potential customers, 
and the grid cannot provide supplementary nor back-
up power. On the one hand, the additional costs of 
connecting distant small-scale distributed power 
sources to the central grid may be excessive, worsen-
ing the economics of possible projects. On the other 
hand, the high connection cost creates opportunities 
for distributed power (e.g. photo-voltaics in develop-
ing countries) when the capacity and willingness to 
pay for distributed power are available. In the latter 
case the danger exists of an interconnection realised 
in the future when central power out competes too 
expensive distributed solutions. 
The impossibility of delivering excess power to a 
grid limits the full exploitation of renewable and of 
co-generation opportunities. Renewable development 
will be truncated to scales matching the power needs 
of the end-users on site. Co-generation development 
will be limited to a capacity corresponding with the 
share of the heat loads that are covered by comple-
mentary power loads, according to the maximised 
power/heat efficiency ratio of the co-generation tech-
nology. This is the best approach economically (Ver-
bruggen, 1996). On sites where the need for useful 
heat exceeds (several times) the need for power (a 
situation occurring frequently), this micro-
economical rational choice results in a underdevel-
opment of efficient co-generation opportunities, fore-
going thereby the chance of fuel savings and climate 
change mitigation. 
Natural gas is the most commonly used fuel for 
most new co-generation installations in the industrial-
ised nations. Countries without a link to gas supply 
networks, or those with only a limited network, there-
fore face an immediate disadvantage. Even where 
natural gas is more widely available it can often be 
too expensive to connect particular sites with distrib-
uted co-generation opportunities to the gas supply 
network (COGEN Europe, 1997b). 
Unequal treatment with respect to fuel supplies 
Because co-generation technologies are in many 
countries developed by end-users or by independent 
power producers they must compete with established 
pools of centralised generators that benefit from 
discounted fuel prices. This may be an important 
handicap to compete with the separate supply of heat 
or steam by means of boiler fuels and with the sepa-
rate supply of power through the interconnected 
power system (Blok and Farla, 1996). 
Authorisation and licensing arrangements 
Procedures for authorising the construction and the 
operation of distributed facilities can be bureaucratic, 
complex and time consuming because most standards 
were developed for central power production installa-
tions. In some countries the investments in power 
generation are subjected to a particular planning 
process, involving official hearings by parliamentary 
ENER Forum 2. Monitoring the progress of the implementation of the EU Gas and Electricity Directives:  
Are European markets becoming competitive? Prague, Czech Republic, 15-16 November 2001 
54 ENER 24.01 
 
or regulatory commissions. For small-scale distrib-
uted generation projects, such procedures would 
mean a significant additional barrier to project devel-
opment. 
Environmental and emission regulations 
A small co-generation engine may be treated as a 
large-scale power producer, having the same (e.g. 
administrative) obligations in obeying environmental 
and emission rules. Also the higher conversion effi-
ciency of co-generation may not be credited suffi-
ciently by regulations directed to the conventional 
power sector. The actual discussion in the EU on 
subventions yes or no to co-generated power shows 
that there are diverging opinions on this issue.  
Environmental standards also may forbid explicitly 
or hinder implicitly the use of particular fuels or of 
particular technologies, overall or on the location of 
the distributed project. For example, co-generation in 
the built environment may have to obey very strict 
standards of flue gas emissions and of noise and 
vibration levels. Respecting environmental standards 
may involve significant expenses for abatement 
equipment. 
Grid connection 
The connection to the power grid is important for 
renewable and for co-generation distributed power 
projects. 
Renewable energy mostly is available as a flow of 
water, wind, radiation or heat (Twidell and Weir, 
1986). Except for some water flows, the most essen-
tial properties of renewable flows are the intermit-
tence and the diffuse character of the flows. A part of 
the intermittence is predictable, some part is not. 
Therefore, the supply of renewable power is gov-
erned by stochastic laws, and falls outside the gov-
ernance by man. The flow of renewable energy is 
running from the natural sources to the natural sinks 
whether or not man is making use of this flow. In 
order to make use of the natural flows one has to 
position within the flows capture and conversion 
devices to feed particular end-uses. In principle the 
resistance created by the devices within the flows 
should be minimised and the concentration of diffuse 
energy should be maximised. In other words the 
capture and conversion devices should be of the 
highest efficiency. Meeting these challenges requires 
already significant technical and economic efforts, 
but does not solve the issue of intermittence. The 
impact of this latter factor fully depends on the end-
uses and end-users served by the renewable plant. 
When the end-user is willing to float his energy needs 
along the stochastic supply by renewable sources, the 
most simple construction is feasible. However in our 
modern society people is spoiled by the availability 
of an unlimited supply of concentrated power supply 
at any moment of time. This provides the feeling of 
discretionary authority and freedom fostered by cul-
tural trends and advertising businesses. This means 
that the end-user wants to steer the supply of energy 
and refuses to be dependent on stochastic supplies. 
 
In still the same setting of natural flows with a cap-
turing-conversion device installed in between, the 
end-user can exert a negative feedback control at the 
entrance of the capturing or at the exit of the con-
verter. This control makes that surplus power in the 
flow, i.e. power that the end-uses cannot absorb, will 
be spilled and that a share of the expensive capacity 
is idle. When moreover end-uses need more power 
than the nameplate capacity of the devices or than the 
current power in the natural flow available, the feed-
back control cannot meet the gap. Either end-users 
adapt their needs to the limits of nature and devices, 
or one must develop other solutions. 
Two solutions are possible. The first is the addition 
of storage capacity to the capturing-conversion de-
vices. The second is the organisation of an intelligent 
feed-forward control system. We will see at the end 
of this chapter that the grid offers both solutions. 
By adding a facility that can store the captured and 
converted renewable energy flow in between the 
capturing-conversion device and the end-uses, feed-
back control by the end-user can reduce the spill-over 
of energy flows while at the same time reducing the 
required capacity of the device itself. The major 
problem is that power by its very nature is non-
storable, and that “power storage” involves a linked 
process conversion-storage-conversion. Investments 
and operational losses go along. Storage solutions are 
developed when no alternatives are available, e.g. in 
isolated settlement conditions. 
Intelligent feed-forward control involves that end-
users are supplied when renewable power is avail-
able. This approach is comparable with the most 
basic application of renewable power we discussed at 
the start of this chapter. The difference however is 
that intelligent feed-forward puts several end-users in 
parallel, manages their loads, ranks the users in merit 
order, and meets the loads accordingly. By this intel-
ligence one tries to harvest the full flow of renewable 
energy. It requires a full control over the end-uses. 
In real life systems of renewable power, one will 
find it most easily not to invest in storage facilities, 
nor to set up a complex feed-forward control, but to 
connect to the bypassing power grid. This means the 
grid is placed in between the own capturing-
conversion devices and the own end-uses. It plays the 
role of an infinite storage facility with respect to the 
distributed generation capacity although in reality 
delivered power to the grid is not stored but is replac-
ing other generation (Hoff et all, 1996). As long as 
the aggregate delivery of distributed (and non-
despatched) power to a grid falls short of a significant 
share of total power generation, substitution is feasi-
ble. When the aggregate becomes very large com-
pared to the grid dimensions, one will have to turn 
again to the two basic solutions discussed above: 
‘power storage’ and intelligent feed-forward control. 
By that time the latter approach may be available 
although it requires an unprecedented level of end-
use governance. A mix of both solutions will always 
be necessary, and in the meantime the terms of grid 
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connection determine to a large extent the future of 
renewable power. 
The terms of grid connection 
Every distributed generation project should benefit 
from being linked to the interconnected power grid, 
because this provides the advantages of being inte-
grated into the extended electricity “market”. There 
have been witnesses of technical, economic and insti-
tutional rules and practices that limit a fair access to 
the grid for distributed generators. In many nations 
these barriers have proven to be the most oppressing 
factor to the development of independent renewable 
or co-generation opportunities. 
Position and attitude of the grid operator 
In many power supply systems by now, there is not 
yet an independent system operator available that 
balances the offers from the various competitive 
suppliers. Mostly the system operator was (and in 
many countries still is) a part of a vertical integrated 
electricity supply company that moreover enjoys a 
monopoly position. When such electricity monopo-
lies function within a regulatory environment of 
making profits proportional to electricity sales vol-
umes, distributed generation will be approached as a 
loss of sales that should be avoided on all occasions 
(Rüdig, 1986). In the USA and in some other nations, 
the regulators have imposed the obligation of Inte-
grated Resource Planning on the utilities, requiring 
an equal treatment between the own central and other 
man’s distributed generation sources (Thomas et al, 
2001). The success of IRP is not guaranteed without 
a very strict regulatory supervision out of reach of 
most countries in the world. In general the attitudes 
of the central electricity systems have been hostile 
towards distributed generation initiatives (Dufait, 
1996). 
In liberalising the electricity markets, an independ-
ent system operator should be installed to organise 
the transactions in the electricity (bulk) market. This 
may result in a more neutral approach of distributed 
generators, and in a levelling of the barriers impeding 
a smooth access to the power markets. These other 
barriers are discussed hereafter (COGEN Europe, 
1997b). 
Technical barriers 
Incumbent power companies sometimes impose very 
heavy regulations on producers or industries that file 
for a connection to the electric grid. On occasions the 
demander is requested to install a separate link to the 
next-by transformer station in the grid. The connec-
tion, the metering, the safety equipment, etc. all may 
be extra-ordinarily loaded to discourage independent 
producers. Especially small institutions and compa-
nies can be scared off by technical prescriptions that 
cannot be met in standard packages. 
Tariff conditions 
There are three types of power flows that can be 
exchanged between an independent producer and the 
grid (Verbruggen, 1990, 1996). 
1) Surplus power that the distributed generator 
delivers to the grid. 
2) Shortage power bought by the distributed 
generator at the grid: make-up (additional, 
complementary). 
3) Shortage power: back-up for a failing distributed 
plant. 
The tariff conditions are a particularly difficult is-
sue, because the value of a kWh is dependent on the 
time, the place, the quality, the reliability and the 
liability32 of supply. Therefore it mostly is true that a 
kWh from the central grid is of higher value than the 
kWh supplied by a particular distributed generator, 
but it is also true that the applied prices to both kinds 
of kWh are mostly far more apart than their real val-
ues are. 
The tariff conditions are very crucial and domi-
nantly determine the growth opportunities of distrib-
uted generation facilities. 
Tariff conditions are a result of the interplay be-
tween on the one hand technical and economic reali-
ties and on the other hand institutional and political 
deliberations. While time, place, quality and reliabil-
ity of electricity supply can be measured in a techni-
cal way, the liability aspects are more the subject of 
evaluation and opinion, dominated by organisational 
and political power. 
Surplus power 
The remuneration of surplus power is based on the 
principle of ‘avoided costs’ by the grid-system (Fox-
Penner, 1990). Although this principle is widely 
accepted, its implementation is set back by theoreti-
cal and practical difficulties in defining and measur-
ing the avoided costs. In practice, one should meas-
ure the instantaneous marginal cost of the integrated 
power supply system taking into account generation 
plants’ constraints, grid constraints and reliability 
aspects. When the electricity markets are liberalised, 
competition may bring the kWh-price near to the 
marginal costs of its supply. 
Regulated ‘avoided costs’ prices and competitive 
marginal cost prices will entail an impediment to the 
development of distributed resources, when the latter 
generate electricity at a higher marginal cost. This 
can be due to a number of factors. First, the central 
power supply may be subsidised. Second, the central 
system may be run on hydro-power or on nuclear 
power, that are both characterised by low short-run 
                                                           
32 Liability of supply is related to the ‘obligation’ to sup-
ply power when demand occurs and to the ‘impossibility’ 
of supply when demand does not occur. Central power 
systems meet a high degree of liability, while distributed 
generators mostly are characterised by a low degree of 
liability. In effect, most distributed plants are non-
despatched and deliver power to the grid when they gener-
ate a surplus above the own needs while at the same time 
they are not ready to supply (additional) power when the 
grid would ask for it. Power delivered on request by the 
customer is more valuable than power delivered on deci-
sion by the supplier. 
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marginal costs. Third, central power systems may 
face significant over-capacities in generation plant 
that depress short-run marginal costs below the long-
run ones. Fourth, the marginal cost of electricity 
transport over the grid may increase because of grow-
ing power trade and because of difficulties in getting 
licences for new lines. Of course, the latter constraint 
should imply stimuli in favour of distributed re-
sources, but this is not reflected in the pricing of 
delivered surplus power by the distributed generators. 
 
Shortage power: make-up 
Make-up power is the power in top of the own pro-
duction required by a distributed generator for meet-
ing the own end-uses. Depending on the heat and 
electricity load profiles, the amount of make-up 
power tapped from the grid may be large or small, 
stable or fluctuating over time. In principle, make-up 
power should be billed to the distributed generator at 
the same tariffs conventional customers are charged. 
This is not always the case, because in some coun-
tries make-up power is charged at special rates based 
on arguments that make-up power shows more ir-
regular load profiles than normal electricity demand. 
Shortage power: back-up 
When the own generation plant is in forced outage 
most distributed generators will want to tap power 
from the grid, especially when the end-uses serve 
processes of high value or urgency. In many systems 
back-up power supplies by the grid carry high prices. 
This is the result of the joint occurrence of on the one 
hand applying the overall customer tariff on the back-
up supplies, and on the other hand the property that 
most of these non-linear or block tariffs encompass a 
high fixed (per kW) term. The appeal during very 
short duration on a significant back-up capacity will 
be charged then the full fixed term, what may involve 
a deadly bleeding for a distributed generation project. 
In principle, the distributed generator should have 
access to spot power priced accordingly or to con-
tracts for reserve power taking into account the insur-
ance costs that distributed generation imposes on the 
central system. 
High wheeling charges 
On some occasions, distributed generators may want 
to wheel power over the grid to related companies or 
to customers that are willing to pay a higher price for 
the surplus power or to producers that are charging a 
lower price for shortage power. These transactions 
are impeded when transporting power over the grid is 
loaded with predatory tariffs. 
Energy policy 
The terms of grid connection and grid interaction are 
crucial for the future of distributed power generation. 
Unfair systems cause economic efficiency losses 
inflicted on society, and make policy instruments 
ineffective, e.g. subsidies that policy makers assign to 
renewable energy projects, can be stripped off by 
vested power companies that control the conditions 
of grid connection. Of course, this outcome is not the 
target of the policy makers.  Market reform can im-
prove the terms of grid connection or it can blow up 
particular existing preference rules that were set up 
for promoting distributed power. A few years ago it 
was expected that distributed generation would de-
velop more fully when electricity markets were 
opened to competition that brings more exit and entry 
opportunities and more choice for market participants 
(COGEN Europe 1997b). Competition should de-
velop power tariffs reflecting the short-run marginal 
costs of supply. It should bring forward ranges of 
contracting opportunities (e.g. also covering reserve 
power deliveries) and it should free the access to the 
electricity transmission grids for third parties. How-
ever, fair competition in the electricity sector must be 
organised by enlightened regulators. Firm public 
policy and regulatory authority are necessary to in-
stall and safeguard harmonised conditions for all 
participants, transparency of the processes and un-
bundling of the main power supply functions. Most 
countries today still lack the intellectual and adminis-
trative capabilities for the foundation of authoritative 
regulatory services. This will lead to sub-optimal 
returns from the liberalisation process for options 
such as distributed generation and co-generation. 
The final settlement of grid conditions is the result 
of the interplay between technical and economic 
factors on the one hand and institutional and political 
deliberations on the other hand.  The latter delibera-
tions can bring forward solutions that subsidise or 
want to subsidise distributed solutions (e.g. the sys-
tem of green certificates or regulations stimulating 
the development of co-generation). Because of the 
environmental benefits of renewable and co-
generated power, this policy is justified. However, 
we argue that one always should try to keep situa-
tions, proposals and solutions transparent. On the one 
hand, the fair terms of grid connection should be 
spelled out. On the other hand, the subsidy measures 
should be stated and their interaction with the former 
terms studied. This way of discussion has at least two 
advantages. First, it helps to avoid situations where 
the subsidies are ripped off by grid owners or by 
incumbent power companies. Second, it keeps the 
minds clear for eventual changes in the terms of trade 
with the grid in the future. Distributed systems that 
are not robust for such changes, should receive lower 
priority than systems that are robust. 
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Abstract. Although Switzerland is not a EU-member coun-
try, in December 1999 the Swiss Parliament adopted the 
new Swiss Electricity Market Law (EML). The EML laid 
the foundations for reforming the Swiss electricity industry 
by moving from regulation to deregulation. The Swiss 
population will vote on this issue in late 2002. This change 
will be phased in gradually during a transitional period of 
seven years. This paper briefly describes the Swiss electric-
ity industry and details the reform plans set out in the law. 
It also analyses the impact of EML on the hydropower 
firms and offers an overview on the competitiveness of the 
hydropower sector in the deregulated market. 
Introduction 
Over the past two decades many EU-member coun-
tries have legislated either a gradual or full opening 
of their electricity markets. This process was begun 
in accordance with member countries’ obligations to 
implement the EU Electricity Directive 96/92/EC no 
later than February 1999. Although Switzerland is 
not an EU-member country, in December 1999 the 
Swiss Parliament adopted the new Swiss Electricity 
Market Law (EML). However, this Law has since 
been submitted to popular referendum.36 Therefore, 
the Swiss population will vote on this issue in late 
2002, and, if the EML is approved, the Swiss 
electricity market will be deregulated on January 
2003.  The EML lays the foundations for reforming the 
Swiss electricity industry by moving from regulation 
to deregulation. This change will be phased in gradu-
                                                           
33 This article is based on a report written for the Swiss 
Federal Office of Energy, Bern (Filippini et al., Perspek-
tiven für die Wasserkraftwerke in der Schweiz –
 Langfristige Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und mögliche Ver-
besserungspotenziale, December 2001). 
We would like to thank Cornelia Luchsinger and Jörg Wild 
for their helpful comments and research assistance. 
34 silvia.banfi@cepe.mavt.wthz.ch 
35 massimo.filippini@cepe.mavt.ethz.ch 
36 Federal laws, generally binding decisions of the Con-
federation, and State treaties concluded for an indefinite 
duration are subject to an optional referendum: in this case, 
a popular ballot is held if 50,000 citizens request it. The 
referendum is similar to a veto and has the effect of delay-
ing and safeguarding the political process by blocking 
amendments adopted by Parliament or the Government or 
delaying their effect..  
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ally during a transitional period of seven years. To-
day in Switzerland some fear that this reform will 
adversely affect the economic and financial situation 
of the hydropower plants. 
The purpose of this paper is to detail the reforms 
plans set out in the EML and to offer a first overview 
on the possible impacts of the reform on the competi-
tiveness of the hydropower sector.  
The article is organized as follows. In the next sec-
tion we briefly present the Swiss electric power in-
dustry. After that the main elements of the Swiss 
Electricity Market Law are discussed. The possible 
economic effects of the introduction of this Law on 
hydropower sector follow in section 3. Section 4 
concludes.  
The Swiss electric power industry 
The Swiss electric power industry is composed of 
about 1,170 firms, public and private, that are en-
gaged in the generation, transmission and/or distribu-
tion of electric power. There is great diversity of size 
and activity among these companies. Generally, we 
can distinguish three types of electric companies. The 
first type is characterized by companies that generate 
and transmit electricity. The second type is repre-
sented by electric companies that primarily distribute 
electricity. Finally, the third type of company per-
forms all three electric power system functions and is 
vertically integrated. Table 1 presents an overview of 
the composition of the Swiss electricity industry.  
Table 1. Number of electricity companies in Switzer-
land (1997) 
Generation and/or Transmission 90 
Generation, Transmission and Distribution 140 
Transmission and/or Distribution 940 
Total 1170 
Source: VSE, The Swiss Electricity Supply Industry Development 
and Structure, 1997. 
 
In the first group of companies we also find the so-
called partner company, where shareholders can 
claim electricity production in proportion to their 
share of capital. These partner companies are hydro-
power plants (storage) located in the Alps.  
In terms of numbers, utilities exclusively engaged 
in the distribution of electric power are dominant, 
comprising 74% of the total. The majority of these 
900 or so companies are municipals and provide 
power to their communities exclusively. The remain-
ing utilities operate within urban or regional areas. 
Part of this group of firms is involved in generation, 
transmission and distribution, but generally the 
amount of generated power is small and is deter-
mined by the ability to exploit favorable hydroelec-
tric power generation possibilities. There are few 
vertical integrated utilities that generate a large 
amount of power. The municipal and regional electric 
utilities purchase power mainly from the nine largest 
overland companies, which form the backbone of the 
industry. These larger vertically integrated companies 
provide most of the generated electricity and are also 
involved in the transmission and distribution of elec-
tricity to final consumers and municipal utilities. 
Moreover, these dominant companies own and con-
trol the trans-regional and the international grids, 
which are planned and used in close cooperation.  
This means that these companies are the relevant 
international actors for the exchange of electric 
power with neighboring countries.  
The characteristics of Swiss electric power genera-
tion are best illustrated with the aid of Table 2.  
Table 2. Characteristics of Swiss power generation 
sector (2000) 
Type of 
power plant 
In-
stalled 
capac-
ity 
MW 
In-
stalled 
capac-
ity  
in % 
Annual 
electricity 
production 
Gwh 
Annual 
electricity 
produc-
tion  
in % 
Hydro 
(Run-of-
river) 
 
3570 
 
20.8 
 
17566 
 
26.9 
Hydro  
(Storage) 
9600 55.9 20285  31 
Nuclear 3200 18.6 24949 38.2 
Thermal 
power 
plants and 
others 
 
790 
 
4.7 
 
2548 
 
3.9 
Total 17160 100 65348 100 
 
Source: Schweizerische Elektrizitätsstatistik, 2000, Swiss Federal 
Office of Energy, Bern. 
 
The Swiss electricity sector is almost exclusively 
based on hydropower generation (~58%) and on 
nuclear power generation (~38%). The production of 
electric power using thermal power plants or wind or 
photovoltaic energy is still limited (~4%). Run-of-
river hydro power plants and nuclear power plants 
are principally utilized to satisfy the electricity de-
mand at the national level during the medium and 
low load periods, whereas the storage and the 
pumped storage power plants are employed to satisfy 
the electricity demand during the high load periods. 
The Swiss Electricity Market Law (EML) 
With the introduction of the Electricity Market Law, 
the electricity sector of Switzerland will be reformed 
by moving from regulation to liberalization of some 
parts of the industry. At the end of the process, all 
customers will have the option to choose their energy 
supplier. The Swiss Electricity Market Law rewrites 
the rules that have traditionally governed all electric-
ity-related activities in Switzerland. The basic princi-
ples of this law involve turning generation and retail-
ing into competitive activities and allowing free ac-
cess to the transmission and distribution grids, which 
will remain regulated activities.   
The main characteristics of the EML include the 
following: 
1) A system of regulated third-party access to the 
networks and therefore wholesale and retail 
competition.  
2) Organisational unbundling of electricity trans-
mission at the extra high voltage level and other 
activities. As part of the regulatory reform, the 
high voltage transmission grid will be disin-
vested by the seven firms (Ueberlandwerke) cur-
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rently in control of the national grid. The na-
tional grid will be organised as a private com-
pany with the function of an independent system 
operator (ISO). 
3) Separation of accounting for generation, distribu-
tion/retail supply and non-electricity related ac-
tivities. 
4) The creation of a new institution, the Arbitration 
Commission, to act as an independent agency 
with responsibility for supervising transmission 
and distribution tariffs. 
5) A system based on bilateral contracts freely 
negotiated between buyers and sellers; therefore, 
a system without an independent system operator 
(ISO) that operates a centralized spot market.  
6) Power exchange with other countries based on 
the adoption of a reciprocity clause. However, a 
safeguard clause in the law ensures that access to 
the grid can be refused to suppliers from coun-
tries with less liberalised electricity markets. 
7) The EML allows qualified consumers to choose 
their electricity supplier. This element of the re-
form will phased in. In the first phase (first 3 
years) of the introduction of the reform the dis-
tribution companies will have the possibility to 
choose their electricity supplier for 20% of their 
supplies. Whereas in the second phase (second 3 
years) of the reform this share increases to 40%. 
After six years, the electricity market will be 
fully open to competition, which goes beyond 
the requirements of the EU Electricity Directive. 
The cost structure of the Swiss hydropower 
industry 
Although at the moment it is uncertain when the new 
electricity market law will be in force, some fear that 
power prices in the next years will decrease and that 
this decrease could have a negative impact on the 
financial situation of the hydropower producers. In 
order to analyse this impact, the Swiss government 
and the Swiss Electricity Supply Association have 
commissioned some studies on the issue of stranded 
investments due to the deregulation process.37 
In this paper, we employ another approach to ana-
lyse the impact of the EML on the competitiveness of 
hydropower firms. Our study is based on the com-
parison of the actual cost structure of a sample of 
hydropower firms with the expected market prices for 
the next ten years. In our analysis a firm is competi-
tive in the short-run, and therefore, does not shut 
down, if the market price is equal to or higher than 
the minimum of its average variable costs.38 This 
definition, considering that the majority of the Swiss 
hydropower firms will renovate their plants only after 
                                                           
37 Estimates of stranded investment of the electricity sector 
in Switzerland have been carried out for example by econ-
cept (1997) and CSFB (1997) 
38 In this analysis, due to the very long run character of the 
hydropower investments, short-run means 5 to 10 years  
2020, seems, from the economic point of view, ap-
propriate.  
Our analysis is based on the assumption that the 
cost structure of enterprises will not change signifi-
cantly over the next decade. This seems quite reason-
able since in recent years - in view of market liberali-
sation - important improvements in cost efficiency 
have been achieved. Operational costs (wages and 
maintenance) especially have been lowered. 
In addition, the potentials for capital cost reduction 
have been, as far as possible, exploited. Producers 
have carried out extraordinary depreciations, since 
they fear that in a liberalised market power prices 
will not be high enough to allow for an amortization 
of plants. Enterprises are largely unable to reduce 
interests’ payments on debt capital, since the capital 
market fixes interest rates. Consequently, it can be 
observed that interest payments vary according the 
development of interest rates, increasing during peri-
ods with high interest rates and decreasing when the 
interest rates fall. 
Dataset  
The analysis of the cost structure is based on a data-
set containing technical and economic information 
for a sample of 46 producers39. The dataset contains 
economic information derived from the annual re-
ports of the producers for four years (1990, 1995, 
1997, 1999), whereas the technical data are available 
for the year 1999. One major difficulty was to find 
meaningful criteria to allocate enterprises that gener-
ate electricity from several different types of plants to 
one specific hydropower category. 
For the analysis the following categories of hydro-
power plants were defined and allocation criteria 
used:  
1. Hydropower producers with an installed capac-
ity between 1 and 10 MW: This category includes 
all firms producing more than 50% of their power 
with plants that have an installed capacity between 1 
and 10 MW. This category usually has higher spe-
cific investment costs (costs per installed kW) and is 
therefore analyzed separately.40  
2. Run-of-river hydropower producers (exploit-
able drop below 25 m): This category includes all 
firms that produce more than 50% of their power 
with run-of-river plants having an exploitable drop 
below 25 meters. These plants have no storage capac-
ity and therefore have to produce continuously ac-
cording to the river’s seasonal and annual flows. 
Run-of-river plants with a small difference in eleva-
tion (less than 25 m) between catchment area and 
turbines are usually located along the large rivers in 
                                                           
39 From the original dataset we had to eliminate all those 
enterprises that are producers and distributors. At the mo-
ment it is not possible to discern the share of the costs of 
each activity.  
40 Elektrowatt 1998 
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the flat parts of the country. Further, they generate 
power constantly over the year.  
3. Run-of-river hydropower producers (exploit-
able drop above 25 m): This category includes all 
firms that produce more than 50% of their power 
with run-of-river plants having an exploitable drop 
above 25 meters. This category contains mostly the 
run-of-river plants located in the mountainous re-
gions of the country. Usually, these plants exploit the 
large altitude differences between the catchment area 
and the location of turbines. The water is usually led 
into pressure conduit systems. These producers often 
have problems with minimal flow requirements in the 
downstream reaches (between the point of catchment 
and the release of water into the river). Their power 
generation is larger during the summer period (higher 
flows of the mountain’s rivers).  
4. Producers using storage plants without pumps: 
This category contains all firms that produce more 
than 50% of the power with “pure” seasonal storage 
plants. They are usually located in the alpine regions 
of the country. Their investment costs (costs per 
installed kW) are significantly higher than those of 
run-of-river plants. These additional costs are com-
pensated for by focusing production on peak demand 
hours.  
5. Producers using storage plants with pumps: 
Firms assigned to this category use pumps whose 
capacity reaches more than 8% of the capacity of the 
turbines. The presence of pumps has an impact on 
investment costs (costs per installed kW). On the 
other hand, the water pumped in the reservoir during 
the off-peak period can be used to generate electricity 
during the peak-load periods, increasing the enter-
prise’s revenues. 
Table 3. Characteristics of the sample (data for the 
year 1999) 
Categories # of 
firms 
#  of 
plant
s 
∅ Installed 
capacity MW 
∅ output 
in GWh 
1-10 MW 5 8 5 24 
Run-of river 
(drop <25 m) 
7 8 59 346 
Run-of river 
(drop >25 m) 
11 27 91 342 
Storage with-
out pump 
11 27 217 434 
Storage with 
pump 
12 58 553 884 
Total sample 46 125 185 406 
Total Switzer-
land 
311 525 45 110 
 
The sample includes 46 firms with 125 power 
plants. Considering that in Switzerland there are 525 
hydropower plants with a capacity of more than 1 
MW, our sample includes about one fourth of all 
these plants.  
The figures in Table 3 show that the average size of 
the plants considered (185 MW) is much higher than 
the Swiss average (45 MW, only plants above 1 MW 
capacity). Consequently, the average power genera-
tion of the plants is much higher than the Swiss aver-
age (sample: 406 GWh; Swiss average: 110 GWh). In 
total, the sample plants generate more than 60% of 
power produced in Switzerland. Looking at the dif-
ferent plants’ categories, storage plants with pumps 
have the largest average capacity (553 MW) and 
annual generation (884 GWh). By contrast, the stor-
age plants without pumps considered in the sample 
are considerably smaller and produce about half as 
much power as storage plants with pumps. The two 
categories of run-of-river plants have very similar 
output levels, although some differences in their 
average capacity can be observed. Finally, the aver-
age installed capacity as well as the average output 
level of plants between 1 and 10 MW is very low, 
according to the definition of this category.  
Actual cost structure 
Fig. 1 shows the costs structure for the five categories 
of hydropower plants. The hydropower plants with a 
capacity between 1 and 10 MW have the lowest costs 
per kWh. Further, the run-of-river plants have below-
average costs. In contrast, the production costs of 
hydropower plants with storage possibilities are 
above average.  
Ct./ kWh 1999
0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00
Total (N=46)
Storage with pumps (N=12)
Storage without  pumps (N=11)
Run-of-River (>25m) (N=11)
Run-of-River (<25m) (N=7)
Hydropower plants 1-10 MW
(N=5)
Energy costs
Wages
Other  operational costs
Amort izat ion 
Interest payments
Dividend and legal provisions
Water royalt ies
direct taxes 
5.78
7.76
6.49
4.59
4.56
3.73
Fig. 1. Production costs for different categories of 
hydropower plants (1 CHF = 0.67 €) 
Over all categories, the variable costs of power 
generation – wages, energy and other operational 
costs – amount to 27% of total production costs, 
while 46% are related to capital costs (interest pay-
ments, amortizations, and legal provisions). This 
share is higher for the high capital-intensive hydro-
power plants with storage, where this costs’ category 
is responsible for more than 50% of total production 
costs. Finally, 27% of overall production costs are 
related to water royalties and taxes. This share is 
higher for those plants with low operational and capi-
tal costs (i.e. plants with a capacity between 1 and 10 
MW and run-of-river plants).  
Variable costs and output level 
In order to identify the factors decisive for the level 
of production cost of firms, it seems reasonable to 
look at the variable and the fixed production costs 
separately. We assume that different elements affect 
the level of these two cost categories.  
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Fig. 2. Relationship between output and specific 
variable costs of production (labour, energy and other 
operational costs, 1 CHF = 0.67 €) 
Fig. 2 illustrates the relationship between the vari-
able production costs and the annual power genera-
tion (in GWh) for the five categories of hydropower 
plants. The level of variable costs varies considera-
bly, between categories as well as between plants of 
the same category and with similar levels of produc-
tion (see for example the variable production costs of 
storage plants with pumps). Within the same category 
of power plants variable production costs vary by a 
factor of two or more. These differences can be ex-
plained either by site-specific characteristics - and 
thus differences in the maintenance of the plants - or 
by different efficiency levels.  
Storage plants with pumps show decreasing vari-
able costs with an increase in output level. For the 
other categories this relationship seems to be weaker. 
Given the small number of enterprises considered 
in each category, these results are to be interpreted 
carefully. In the next step of analysis we plan to carry 
out econometric analysis with a larger sample in 
order to identify more definitively the presence of 
economies of scale in production.  
Capital costs 
Investments in new storage plants or in enlargement 
of existing plants imply considerable investment 
costs (costs per installed kW). These can be compen-
sated for either by an increase in the output level or 
by a change in the production pattern i.e. an increase 
in peak load generation (an increase in the average 
market price).  
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Fig. 3. Relationship between capacity installed and 
specific capital costs (amortization, interest pay-
ments, dividends, legal provisions, 1 CHF = 0.67 €) 
Fig. 3 shows the relationship between specific capi-
tal costs (sum of amortizations, interest payments, 
dividends and legal provision) and installed capacity.  
On the one hand, increasing capacity implies 
higher capital costs: investment costs (costs per in-
stalled kW), and therefore amortizations and interest 
payments, are positively related to the capacity in-
stalled. On the other hand, this cost-increasing effect 
can be partly offset by an increase in the production 
level.41 Probably because of the small sample, it is 
difficult to identify clearly how capital costs vary 
with the capacity installed.  
Fig. 4  illustrates the development of specific capi-
tal costs according to the age of the plant (years since 
plant construction). As expected, specific capital 
costs are lower for older plants. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that a larger share of the value of 
the plant has already been depreciated.  
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Fig. 4. Relationship between year of construction and 
specific capital cost (amortization, interest payments, 
dividends, legal provisions, 1 CHF = 0.67 €) 
Comparison of the production costs with the 
expected prices 
In this part of the paper we compare the specific 
actual costs of the hydropower firms in our sample 
with the expected power prices for the next years 
                                                           
41 One objective of an increase in the capacity installed 
can be an increase in production in peak load periods, 
leaving the total annual production unchanged.  
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(Table 3, prices expected by Swiss producers). This 
comparison will show whether or not some firms 
from our sample will be able to cover their variable 
costs. From the theory we know that in the short run, 
hydropower plants will operate as long as electricity 
market prices cover at least the variable costs of 
production. 
Table 3. Forecast of electricity market prices (1 CHF 
= 0.67 €)  
Period Peak (Cts./kWh) Off-peak (cts./kWh) 
2003-7 5-6 3-4 
 
Source: Econcept (1997) and information of Swiss electricity 
producers 
 
On the basis of our sample of 46 enterprises, it is 
possible to look in more detail at the production costs 
and average prices of each enterprise. 
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Fig. 5. Variable specific production costs and average 
market prices of the enterprises in the sample (N=46), 
peak market price: 5.5 Ct./kWh; off-peak price = 3.5 
Ct./kWh (1 CHF = 0.67 €) 
Fig. 5 shows the variable production costs as well 
as the costs of taxes and water royalties and, as indi-
cated by a thin line, the average market price of en-
terprises. We calculate the average price taking into 
consideration the production structure of enterprises. 
For storage plants we have assumed that production 
takes place primarily in peak periods and only secon-
darily in off-peak periods. Run-of-river plants are not 
able to adapt production to the different load periods. 
Therefore we assume a constant production pattern 
across the day and the year42. The output in each 
load period is priced according to its corresponding 
market prices (Table 3). 
If we compare the expected short-run prices with 
the variable production costs (including taxes and 
royalties) we see that the great majority of enterprises 
will be able to cover at least their variable costs. Only 
those producers with the highest specific operational 
costs will have difficulty covering them.  
Since small plants (with capacities between 1 and 
10 MW) have low operational costs they do not seem 
to incur such problems in the short run. The same 
holds for the storage plants with pumps. Although 
                                                           
42 We consider the differences between hibernal and sum-
mer production levels.  
they have higher average operational costs, the prices 
they achieve are also higher than those of run-of-river 
plants. The other categories have only a few enter-
prises with variable costs above or near average 
prices. For a majority of enterprises, the difference 
between specific variable costs and prices is high 
enough to allow for small variations in price level or 
costs without having an impact on the short-run deci-
sion of whether or not to generate.  
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Fig. 6. Total specific production costs and average 
market prices of the enterprises in the sample (N=46), 
peak market price: 5.5 Ct./kWh; off-peak price = 3.5 
Ct./kWh 
Including the capital costs obviously dramatically 
changes the situation concerning the economic per-
formance of enterprises.  
Although the specific costs in Fig. 6 could repre-
sent an upper limit of effective capital costs (due to 
extraordinary amortization carried out in view of 
market liberalization), several enterprises will not be 
able to cover their capital costs. Particularly among 
the capital-intensive storage plants with pumps, the 
forecasted market prices could imply important 
stranded investments.  
Conclusion 
The new Electricity Market Law will bring about a 
liberalization of some parts of this industry. It is 
expected that in the short term, in a European market 
situation characterised by over-capacities, power 
market prices will fall. As a result, some fear that 
Swiss hydropower plants will encounter economic 
and financial problems and, in the worst case, could 
be obliged to shut down.  
An analysis of the cost structure of hydropower 
plants and a comparison of the expected specific 
revenues with production costs yields the following 
conclusions:  
1) In the short run only a few producers will have 
financial difficulties covering operational (vari-
able) costs. Therefore, the majority of the Swiss 
hydropower firms will not shut down their 
activities.  
2) Some firms of our sample present very high 
variable costs. We believe that these firms have 
the potential for optimisation and efficiency in-
creases.  
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3) In the short run several power plants will be 
unable to cover the full production costs. Capi-
tal-intensive hydropower plants (plants with 
storage) will be particularly affected.  
4) In the long run, the competitiveness of the hy-
dropower sector will be determined by the capa-
bility of the producers to renovate, and therefore 
to re-invest in, their plants. The expected long-
run market prices will be decisive for these in-
vestment decisions. 
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